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I.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioners submit this Reply Brief in response to the joint brief filed on behalf of
Respondent, Payette County (the "County"), and the Intervenor, Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc.
("AEHI"). AEHI and the County (collectively "Respondents") have asked the Court to excuse
the many procedural defects and substantive errors in the County's approval of AEHI's
conditional rezone and uphold the County's improper actions.

Their arguments lack merit.

Under the facts and the applicable law, it is clear that the Petitioners have standing to pursue this
appeal and that the rezone and accompanying development agreement are both procedurally and
substantively improper.
II.
LEGAL ARGUMENT

A.

Petitioners Have Standing to Pursue Their Petition for Judicial Review.

Respondents persist in their argument that the Petitioners lack standing to pursue their
Petition for Judicial Review. In pressing that argument, Respondents seek to have this Court
impose a standard different than that adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in land use cases such
as this one. The Idaho Supreme Court has made the standard to gain standing in a land use case
perfectly clear:
"To have standing in a land use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not prove,
only that the development could potentially harm his or her real estate interests."

Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224,
1227 (2011). See also, Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) (the existence of
real or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision). This standard has been
applied to confer standing on nearby property owners and residents on a number of occasions
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where the potential harm to the neighboring property owners is not nearly as significant or severe
as is the case here. 1
In this case, Petitioners have alleged that their properties all lie within the ten mile
"Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone" the ("EPZ") of the approved power plant
as determined by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. R. p. 3467-3482; 3666-3667. The EPZ is defined as the area for which
planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective action can be taken to protect the public in
the event of an accident. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E; "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants",
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev.1, November 1980. For those within the EPZ, protection is
needed from exposure to radiation from the passing plume from a release resulting from an
accident at a nuclear power plant. Id The significance of having one's property located within
the EPZ is aptly illustrated by the requirement, among many others, imposed on nuclear power
plant operators to assure the actual availability of medical service providers in the vicinity of the
nuclear power plant capable of and qualified to treat residents of the EPZ for exposure to nuclear
radiation, a mere list of existing medical facilities being insufficient.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(12);

GUARD v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir 1984).

In

the EPZ the requirement to seek shelter and/or evacuate are considered the principle immediate
protective actions recommended for the general public.

10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

Thus, as

pointed out in Petitioners' opening brief, in the event of an accident at the approved plant, the

1

Taylor v. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) (adjacent landowner
objecting to conditional rezone is an affected person); Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 204 P.3d 1127
(2009) (adjoining property owner affected by increased housing density is viewed an affected person); Cowan v.
Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (landowners affected by adjacent
subdivision development); Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116
(2005) (petitioners affected because they might smell proposed wastewater treatment plant over three miles distant).
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individual Petitioners may be required to evacuate their homes, leaving their possessions and
animals, including livestock, behind. Those individuals in the EPZ, at the same time they were
given an evacuation notice, would have to deal with making arrangements for farm animals and
will have the impossible task of trying to put all of their livestock under shelter and then feed
them only covered, stored feed and provide water only from protected containers. Id.
In addition to the harm to their real estate interests as a result of being located within the
EPZ, the Petitioners have alleged that they will suffer injury and harm from the routine emissions
of radioactive water from the approved nuclear reactor, exposing the Petitioners to radioactive
materials which are recognized carcinogens. R. p. 3660-3667. These discharges occur as a part
of the routine, allowed operation of nuclear power plants in the United States, above any
naturally occurring amounts and apart from accidents or leaks. Nuclear facilities are allowed to
emit radioactive substances as a part of normal operation not because such emissions carry no
risks, but because they are unavoidable. R. p. 3692.
Moreover, Petitioners have alleged that they will suffer immediate economic harm due to
the diminished value of their properties caused by the mere possibility that a nuclear power plant
may be built in their community. That economic harm will persist for at least the 20-year term
of the development agreement and, if the development agreement is extended in accordance with
its terms, or if the nuclear power plant is actually built, the economic hann will persist longer,
and possibly, indefinitely. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 98-101. In addition, Petitioners have alleged that
approval of the power plant will interfere with the established business, commercial and
agricultural operations and uses of their properties. R. p. 3647-3661. These allegations of harm
certainly meet and exceed the standards set forth in the cases cited above and are clearly
sufficient to confer standing on the Petitioners.
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Citing to, In The Matter of the Jerome County Board of Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298,
281 P.3d 1076 (2012), Respondents argue that the test for standing to pursue a petition for
judicial review quoted above incorporates the general constitutional requirements for standing,
requiring a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. While the court In The Matter of the Jerome
County Board of Commissioners, supra, did make passing reference to several basic propositions
regarding standing, it nevertheless proceeded to analyze the various standing issues raised in that
case under the provisions of LC. § 67-6521, nowhere suggesting that the standards contained in
that statute were insufficient, incomplete or improper, saying:
"Next, we find that the record contains sufficient allegations that the LCO
could potentially harm the individual property owners' real estate and health
interests. See Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. Of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231,
254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (citing Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73
P.3d 84, 89 (2003)); see also Davisco Foods Int'!, Inc. v. Gooding Cnty., 141
Idaho 784, 787, 118 P.3d 116, 119 (2005) (finding property interest adversely
affected by possibility to smell odors on property sufficient for standing in special
use permit proceeding). Evidence was presented to the Board regarding probable
compromised resale value of existing homes in the area, odors, and possible
health concerns. These could each be categorized as threatened harm."
281 P .3d at 1087. The allegations made by Petitioners here are no less significant than those
found to be sufficient in that case.
The Petitioners have, nevertheless, alleged a sufficiently particularized harm to be
pennitted to pursue this action even if the non-LLUPA standard promoted by Respondents is
adopted. The Idaho Supreme Court in Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757
(1989) adopted the following criterion for standing in a declaratory judgment case:
[T]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking
to invoke the court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the
court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
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questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement
of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a
"distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly
traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct.
Id at 641, 778 P.2d at 76 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438

U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)) (citations omitted). In lvfiles, the plaintiff,
Miles, brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of certain
legislation enacted pursuant to an agreement between Idaho Power and the State, the effect of
which would force ratepayers to pay for equipment that was rendered useless under the
agreement. Id at 638, 778 P.2d at 760. The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Miles had
standing because the ratepayers injured by the legislation did not constitute the entirety of Idaho
citizens or taxpayers. Id at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. The Supreme Court explained that:
This is more than a generalized grievance. It is a specialized and
peculiar injury, although it may affect a large class of
individuals. The political process obviously will be more unkind
to injured ratepayers seeking to change legislation affecting the
whole state of Idaho than to injured citizens and taxpayers. When
the impact of legislation is not felt by the entire populace, but
only by a selected class of citizens, the standing doctrine should
not be evoked to usurp the right to challenge the alleged denial
of constitutional rights in a judicial forum. (Emphasis added.)
Id Accordingly, even if the legislation harms a large class of individuals, that harm can still be

particularized.
When the alleged grievance relates to the party's status as a landowner "it is the quality
or magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large
in order to confer standing." Student Loan Fund ofIdaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824,
827, 875 P.2d 236,239 (1994). In that regard, the situs of property is relevant to standing to the
extent the property's location exposes the landowner to peculiarized harm. Id at 828, 875 P.2d at
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240. This criterion was applied in Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 499, 960 P.2d 181, 182
(1998). Butters sought a declaratory judgment that a newly enacted zoning ordinance was void.
Id.

Under the newly enacted ordinance, a neighbor, Hauser, was granted a conditional use

permit that allowed him to build a radio transmission control tower. Id. Butters complained that
the tower loomed over her land and required her to install an expensive new telephone system in
order to eliminate the radio tower's electrical interference. Id. at 501, 960 P.2d at 184. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hauser, finding that Butters' injuries were
not unique to her. Id. at 500, 960 P.2d at 183. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed holding that
"[a]lthough the location of [Butters'] property alone does not confer standing, the location does
expose her to peculiarized harm." Id. at 501, 960 P.2d at 184. The Supreme Court concluded
that Butters had "shown a peculiarized harm as a result of the conditional use permit" and
therefore, that she had "standing to pursue a declaratory judgment action regarding the validity
of the ordinance amendment." Id.
In Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 516, 248 P.3d 1243, 1251 (2011), the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized that "a party whose property had been downzoned by the 2008 zoning
amendments would unquestionably have standing to bring this action, as would a property owner
who could show a specific palpable harm that he would incur from the imminent development of
an upzoned neighboring property."

Similarly in Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of

Commissioners, 151 Idaho 123, 128, 254 P.3d 24, 29 (2011), Kootenai County argued that the
plaintiff, Ciszek, lacked standing to bring a declaratory judgment action arguing that Ciszek
failed to alleged "particularized harm." Id. Ciszek alleged that "her property is adjacent to the
new mining rezone and that that there will be 'detrimental dust, noise and traffic created' by new
mining activity taking place adjacent to her prope1iy. She also alleges that her property values
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will decrease by over $10,000 as a result of the rezones."

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Comi

determined, based on these allegations, that Ciszek had standing, finding that "Ciszek' s
allegations of interference with the use and enjoyment of her prope1iy, as well as decreased
property values, are sufficient to demonstrate a particularized harm." Id.
Therefore, according the above-cited cases, an injury can be particularized even if
suffered by a large class of individuals as long as it is not a grievance suffered by the general
populace.

Furthermore, even though situs of a property alone does not confer standing,

proximity can be used to demonstrate a particularized injury.

Moreover, allegations of

interference with the use and enjoyment of property, as well as decreased property values, are
sufficient to demonstrate a particularized harm.
As summarized above, the Petitioners have alleged that the location of their properties in
relation to the approved nuclear power plant exposes them to particularized harm. For example,
each of the Petitioners owns and/or resides upon property within the ten mile EPZ wherein they
constitute the population most subject to risk of exposure to radiation from an accidental release
from the power plant.

See, NUREG-0654, supra. 2

Petitioners have also alleged that the

locations of their properties in relation to the approved nuclear power plant exposes them to
routine emissions of radioactive water, a known carcinogen, a risk not shared by those owning
properties and residing more distant from the power plant. R. p. 3665-3666. In addition, the
Petitioners have alleged that the approved nuclear power plant will otherwise interfere with the
use and enjoyment of their properties. For example, Jeffrey Weber alleges that the dog kennel
and training business he operates on his property will no longer be a viable use (R. p. 3657), and
H-Hook alleges that the construction and operation of the approved nuclear power plant would

2

Although somewhat large in area, the teu mile diameter Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone does
not encompass the entirety of Payette County but only a portion thereof. See, R. p. 13.
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interfere with the normal ranching operations on its lands which are immediately adjacent to the
subject site. R. p. 3662-3665.
The Petitioners have also alleged that increased traffic along Big Willow, Stone Quarry
and Little Willow Roads 3 and the associated noise and dust both during and after construction of
the plant will disrupt and interfere with the normal agricultural and commercial activities
conducted on their properties. Id. To be clear, Petitioners do not, as AEHI seems to believe,
demand the exclusive right to use those roads. Petitioners' objection is to the adverse impact on,
and interference with, Petitioners established uses resulting from the new, different and excessive
uses of those roads in connection with the construction and operation of AEHI's power plant.4
As a result of these immediate and future adverse impacts, Petitioners have alleged that
the marketability of their properties has been negatively impacted and that the values of their
properties have been diminished.

Id.

The diminution in value of some of the Petitioners

properties is measured in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars. 5 The
particularized harms shown by the Petitioners in this case are much greater than was found to be
sufficient in Miles, Butters, Martin and Ciszek.

3

Respondents claim that the County's approval of the nuclear power plant was made conditioned on AEHI not
using Little Willow Road. However, use of that road is far from foreclosed. The 20 year Development Agreement,
at Condition No. 11 does seek to restrict use of Little Willow Road by contractors and subcontractors, but leaves
enforcement of the restriction to be accomplished entirely by AEHI by "making the concept clear in its contractual
arrangements with construction contractors", an enforcement mechanism of dubious value. And, the same condition
reopens the door to use of Little Willow Road as an "emergency access", the nature and enforcement of which is
undefined.
4
Moreover, although these are public roads, they exist within prescriptive easements on Petitioners' properties.
Change in the nature and extent of the uses of those roads will, especially when AEHI' s uses interfere with the
established uses by Petitioners, clearly injure Petitioners' real estate interests.
5
See Affidavits of John W. Buriiie, Jeffrey G. Weber, Thomas F. Pence, Clifford D. Morgan, James S. Underwood,
Michael Humphreys, Tom Roland, Pat Thacker and Mark Richey, discussed more fully in Section II. I. of this reply
brief, below, all of which have been filed in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State ofldaho and
for the County of Payette in a case entitled John W. Burlile, et al vs. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., et al, Case
No.CV-2012-364. The Petitioners request the Comito take judicial notice of those affidavits pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Evidence 201. Copies of the Affidavits are attached in Appendix A to this brief for the Court's
convenience.

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF, Page 8

Finally, like they did in connection with the County's approval of the related variance,
attempts to argue that the Petitioners may not rely on the potential harm to their persons
and properties arising out of the radiological risks associated with property ownership adjacent to
or in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant to establish the requisite adverse impact for them to
have standing to contest the county's approval of the conditional rezone because safety and
health effects of nuclear power are matters preempted by Federal law.
misperceive the Petitioners' position in respect to these harms.

Respondents still

By pointing out the risks

associated with nuclear power plants and the potential harm that may befall neighboring property
owners if those risks are realized, the Petitioners do not suggest that the County should enter the
field of regulating the safety of nuclear power plants. Rather, Petitioners simply intend to
establish that they have the requisite standing to contest the County's land use decisions which
are certainly within the County's purview.
As pointed out above, to have standing in a land use case, the Petitioners need to allege
that the development could potentially harm their real estate interests. Among the harms the
nuclear power plant may visit upon the Petitioners includes both the potential of a nuclear
accident and also the immediate impact on the value and marketability of their properties
resulting from the threat of such an accident. Consideration of these effects are not preempted
by Federal law. As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Gas and Electric
Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190,
103 S.Ct. 1713, (1983):
"Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear powered electricity
generation: The Federal government maintains complete control of the safety and
'nuclear' aspects of energy generation; the states exercise their traditional
authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating
facilities to be licensed, land use, rate making and the like."
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461 U.S. at 211-212.
Both of the cases cited by AEHI in support of its preemption argument6 recognize the
dual role created by Congress providing for federal control over nuclear safety but reserving to
states their traditional authority over matters such as land use. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-AfcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d. 443
(1984) made it clear that while the federal government has exclusive control over safety
standards applicable to nuclear plants, state law remedies for injuries caused by nuclear incidents
were not preempted. 464 U.S. at 256, 104 S.Ct. at 625-626. The issue here is similar. Petitioners
do not ask the County to enter the field of regulating the safety of nuclear power plants.
Petitioners simply rely, in part, on the risk of injury to their persons and property from the
routine operation of a nuclear power plant and/or a nuclear incident in order to make the showing
of harm required by state law in order for them to contest the land use action taken by the
County. The Petitioners are only seeking their state law remedies made available by judicial
review.
Certainly, this Court in being called upon to dete1mine whether the Petitioners have
standing to contest the County's actions in approving a conditional rezone permitting the
development of a nuclear power plant is not required to ignore the real and substantial haims that
may result from that power plant and which the Court is required to determine do exist, simply
because the Federal government has the ultimate say on safety issues. Said simply, there is no
question but that the Petitioners are adversely affected by the approval of the conditional rezone
which permits a nuclear power plant. Notwithstanding AEHI's protestations to the contrary, the
Petitioners have standing to contest the County's land use decisions.

6

Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission,
461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983) and U.S. v. City o/New York, 463 F.Supp. 604 (SDNY 1978).
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Conditional Rezone is
Comprehensive Plan.

Because it is Based Upon an

The Petitioners have pointed out that under the holding in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates,

Inc. v. City ofHailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999) the County's conditional rezone of the
subject property from Agricultural to Industrial was invalid because the County's
Comprehensive Plan is invalid. The County's Comprehensive Plan is invalid because it does not
include an analysis showing general plans for power plant sites, an element required to be
included in every comprehensive plan by LC.§ 67-6508.

This missing element from the

County's Comprehensive Plan is clearly critical to the issue in this case since the very purpose
for the conditional rezone granted by the County was to permit AEHI to construct a power plant.
In response to this defect in the County's Comprehensive Plan, Respondents first argue
that the Petitioners originally raised the issue of the invalidity of the County's Comprehensive
Plan over two years ago during the County's hearings on AEHI's application to amend the
County's Comprehensive Plan Map, an observation that is entirely correct. As pointed out in
Petitioners' opening brief, Petitioners did, in fact, raise the issue of the invalidity of the County's
Comprehensive Plan during the 2009-2010 public hearing process in which AEHI requested that
the County's Comprehensive Plan Map be amended to reclassify the subject property from
Agricultural to Industrial.

In response to the Petitioners' warning, the County attempted to

remedy the defect in its Comprehensive Plan by amending the text of the Plan to add language
providing that energy producers who wish to locate energy production facilities in Payette
County must apply to Payette County and each application will be considered on an ad hoc basis.
R. p. 3883.
Since there is no right to seek judicial review of an amendment to a county
comprehensive plan (Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238
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(2008)), the issue was raised again by Petitioners during the public hearing process on AEHI's
request for the conditional rezone which is the subject of this action. 7 In that instance, the
Petitioners advised the County that if approved, the conditional rezone would be invalid because,
despite the County's 20 IO amendment to its Comprehensive Plan, the Comprehensive Plan was
still invalid by reason of its continued failure to include an analysis showing general plans for
power plant sites. R. p. 3674-3676.
The fact that the Petitioners raised the issue with the County during the administrative
process does not disqualify the Petitioners from raising the issue on appeal to this Court. Indeed,
had the Petitioners failed to raise the issue before the County, Respondents would undoubtedly
argue that the issue was waived and could not be raised in this action. The Petitioners diligence
in warning the County of the defect in its Comprehensive Plan provides no basis to now excuse
the County from performing its statutory duty. To the contrary, the County's continued refusal
to perform that statutory duty in spite of the Petitioners repeated request that it do so,
demonstrates and highlights the County's determination to approve AEHI's applications, no
matter what the applicable law might otherwise require.
Respondents next argue that the adoption of a comprehensive plan is a legislative act
entitled to great deference.

Respondents apparently hope that, by so labeling the County's

action, the Court will not hold the County to the standard required by LC. § 67-6508. In support
of that proposition, Respondents cite to Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada
County, IOI Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) and Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville
County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (1982). Neither case, however, provides support for the

7

The propriety of the County's amendment to its comprehensive plan is, however, the subject of a separate
declaratory judgment action brought by some of the Petitioners, presently pending before this Court.
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proposition that the Court should defer to a county's legislative action in adopting a
comprehensive plan which fails to conform to the requirements of the applicable statute.
Cooper was an appeal of the Board of Ada County Commissioners' denial of Cooper's

and Edmunds' application for a rezone of certain prope1iy.

The denial of the rezone was

overturned due to the failure of the Board to afford Cooper and Edmunds the procedural due
process to which they were entitled. Although the Court discussed the distinction between
legislative actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans, which are subject to limited
review by the courts, and quasi judicial actions, such as granting rezones, which are subject to
greater review, nowhere in that case did the court suggest that counties are free to ignore the
requirements of I.C. § 67-6508 in the adoption of their comprehensive plans. Similarly, Gay was
an appeal of the action of the Bonneville County Commissioners permitting the construction of a
fertilizer storage and blending facility in an agricultural zone. Relying on Cooper, the court
concluded that approving a change of authorized land use is a quasi judicial action requiring the
application of procedural due process protections and that the county had failed to provide such
protections in granting that approval. Like the Cooper case, however, nowhere did the court
suggest that counties are not required to conform to the requirements of LC. § 67-6508 in
adopting their comprehensive plans.
In any event, whatever deference the County may be entitled to in the adoption of its

comprehensive plan does not extend to the County's failure to include in its plan a statutorily
required element. The law in this state is clear: " ... a valid comprehensive plan must contain
each of the components as specified in section 67-6508." Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, 133
Idaho at 321. If it does not, the plan is invalid and any zoning ordinance adopted under it is
invalid. Id.
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Respondents next argue that since the County worked really hard, involved numerous
people and incurred great expense in the adoption of its Comprehensive Plan in 2006, the County
should be excused from failing to include in that Plan a required element Respondents provide
no authority for such a proposition and Petitioners are aware of none. Notwithstanding the
County's purported efforts, the adopted Comprehensive Plan is defective and fails to conform to
the requirements of the statute.
Next, Respondents argue that the County's Comprehensive Plan as originally written in
2006 does, in fact, include an analysis showing general plans for power plant sites. In support,
they point to language in the Comprehensive Plan which acknowledges that Idaho Power
supplies electricity in Payette County and that electricity is generated by several hydroelectric
facilities in the region (including a power plant not mentioned in the comprehensive plan), and
ask the Court to conclude that such treatment of the topic is sufficient analysis of general plans
for power plant sites. The comprehensive plan, they argue, is not a facility siting statute.
The Petitioners have never called for the County to adopt a facility siting statute. The
Petitioners do believe, however, that in order to comply with the applicable statute, some effort
should be made to include provisions in the plan to guide the siting of power plants. The
Petitioners do expect that the County should be required to fulfill its duty to "consider previous
and existing conditions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or
desirable future situations for each planning component" including "an analysis showing general
plans for ... power plant sites ... ". LC. § 67-6508. The Petitioners also believe that compliance
with the statute's requirement to generally plan for power plant sites is not achieved by providing
in the County's comprehensive plan that applications for power plant sites be addressed on a
case by case basis without any prior planning. In adopting that ad hoc approach to approving
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power plant sites, the County has, in fact, expressly refused to plan for such facilities in direct
contravention of the requirements of this statute. There is simply no other reasonable way to
describe the County's approach to the issue. As a result, under the holding of Sprenger, Grubb
& Associates, the County's comprehensive plan is invalid and the conditional rezone of the
subject property is likewise invalid.
C.

The Conditional Rezone Constitutes Spot Zoning.

The Respondents' sole defense to Petitioner's spot zoning claims is that the rezone is not
illegal spot zoning because it allegedly meets the type one spot zoning test. (Respondent's Brief
at 19.) Respondents, completely ignoring the type two spot zoning test, argue that a court need
not address type two spot zoning if a rezone meets the type one test. Their arguments, however,
fail for t\vo reasons. First, the rezone is invalid under the type one test. Second, even if the
rezone met the type one test, it does not meet the type two test, and contrary to their argument, a
rezone can still be invalid as type two spot zoning even if it meets the type one test.
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that there are two forms of spot zoning, or
ways in which a rezone is not in accord with the comprehensive plan. Evans v. Teton County,
139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). As set forth in Petitioner's opening brief, according to
Evans, type one spot zoning is a rezoning of property for a use prohibited by the original zoning
classification. Id at 77, 73 P.3d 90. If the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive
plan, it is not invalid as type one spot zoning. Id That said, it may still be prohibited as type
two spot zoning if the zoning change "singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the
permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property
owner." Id
Contrary to Respondents' erroneous assertion, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
Taylor v. Canyon County Ed of Comm 'rs, supra did not change this analysis; it did not make
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"type two" spot zoning a nullity. In fact, the Taylor decision confirmed the analysis originally
set forth in Evans. Id at 436-37, 210 P.3d at 544-45. The Taylor court, quoting the Evans
decision, reaffirmed that there are two types of spot zoning and that "'the test for whether type
one spot zoning is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive plan"'
and that a zoning change may still be prohibited as type two spot zoning if the change "singles
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district
for the benefit of an individual property owner." Id. at 436,210 P.3d at 544 (quoting Evans, 139
Idaho at 77, 73 P.3d at 90).
In Taylor, contrary to Respondents' asse1iion, the Supreme Court did not hold that courts
need not consider whether type two spot zoning occurred if the spot zone meets the type one spot
zone test. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the only spot zoning at issue in the case was type
one spot zoning and that the type one spot zoning that occurred was valid because it was in
conformance with the comprehensive plan. Id. at 437, 210 P.3d at 545. Specifically the Court
stated that "the Vicker's claim of spot zoning need not be addressed since the type one spot
zoning that occurred in this case is valid." Id. The Court agreed with Canyon County that "only
type one spot zoning occurred in [the] case." Id. at 436, 210 P.3d at 544. Thus, the Taylor
decision is distinguishable on the facts because the Court in Taylor did not hold that type two
spot zoning should not be considered if the spot zone meets the type one test, but instead found
that the only possible type of spot zoning that occurred was type one spot zoning. Reading the
Taylor decision otherwise would be contrary to the facts of the case. Furthermore, such a

reading would make type two spot zoning a nullity because, under such a reading, if the zone
meets the type one test it is valid and if does not meet the type one test, there is no need to
determine the spot zone's validity under type two spot zoning because it is invalid under type
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one. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has not evinced any intention to make type two spot
zoning a nullity.
Rezone Fails as Illegal Type One Spot Zoning.
Respondents argue that the rezone does not constitute spot zoning because it is in accord
with the Payette County Comprehensive Plan. Their argument fails for several reasons.

As

described in Petitioners' opening brief and in Part II.B of this brief, the manner in which the
Comprehensive Plan was amended to authorize the project in and of itself violates the spirit of
the rules against spot zoning. Indeed, it could be said that the comprehensive plan was "spot"
amended because it was amended at the request of AEHI specifically to allow for a rezone to
take place for a use that was inconsistent with the permitted uses in the rest of the zoning district
for the benefit of an individual property owner.
Also as set forth in Petitioners' opening brief and in Part II.B of this brief, the manner in
which the Comprehensive Plan was amended to allow for this inconsistent use was in
contravention of the Local Land Use Planning Act.

LC. § 67-6508.

In fact, the invalid

amendment to the Comprehensive Plan, in application, mandates that sites for power plants be
"spot zoned." That amendment provides that "[e]nergy producers who wish to locate electric,
gas or other energy production facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County
Planning and Zoning Department and each application will be considered on an individual basis
in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act (LC.§ 67-6500 et seq.),
Payette County Code and this plan." R. p. 3883. Thus, under the improper amendment, there is
no power plant provision that the rezone can be in accord with. Consequently, the rezone is
invalid as type one spot zoning. The Respondents' interpretation that the amendment authorizes
the rezone must be rejected because it conflicts with the plain language of the amendment and
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because under such interpretation, the County would have free reign to engage in type one spot
zoning for power plants because under the amendment, power plants can be located anywhere.
There would be no zone that is off limits. Under such interpretation, all a power plant developer
has to do is request a rezone and that rezone will conform to this improper amendment of the
Comprehensive Plan.
Moreover, it is clear that this amendment was requested by AEHI to specifically
authorize its plan to engage in illegal spot zoning.

Respondents, however, should not be

permitted to circumvent the prohibitions on spot zoning, by amending the comprehensive plan to
allow spot zoning to occur. Accordingly, the Court should find that the spot zoning performed
pursuant to the invalid Comprehensive Plan is improper.
2.

The Rezone Fails as Illegal Type Two Spot Zoning.

As set forth above, even if the spot zoning that occurred in this case meets the test for
validity under type one spot zoning, it must still be scrutinized as to whether it constitutes illegal
type two spot zoning. In that regard, the spot zoning that occurred in this case is quintessential
type two spot zoning. There was no evidence presented that the surrounding area had changed
from agricultural to heavy industrial. To the contrary, the Payette County Commission found
that "the surrounding uses include agriculture, confined animal feeding operations, a county
landfill and residential." R. p. 4156. In sum, the rezone impermissibly singled out a parcel of
land in the midst of a wide swath of agricultural land and changed the classification from
agricultural to "I-2 (Heavy Industrial)" solely for the economic benefit of the developer and
owner.

By so doing, the County permitted "a use of that parcel inconsistent with the use

permitted in the rest of the district... merely for private gain." Dawson Ente1prises, Inc. v. Blaine
County, 98 Idaho 506, 515, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266 (1977); see also Balser v. Kootenai County Bd.
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of Com'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986) (landowner not entitled to change existing zone

classification from agricultural to industrial where, among other things, the requested zone
change was of an isolated parcel in the midst of other agricultural parcels). As such, the rezone
is invalid as it is classic "type two" spot zoning.
D.

The Conditional Rezone Violates the Provisions of Payette County
Code§ 8-10-9.

Petitioners have pointed out that the conditional rezone approved by the Board violates
Payette County Code § 8-10-9 in that the approved use for the rezoned property violates the
prohibition against any use "in any manner creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise
objectionable conditions which would adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining
premises," specifically, the emission of "harmful radioactivity at any point." In support of their
claim, the Petitioners point to the unrebutted testimony submitted by Dr. Arjun Makhijani
demonstrating that the construction and operation of AEHI's proposed nuclear power plant will
routinely and unavoidably emit harmful radioactivity which could adversely affect the
surrounding areas or adjoining premises.
Respondents counter by saying that Dr. Makhijani's testimony is not unrebutted and
point to other evidence in the record they say contradicts his testimony. While the record does
contain testimony from a few individuals generally testifying to the safety of nuclear power
plants, and while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication mentioned on page 21 of their
brief does address the routine emissions of tritium from nuclear power plants, none of the
testimony, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication, directly rebuts
Dr. Makhijani's testimony. In fact, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission publication actualiy
supports Dr. Makhijani's testimony wherein it admits that nuclear power plants do routinely
release tritiated water and that any exposure to tritium poses a health risk. Thus, violation of
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Payette County Code§ 8-10-9, even taking the evidence proffered by AEHI into account, 1s
certain to occur.
Respondents nevertheless go on to argue that in any event, the Board was entitled to
make its own factual findings based on the "conflicting testimony" and that this Court is bound
to accept those findings unless clearly erroneous. The problem with that argument is that, as
pointed out in Petitioner's opening brief, the Board made absolutely no findings with respect to
Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. No mention is made of the evidence presented by either the
Petitioners or AEHI on that point, no attempt was made to weigh the evidence and no analysis or
mention is made of Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. The Board simply ignored both the evidence
presented and the provisions of Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. Thus, there are no findings made
by the Board to which this Court could defer even if the Court felt compelled to do so.
A governing body is bound to follow the provisions of its ordinance. Noble v. Kootenai
County, 148 Idaho 937, 231 P.3d 1034 (2010); Taylor v. Board of County Commissioners,
124 Idaho 392, 860 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1993). The Board completely ignored the provisions of its
ordinance requiring consideration of whether the conditional rezone would result in dangerous,
injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable conditions such as, but not limited to the emission
of harmful radioactivity. And, the Board entirely failed to consider the unrebutted evidence of
such dangerous and injurious conditions submitted by Petitioners which, coupled with the failure
of the Board to apply this evidence to the requirements of the County's own ordinance, was
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of the Board's discretion.

As pointed out in Petitioners'

opening brief and below, a decision making body must articulate in writing the facts found, the
conclusions reached, and the rationale underlying those findings and conclusions. Jasso v.
Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 264 P.3d 897 (2011). In this instance, the Board has not only
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failed in its obligation to find facts, but also failed in its obligation to reach legal conclusions and
explain the rationale underlying those factual findings and legal conclusions, leaving this Court
to guess what the Board might have found and concluded.
Similarly, the issue of federal preemption now raised by Respondents was unaddressed.
Respondents argue that nuclear safety questions are preempted by federal law and that a decision
to withhold a permit based on nuclear safety concerns would have been illegal.

However,

federal preemption was never raised before the Board, nor did the Board ever mention federal
preemption as a basis for its decision. So far as the Petitioners have been able to determine, the
record is silent on the topic. It is a well-established rule in Idaho that review on appeal is limited
to those issues raised before the lower tribunal and that an appellate court will not decide issues
raised for the first time on appeal. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145
Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126 (2002); Balser v. Kootenai County, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986).
Here, in their submittal to the Board (R. p. 3683-85) the Petitioners specifically argued for the
application of Payette County Code § 8-10-9 to AEHI' s application for the conditional rezone.
However, AEHI did not argue federal preemption as a reason for the County not to apply the
provisions of that section.

As a result, AEHI has waived the right to raise the issue now.

Accordingly, the Board's decision approving the conditional rezone should be vacated for the
reason that the approved use violates Payette County Code § 8-10-9.

E.

The 20 Year Development Agreement Exceeds the Statutory Authority of the
County.

Respondents argue that there is no statutory limit on the content of a development
agreement. (Respondent's Brief at 23.) Their argument, however, has it backwards. Counties
only have the ability to act as authorized by the Idaho legislature. I.C. § 31-60 I. Accordingly,
development agreements are confined by the terms of the authorizing statute. In this instance,
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the authorizing statute, LC. § 67-6511A, provides that a county may "require or pe1mit as a
condition of rezoning that an owner or developer make a wTitten commitment concerning the use
or development of the subject parcel."

(Emphasis added.) The statute, however, does not

authorize a county to make any commitments to the owner or developer other than to rezone the
prope1iy. Nor does it authorize a county to freeze land use regulations and thereby bind future
boards of commissioners.
Respondents ignore the authorizing language of LC. § 67-651 lA and instead claim that
the County is authorized by Payette County Code § 8-5-11 to make binding commitments in a
development agreement. That ordinance, however, does not contain any language making such
an authorization nor could it because an ordinance cannot authorize a County to act in excess of
its legislative grant of authority. Johnson v. Blaine County, supra. In fact, Respondents have not
cited to any authority empowering a County to make commitments to the owner or developer in
a Development Agreement.
Furthermore, Respondents do not dispute that the County cannot bind future boards of the
Payette County Commission. Instead, they argue that the Development Agreement is nothing
more than a recognition of the rezone.

As set forth below, the Development Agreement,

however, is much more than a recognition of the rezone.

It contains numerous ultra vires

commitments by the County concerning its land-use functions which extend beyond the term of
the current board of commissioners. As such, the Development Agreement is illegal. See, Idaho
Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 97, 117 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1941); Inverness Mobile Home
Community, Ltd v. Bedford Tp., 687 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
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Petitioners
Agreement

Not Mischaracterize

Contents of the Development

Contrary to Respondents' assertions, Petitioners have not mischaracterized the terms of
the Development Agreement. The express language of that agreement makes clear that the
agreement is ultra vires. Indeed, although the County may be authorized to enter into certain
agreements, the legislature has not empowered the County to enter into a Development
Agreement that exceeds the County's grant of authority contained in LC. § 67-651 lA. Allied
Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405,413,258 P.3d 340,348 (2011). (Holding
that county commissioners are not empowered "to perform acts ultra vires, or beyond the scope
of their statutorily-authorized duties" and that "a board of county commissioners may not expand
its statutory authority" by contract.) That, however, is exactly what the County did in this case.
2.

Examples of Illegal Terms in the Development Agreement

Recital J requires the County to "continue to take steps necessary to rezone the

Property." R. p. 4104. The plain language of this provision is that the County, due to the
Development Agreement, is committed to rezone the property even if a rezone is improper.
Such a commitment is beyond the County's statutory authority. Accordingly, if this Court were
to remand this matter and ask the County to rescind the rezone, the County would be in breach of
the Development Agreement. Such an outcome was not intended by the legislation authorizing
development agreements, which specifically limits the commitments in such agreements to
commitments by developers and owners.
Section 2.1 binds the County to the rules and regulations in place on the date of the

Development Agreement with respect to the "Project," including requiring that the County not
change any of those rules or regulations without the consent of AEHI. (R. p. 4105.) Citing to the
cases Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003) and Payette River
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Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Com'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477
(1999), Respondents assert that Section 2 does not improperly bind the County because AEHI's
right would always be governed by the law in effect at the time of the application. These cases
are readily distinguishable.
In Chisholm, a neighboring land ovmer sought review of the issuance of a permit for a

dairy. The neighbor argued that the County failed to comply with notice provisions required by
a section of the Idaho Code that was enacted after the permit was approved. Noting that the
"applicant's right are dete1mined by the ordinance in existence at the time of filing an application
for the permit," the Court declined to apply the statute retroactively and instead examined
whether the correct procedures had been undertaken under the statutes in operation at the time.

Chisholm, 139 Idaho at 134-35; 75 P.3d at 188-89. Similarly, in Payette River Property Owners
Ass'n v. Board of Com'rs of Valley County, supra, an organization filed an application for a
conditional use permit in a flood zone. After the application was denied, the organization argued
that a Land Use Ordinance, which was enacted after the application was filed but before the
conditional use permit was decided, should have been the governing standard. On appeal, the
Supreme Court disagreed.
Both of these cases stand for the unremarkable position that the law and procedures
concerning the granting or denying of a permit are governed by the law in effect at the time.
However, this is not what the Development Agreement memorializes.

The Development

Agreement notes that the applicable rules governing the future development of the Property are
those in force at the time of the application, unless mutually amended by amendment to the
Agreement." R. p. 4105, Sections 2.l(a) and (b) (emphasis added). That is, in contravention of
the law, the Development Agreement purports to limit the County's ability to adopt future land
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use ordinances and policies, safety codes, and rezoning which might otherwise apply to the
future development of the Property and purports to give AEHI and the County the authority to
decide the applicable law. This is not the mere memorialization of the principal that the law at
the time of the application is the controlling law, but rather contains concessions that exceed the
authority of LC. § 67-651 lA and Payette County Code § 8-5-11 and contains commitments by
the County concerning the development of the parcel, not merely commitments by the developer.
Under the law, AEHI is entitled to have its conditional rezone application determined under the
County's ordinances as they existed on July 13, 2010, when AEHI submitted that application.
AEHI is not entitled to have every future application it may be required to make for its nuclear
power plant project determined under the County's ordinances in effect on July 13, 2010.
Rather, under the law, any future applications AEHI is required to submit must be determined
under the County's ordinances in effect when those applications are filed. The development
agreement imperrnissibly attempts to modify that legal principle.

If Section 2.1 is actually

intended to simply state this legal principle, as AEHI and the County now maintain, it would not
require seven paragraphs to do so. Clearly, the purpose of Section 2.1, in its entirety, is to
handcuff future boards of county commissioners and prevent them from enacting any changes to
the County's ordinances which might otherwise be applied to AEHI's power plant project
except, for example, ones that do not change any rules applicable to AEHI's project or ones that
AEHI agrees to.
Section 2.l(b), contrary to Respondents' arguments, does in fact limit the County's

freedom to act with respect to future "approval requests." (R. p. 4105.) It delineates the future
actions that the County may take thereby excluding all others. Id. It then states that the County
cannot enact future rules or regulations without first providing "AEHI with an opportunity to
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suggest methods of enacting and implementing such provisions to the Property and Project."
This commitment by the County is ultra vires because it is in excess of the County's authority
with respect to Development Agreement and because it binds future Boards to provide AEHI
with such opportunities.
Section 2.3 is ultra vires because in that section the County commits to "cooperate in
good faith to agree upon and use reasonable efforts to process amendments to this Agreement."
R. p. 4107 This commitment is also ultra vires because it is binding on future boards for the
duration of the Development Agreement. Furthermore, the section limits the County's future
action in matters beyond the rezone. It provides:
No moratorium, future ordinance, resolution or other land use rule or regulation
imposing a limitation on the development or the rate, timing or sequencing of the
development, of the Property or any portion thereof shall apply to or govern the
development of the Property whether affecting land use permits, subdivisions
plat(s), building permits, occupancy permits or other entitlements to use issued or
granted by County, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.

Id Thus, the section is ultra vires because it contains commitments from the County limiting the
County's right to act.

Sections 2.5 and 2.6, which provide that while AEHI has a vested right to develop the
property, it has no obligation to do so, are not analogous to a land-use approval. (R. p. 4107.)
While it is true that a land-use approval does not require an owner to develop the at-issue
property, here, unlike a mere land-use approval, the County is bound by several commitments in
the Development Agreement while AEHI has no obligation to develop the property. These
commitments are what make the Develpoment Agreement unlawful.
Section 2.7 of the Deveiopment Agreement provides that the "County, as necessary to
implement the installation of Public Infrastructure, shall cooperate reasonably with AEHI." (R.
p. 4107.) Despite Respondents' protestations to the contrary, the plain language of this section
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contains a commitment by the County to assist AEHI. Such a commitment, as set forth above, is
beyond the statutory authority granted to the County with respect to development agreements.
The commitment is also ultra vires because it extends beyond the cunent commission to future
commissions for the duration of the Development Agreement. Id The fact that the Section also
provides that "the level of cooperation that is reasonable under the circumstances" shall be
determined "by the then-sitting Board" does not alleviate the problem; future Boards still have to
reasonably cooperate. Future Boards do not have the discretion to decide not to cooperate.
Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Idaho 190, 953 P.2d 630 (Ct. App., 1998) (When one party to

a contract retains power or sole discretion in an express contract, it must exercise that discretion
in good faith.) Thus, the contract unlawfully restricts the ability of future boards to exercise their
police powers.
Section 3.2 is ultra vires because it requires the County to cooperate with AEHI in the
defense of a lawsuit challenging the Agreement and provides that if separate counsel is retained
for each party, costs "shall be shared equally by the parties." (R. 4108.)
commitments by the County to AEHI in the Development Agreement.

These are firm

Frnihermore, these

commitments are binding on future Boards. Consequently, this section is improper and it makes
no difference that Respondents, in contravention of the Development Agreement, allegedly have
not shared costs.
Section 3.5 provides for costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in the event of

litigation over a default. (R. p. 4109.) The fact that this provision applies to both the County and
AEHI does not change the fact that it is ultra vires in that it contains a commitment from the
County to AEHI to pay AEHI' s attorneys' fees in the event AEHI successfully sues the County
for a default-a commitment not authorized by LC.§ 67-651 lA.

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRJEF, Page 27

Finally, AEHI and the County point to Section 6.14 of the Development Agreement
(R. p. 4113) and argue that the severability provision contained therein resolves the problems
with the illegality of the Development Agreement. (R. p. 4112.) AEHI and the County fail to
mention Section 6.8 of the Development Agreement (R. p. 4113) which, while also containing a
severability provision, goes on to require the County to renegotiate any such illegal provisions,
which, like so many other provisions of the Development Agreement, impermissibly seeks to
bind future boards.
Therefore, because the agreement binds the County, and does so for 20 years or more, it
is void as a matter of law.

F.

The 20 Year Development Agreement and Rezone were not Properly
Adopted.

Petitioners have also pointed out that the Development Agreement was not properly
adopted by ordinance as required by LC.§ 67-651 IA, the first sentence of which clearly requires
the approval of a development agreement by adoption of an ordinance:
"Each governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in accordance
with the notice and hearing provisions provided under section 67-6509, Idaho
Code, require or permit as a condition of rezoning that an owner or developer
make a written commitment concerning the use or development of the subject
parcel."
In addition to the statute, the Development Agreement itself provides that its term commences
upon the adoption of the "Development Agreement Ordinance" which is defined as the "county
ordinance that duly adopts this Agreement".

R. p. 4101.

And, although the rezone was

conditioned on adoption of a development agreement, there is no evidence in the record that the
Development Agreement was actually adopted by any official action of the Board. Respondents
respond by pointing to the second sentence of LC.§ 67-6511A which authorizes governing
boards to adopt ordinances providing for the creation, form, recording, modification,
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enforcement and termination of development agreements and Payette County Code§ 8-5-11
which provides that a development agreement shall take effect upon the adoption of the
amendment to the zoning ordinance.
The solution to this supposed dilemma is found in the application of a few general rules.
The first, as set out in Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, supra, is that the
Board, in approving a rezone, is obligated to comply with the provisions of the Local Land Use
Planning Act and in this case, specifically, LC. § 67-651 IA.

The second is that statutory

construction begins with the literal language of the statute. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of

Fremont County, supra. And the third is that statutes are to be construed so that effect is given
to all their provisions, and no part is to be rendered superfluous or insignificant. Friends of

Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9 (2002).
Applying those general rules to the matter at hand requires that the Court first look to the
language of LC.§ 67-651 lA, interpreted so as to give effect, in this instance, to both the first and
second sentences, and then apply that interpretation to the County's adoption of the Development
Agreement.

The first sentence authorizes a governing board to approve a development

agreement as a condition of a rezone and requires that a development agreement be adopted by
ordinance. The second sentence authorizes a governing board to adopt ordinance provisions
regarding certain details of development agreements such as the form and content. However, the
second sentence does not subsume the first.

Rather, the first sentence addresses a different

topic-the manner in which development agreements must be adopted. The second sentence is
similar to the provisions of LC. § 67-6512 (regarding conditional use permits), LC. § 67-6513
(regarding subdivisions) and LC. § 67-6516 (regarding variances) which permit governing
boards to adopt, as a part of their zoning ordinances, specific provisions for the processing of
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applications for certain permits.

In each instance, the legislature granted authority to the

governing boards, within the boundaries set by the statute, to adopt their own provisions for
issuing such permits. However, the governing boards must still act within the confines of those
statutes regarding such matters as notice, hearings and other limitations imposed by the
legislature.
In this instance, giving effect to both the first and second sentences of the statute, the
Board is authorized to adopt an ordinance detailing certain aspects of the content and handling of
development agreements, yet the Board is required to adopt development agreements by
ordinance.

To the extent the County's ordinance contemplates adoption of a development

agreement other than by ordinance, it conflicts with this statute and is void. In this case, the
County failed to adopt the Development Agreement in the manner required by the applicable
statute and therefore both the Development Agreement and the rezone on which it is based are
void.
G.

Payette County's Hearing Notice and Hearing Proceedings Violated the
Requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act, Payette County's
Ordinance and Principles of Procedural Due Process.

Petitioners have argued that the administrative proceedings conducted by the County
were fundamentally unfair to the Petitioners, were violative of the notice requirements of
LC.§ 67-6509 and LC.§ 67-6511, were violative of Payette County's hearing procedures as
codified at Payette County Code§ l-7-2A, and otherwise deprived the Petitioners of their due
process rights. Among the defects in the proceedings conducted by the County, as detailed in the
Petitioners' opening brief, are the failure of the County's published and mailed hearing notices to
include a summary of AEHI's conditional rezone application (one that seeks approval for a
nuclear power plant) and a description of the affected land sufficient for identification, the
improper shortening of time for interested persons to submit ,vritten testimony and evidence in
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opposition to AEHI' s conditional rezone application, withholding AEHI' s proposed development
agreement from the public, preventing effective review and comment on it, until just prior to the
public hearings, and favoring AEHI by permitting it essentially unlimited time to make oral
presentations to the Board while imposing strict time limits on the public.
Respondents argue that the Court should excuse these defects because the County
otherwise satisfied the legal requirements to provide notice of AEHI' s conditional rezone
application and that (i) AEHI's conditional rezone application had been filed with the County
and was available to the public for several months before the hearings were held, (ii) the County
posted AEHI' s application on its website, (iii) the public could purchase copies of AEHI' s
application, (iv) the Petitioners could have participated in the technical review committee
meetings held by the County, (v) AEHI spoke to a number of business and community
organizations in the months leading up to the filing of its application, (vi) because some of the
Petitioners were involved in prior proceedings on a different application (an amendment of the
County's Comprehensive Plan), they should somehow have been aware of the filing, content and
details of AEHI's conditional rezone application, and (vii) the County could "interpret" its
ordinance requirements to not require a summary of AEHI's application when it failed to include
one in its published notices.
If any of what Respondents now rely upon to show that the public had notice of

AEHI' s conditional rezone application actually met the requirements of the statute, they might
have an argument. The fact, however, is that those activities do not meet the requirements of the
statute and cannot be used as substitutes for statutory notices 8• Instead, the statute requires that

8

The activities Respondents seek to have substituted for the statutory notice are in any event poor substitutes: (i)
the filing of an application with the County gives notice to nobody except the County, (ii) only AEHI and certain
state and local agencies are invited to the technical review committee meetings, (iii) posting the application on the
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notice, containing a summary of the proposal, be published in a local newspaper and mailed to
property owners within 300 feet of the external boundaries of the land being considered. The
notice published and mailed by the County did not contain such a summary. The list of AEHI's
applications included in the notice are not sufficient. As our Supreme Court has stated, "It is a
well settled principle that notice and hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions
precedent to the proper exercise of the zoning authority." Citizens for Better Government v.

Valley County, 95 Idaho 320,322,508 P.2d 550, 552 (1973). If a zoning action does not comply
with the statutory notice requirements, it is invalid.

"When the statute requires notice and

hearing as to the possible effect of zoning law upon property rights ... the statutory notice and
hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of due process and may not
be dispensed with." Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681,684, 799 P.2d 969, 972 (1990).
By failing to provide the required notice, the County has deprived the Petitioners and others
similarly situated of their due process rights to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard
on AEHI' s request.
Respondents also seek to avoid the statutory notice requirements by pointing to Evans v.

Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 50 P.3d 443 (2002) for the
proposition that the public only need be given notice of the type of issues and evidence that are
likely to arise at a hearing and the types of evidence they may wish to present to rebut an
applicant's claims. Their reliance on Evans is misplaced. First, the court in Evans was not asked

County's website only gives notice to those who might happen to look at the website and chance upon the
application, (iv) the right to purchase a copy of AEHI's conditional rezone application really only helps those who
happen to know that the application exists, (v) speaking to business and community organizations does not make for
notice to the neighboring property owners, such as the Petitioners, (vi) Petitioners involvement in a different prior
application does not provide notice about the filing, content and details of another later application, and (vii) the
County never "interpreted" the notice requirements to provide something other than that which is required by
statute, since the Board entirely ignored the Petitioners' arguments regarding defects in the County's hearing
notices, making absolutely no mention of them in their written decision. R. p. 4137-4160.
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to address the sufficiency of the notice required to be published and mailed to neighboring
property owners by I.C. § 67-6509 and I.C. § 67-6511. Rather, the Court was asked to address
the sufficiency of the application filed by the applicant in that case-an entirely different matter.
Second, the materials objected to by the appellants in the Evans case at least advised the public
that the applicant proposed a gravel pit on its property. Here, the notice published and mailed to
the County entirely omitted the fact that AEHI proposed a nuclear power plant for the subject
property, a fact that most anyone would consider important enough to merit mention.
As for the conduct of its hearing, Respondents ask the Court to read into the hearing
procedures established by the County's Code (Title 1, Chapter 7, Payette County Code) a right in
favor of the County "to limit written testimony and control the manner in which such testimony
may be submitted", where no such right actually exists. The County's rules of procedure are
simple: A party may present oral testimony and submit exhibits. There is no time restriction on
submission of exhibits and no provision permitting the County (or the hearing officer) to
arbitrarily establish one.
contradicted.

That the County departed from its established procedures is not

The effect of having done so was to illegally and unreasonably limit the

participation of interested parties in general and the Petitioners in particular.
To make matter worse for the Petitioners, the County withheld AEHI's proposed
development agreement from the public until just a few days before the December 2, 2010,
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing and then repeated the maneuver with the revised
version of the development agreement, releasing it just a few days before the June 6, 2011,
Board of County Commissioner's hearing. Again, Respondents ask the Court to excuse the
County from the requirement announced in Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796
P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1990), that all materials required to be submitted with an application be made
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available to the public in advance of its hearings, by pointing out that drafts of those documents
were available to the public in advance of the hearings. As pointed out in Petitioners' opening
brief, the development agreement is a critical element of AEHI' s application. The development
agreement is intended to, among other matters, set forth the conditions upon which a rezone
might be granted and the approved nuclear power plant developed. Once the prope1iy is rezoned
and a development agreement adopted, AEHI, or anyone else who might acquire the subject
Property, will claim to have the right to construct a nuclear power plant without further action,
approval or control by the County, except to the extent that right is limited or conditioned by the
development agreement. Thus, if the rezone is upheld, the development agreement becomes the
single most important element of the County's decision.
The "draft" development agreement which Respondents say the Petitioners could review
was, at the request of the Planning and Zoning Commission, being reviewed and revised by the
County and its attorneys between the date of the Planning and Zoning Commission
recommendation of approval and the date of the Board's public hearing. R. p. 4029. There is no
way for the public in general, or the Petitioners in particular, to know what changes were made
( and what changes were not) until the final revised form of the development agreement was
released for public review and comment. It could be that the development agreement remained
largely unchanged or it could have been dramatically changed. It could have been made better
from the Petitioners perspective or it could have been made worse. There was simply no way to
know until the proposed development agreement was actually published. By the time it was
published, the public in general and the Petitioners in particular were afforded little time to
review, analyze and respond to the content of the development agreement.
Petitioners object to.

This is what

As the court in Johnson v. City of Homedale, supra, pointed out,
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petitioners were "left with a dearth of information on whether-and in what regard-to object to
the proposal." 119 Idaho at 287.
Finally, Respondents ask the Court to excuse the patently obvious favoritism accorded
AEHI in making its oral presentation to the Board by arguing that the County's rules of
procedure provide that the hearing officer may set a time limit on oral presentations. While the
County's procedural rules do grant the hearing officer that power, neither the ordinance, nor any
principles of law cited by Respondents, permit the hearing officer or the Board of County
Commissioners to discriminate in the application of those time limits. While the public was
limited to five minutes or oral testimony, AEHI was permitted 15 minutes at the December 2,
2010, hearing (Tr. p. 7) then unlimited time at the December 9, 2010, hearing to rebut. Tr. p.
263-324. Similarly, the public was limited to five minutes for oral testimony at the Board of
County Commissioners June 6, 2011, hearing while AEHI was permitted essentially unlimited
time to make its presentation, including the right to make a second presentation after public
comment was closed. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 111-131. Clearly AEHI received favored treatmentand it showed in the County's decisions.
All of the above described barriers to a meaningful opportunity for the Petitioners to
participate in the P&Z Commission's December 2010 hearing and the Board's June 2011
hearing, the defective notices, the limitation of ,vritten submittals, the uneven application of time
limitations imposed on oral testimony, the special treatment afforded AEHI in making two
presentations to the Board, and the missing and delayed development agreement all violated
Petitioners' due process rights and warrant a reversal of the decision approving the rezone and
development agreement.
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Board's Written Findings of Fact

Conclusions of Law are

Petitioners have demonstrated in their opening brief that the Board's written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law failed to satisfy the requirements of LC.§ 67-6535 and have
thereby prejudiced Petitioners substantial right to due process. The Board's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Petitioners point out, consist of conclusory statements that are unsupported
by any reasoned explanation of the grounds upon which they rely. The vast majority of the
Board's Findings of Fact are nothing more than paraphrased summaries of the testimony given
during the June 6, 2011, public hearing. There is no mention of the written evidence submitted
by interested parties, including Petitioners. The Board makes no effort to state the relevant
contested facts, resolve any disputed facts, or articulate the rationale for rejecting factual
information presented by those opposing AEHI' s proposal. In short, the Board simply ignored
the testimony and evidence submitted by anyone other than AEHI, failed to explicitly respond to
the applicable factual and legal questions before it and failed to provide an explanation as to how
the conditional rezone application complied with the requirements of the Payette County Code.
AEHI and the County respond by saying the Board's findings satisfy the requirement of
Idaho and that there is no specific algorithm for findings and conclusions.

Petitioners

acknowledge that no specific algorithm is required in the preparation of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. A governing board is, however, obligated to do more than paraphrase the
testimony given at the public hearings and conclude that an applicant's proposal conforms to the
requirements of its ordinance. The requirement for written findings and conclusions is not
overly complex. A governing board is simply required to state the relevant contested facts, state
how those contested facts were resolved, identify the evidence supporting the factual
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determinations, and explain the basis for legal conclusions. LC. § 67-6535; Jasso v. Camas
County, supra, at 794.
In this case, the Board should, at a minimum, be required to actually address, rather than
totally ignore or summarily dismiss, the evidence submitted by Petitioners regarding, for
example, the compatibility of AEHI's proposal with surrounding uses, the actual, practical
availability of utilities, including water, the opinions of suffounding landowners, and other
factors relevant to the suitability of rezoning the property, all as required by Payette County
Code § 8-11- 7A. The Board might also be required to actually do some fact finding rather than
skipping that step and proceeding directly to conclusion making.

If the 17 ½ pages of

paraphrased testimony contained in the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is
eliminated, all that is left is the Board's conclusions. As a result of the approach taken by the
Board, the Comi is left to guess what facts the Board may have found and how those facts
support the Board's conclusions. The Board might also be expected to address the provisions of
Payette County Code § 8-10-9 discussed above, a criteria entirely unaddressed by the Board.
The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law simply do not serve the important
function of such documents, including the facilitation of judicial review. For those reasons, the
Court should reject the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as inadequate and
overturn the Board's approval of the conditional rezone.
I.

Petitioners Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced.

AEHI contends that the Petitioners have not demonstrated that their substantial rights
have been prejudiced as a result of the County's approval of the conditional rezone, as required
by LC.§ 67-6535(4). In support, AEHI cites to Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and
Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 245 P .3d 983 (2010), where the court held Krempasky' s conclusory
allegations of harm insufficient. This case is not like Krempasky. Here, the Petitioners have
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demonstrated that the approved power plant does, in fact, pose a risk of harm to the Petitioners
and will, in fact, interfere with the use and enjoyment of their properties sufficient to meet the
standard expressed by the Court in Hawkins v. Bonneville County, supra, where the court said
"The petitioner opposing a permit must be in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project
goes forward, such as a reduction in the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use
or ownership of the land." 151 Idaho at 233.
In this case, the Petitioners have demonstrated the harm they will suffer as a result of the
approved power plant.

For example, WTitten testimony was submitted on behalf of the

Petitioners H-Hook, LLC, John and Jo Ann Jeffries, Jeffrey and Deborah Weber, Joe and Betty
Bercik, James Underwood, Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek
Community and People for Payette's Future, Inc. as to both the interference in the use and
enjoyment of their properties near the proposed power plant site (and for the organizations, the
properties of their members) and the diminution in value of those properties. R. p. 3660-3667.
That evidence is summarized in Petitioners' opening brief at page 13 and Appendix A and in this
reply brief in Section IL A., above.
In addition, Mr. and Mrs. Weber separately submitted written testimony that they operate
a dog training and boarding facility and business on their property, the income from which they
rely for their livelihood. That livelihood would be directly affected by the development of a
nuclear power plant on the subject prope1iy, the Webers have testified, since their customers
would no longer consider their facility to be a desirable place to take and leave their animals.
R. p. 3655-3656.
Michael Humphreys, a managing member of H-Hook, LLC, which operates a cattle
ranch and related fanning operation on property adjacent to the proposed power plant site, also
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submitted separate written testimony in which he reiterated the effect the power plant would
on his family's ranching operation and testified that the proposed power plant will place a
cloud of uncertainty on the properties surrounding the power plant, which uncertainty has an
economic cost. R. p. 3911-3912.
Petitioners Bercik and Jeffries have also submitted additional written testimony
demonstrating that because they live within a few miles of the approved power plant they would
be adversely affected due to their vulnerability to damage and injury to their persons and
properties as a result of a nuclear accident, including the potential need to evacuate their
properties (R. p. 3604-3609; 3610), In fact, all of the individual Petitioners have shown that their
properties are located within the ten mile Emergency Planning Zone of the approved power plant
interfering with the use and enjoyment of their properties and putting them in jeopardy of
substantial harm to their persons and properties, all of which is summarized in Petitioners'
opening brief at pages 15-16 and in this reply brief above, in Section II. A.
Petitioners have also submitted wTitten testimony about the routine emission of harmful
radioactive water from the approved power plant, exposing them to radioactive materials which
are recognized carcinogens, again interfering with the use and enjoyment of their properties.

R. p. 3660-36667. This evidence, too, is summarized in Petitioner's opening brief at pages 14-15
and in this reply brief in Section II. A., above.
Moreover, the Petitioners have demonstrated that the County's defective notice, improper
hearing procedure and failure to adopt a reasoned decision in accordance with requirements of
LC. § 67-6535 have prejudiced their substantial rights. See, e.g., Jasso v. Carnas County, supra.
None of this evidence is apparently sufficient to satisfy Respondents, both of whom
seem to believe that some higher order of proof is required of these Petitioners than is generally
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required in land use matters.

Although zoning decisions need to be based on substantial

evidence, I.C. § 67-5279, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the relative informality of
hearings on land use matters and has accepted the fact that it would not be feasible to require that
evidence presented in such hearings strictly comply with the rules of evidence. See, Evans v.
Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, supra, at 432. Substantial evidence is no more than
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Wohrle v.
Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 274, 207 P.3d 998 (2009).

The evidence presented by

Petitioners to demonstrate prejudice to their substantial rights is most certainly the type of
evidence commonly considered in local land use matters and is of a type that reasonable minds
might accept to support that conclusion.
Although the evidence summarized above provides a sufficient basis for the Court to find
that substantial rights of the Petitioners have been prejudiced by the action of the County, in
order to remove any doubt, Petitioners request that the Court take judicial notice, pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, of the affidavits of Petitioners John Burlile, H-Hook, LLC, Clifford
Morgan, Thomas Pence, Torn Roland, James Underwood and Jeffrey Weber submitted in a
related action pending before this Court, John W. Burlile, et al v. Alternate Energy Holdings,
Inc., et al, Case No. CV- 2012-364. Those affidavits further describe the distinct harm and
injuries that have already resulted and will result from the action of Payette County in approving
the conditional rezone for AEHI, including the inability to continue long standing business and
agricultural operations on their properties and plan for future operations and expansion of them,
reduced demand for products produced on their properties, the practical inability to market and
sell their properties due to the negative stigma of being near a nuclear power plant, and the
resultant significant diminution in value of their properties. In addition, two expert witnesses
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(Mark Richey and Pat Thacker) have also submitted Affidavits in that case describing and
corroborating the negative impact that the conditional rezone has had on the value of Petitioners'
properties. Copies of those affidavits are attached to this reply brief in Appendix A

These

affidavits clearly demonstrate that Petitioners' substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result
of the County's actions.
Knowing that the evidence is otherwise sufficient, Respondents continue to argue
erroneously, as they did in their attack on Petitioners' standing, that Petitioners may not rely on
the risk of injury to their persons and properties posed by its power plant to establish prejudice to
their substantial rights, saying those matters are preempted by Federal law.

AEHI again

overstates the extent of Federal control. Although the Federal government controls the safety
and radiological aspects of nuclear power plants, the states exercise their traditional authority
over land use matters.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. State Energy Resources

Conservation and Development Commission, supra. Petitioners do not ask the Court to permit
the County to enter the field of regulating power plant safety, rather, Petitioners point to the risk
of harm to their persons and properties posed by a nuclear power plant to establish their right to
contest the County's approval of a nuclear power plant under state and county land use laws, a
power specifically reserved to the states. See, Northern California Assoc. to Preserve Bodega
Head and Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 61 Cal.2d. 126, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432, 390
P.2d 200, 204 (1964) (recognizing that states retain power to determine location of nuclear
power plants under their land use laws); see also, Afarshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich.
App. 237, 237 N.W.2d. 266 (1975) and cases and authorities cited therein at 237 N.W.2d.
276-277.
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Respondents also continue to suggest that the Court should overlook the County's illegal
action in approving the conditional rezone because "[t]his is not Petitioners' only chance to let
decision makers know their concerns regarding nuclear power." Respondent's and Intervenors'
Brief page 48. Respondents argue to the Court, as AEHI did to the County, that the County need
not concern itself with the details of AEHI's proposal because, after all, AEHI will be subjected
to a rigorous review process before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). Respondents
fail to mention, however, that the NRC will not revisit the County's land use approvals. Unless
contested now, the approvals become final.
As AEHI consistently did during the public hearing process, Respondents attempt to
paint the Petitioners as rabid antinuclear zealots who have res01ied to "hyperbole and fear
mongering" in making their arguments to the County and this Court.

Respondent and

Intervenor's brief pages 42-43. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Respondents have,
throughout the process, steadfastly confined their arguments to legitimate land use issues and
addressed the harms they will suffer only in the context required to demonstrate standing and
prejudice to their substantial rights.

Petitioners should not be denigrated for making the

arguments they are legally required to make, especially when Respondents demand they be made
by attacking Petitioners standing to pursue their petition for judicial review.

In sum, the Petitioners' substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result of the
County's illegal approval of the conditional rezone requested by AEHI and have amply
demonstrated that prejudice. AEHI's attempts to divest the Petitioners of their opp01iunity to
contest the County's illegal actions are based on an overly narrow view of the nature of the
injuries required to be shown and an overly broad view of the extent of Federal control over
power plant siting, neither of which are supported by recognized authority.
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CONCLUSION
The County's decision to approve the conditional rezone requested by AEHI must be
overturned and vacated in its entirety because the decision violates constitutional or statutory
provisions, is in excess of the County's statutory authority, was made upon unlawful procedure,
and is arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the County's defective hearing notices, improper
proceedings and the inadequacy of the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, taken
as a whole, violate both the requirements of the County's ordinances and the Local Land Use
Planning Act as well as the Petitioners' due process rights, justifying the Court in vacating the
Board's decision. The rezone, having been approved pursuant to an invalid comprehensive plan
and resulting in illegal spot zoning, including type 2 spot zoning which cannot be cured, should
be vacated for those reasons as well. The approval of the conditional rezone should also be
vacated because the rezone was approved for a use which, by its very nature, will violate the
explicit provisions of Payette County Code respecting hazardous and dangerous uses and
because the Board arbitrarily failed to address that issue in its findings and conclusions. Finally,
because the rezone was made pursuant to a development agreement which was not properly
approved, authorized or adopted by the Board and which is beyond the statutory authority of the
Board, the decision approving the conditional rezone and the development agreement must be
vacated. A fair reading of the record leaves no doubt that AEHI and its proponents sold the
project to the County with the tantalizing promise of creating thousands of jobs and an economic
renaissance for the County. The County bought

,A..EHI's

sales pitch and, without any serious

consideration for either the legal rights of neighboring property owners or the injuries that those
property owners would bear, did whatever it took, legal or not, to approve the project. None of
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the arguments made by Respondents can legitimize the County's flawed process and the
resulting erroneous decision to approve AEHI' s power plant.
DATED: This

{pt}- day of December, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

i

I hereby certify that on this 'f'-/ day of December, 2012, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1115 1st Avenue North
Payette, ID 83661
Fax: 208.642.6099
E-mail: akelso@payettecounty.org
JoAnn Butler
Spink-Butler
251 E. Front St., Ste. 200
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208.388.1001
E-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc.
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AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN W. BURLILE

BRIANE NELSON MITCHELL (ISB #2346)

nels@maukburgoyne.com
MAUK & BURGOYNE

515 South 6th Street
Post Office Box 1743
Boise, Idaho 83701-1743
Telephone: (208) 345-2654
Facsimile (208) 345-3319

THOMAS A. BANDUCCI (ISB #2453)

tbanducci@b1,vsla1;vgroup.com
WADEL. WOODARD (ISB #6312)

,v·woodard@b\.vslawurouo.com
DARA PARK.ER (ISB #7177)

doarker@bv1slawgrouo.com
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN

THE DiSTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAN, individually and as husband and
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W.
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
individually and as husband and wife;
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R.
ROLAND, individually and as husband and
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an
individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
Case No. CV-2012-364
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN W. BURLILE
)
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
)
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
)
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING
)
STANDING
)
)
)
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC., a )
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L. GILLISPIE, )
an individual; JENNIFER RANSOM, an
)
- _-), _
individual; COUNTY OF PAYETTE~ a·
politicctl s~h'divisiori of the State oflcfuh.o; and ··} ·
P9:ES 1,..10, fictitiously named,
)
)
Defendants.
)

---------------~

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Payette
)
Plaintiff Joh,_'1 W. Burlile, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness,

could and would competently testify thereto.
2.

I reside at 8105 Little Willow Road and I also own property in Payette County,

located at 7100 Little Willow Road. I have lived in this area for more than 25 years. I live
around 6 miles from the site where AEHI has been given permission by Payette County to build
a nuclear power plant.
3.

I have knowledge of where the other Plaintiffs reside and have attached an

accurate map of the area showing their approximate locations.
4.

I am the manager of the H Hook Ranch which is a working cattle ranch. The

Ranch has approximately 15,000 acres and is located on both sides of Stone Quarry Road, and
both sides of Little Willow Creek Road in the eastern part of Payette County. Most H Hook
employees live on the Ranch with their families.
5.

The H Hook Ranch shares a common border with the JG Schwarz property where

AEHI has received approval to build a nuclear power plant. The common border between H
Hook and the JG Schwarz property is approximately three and three-quarter miles in length.
6.

H Hook has its weaner calf operation at the comer of Stone Quarry and Little

Willow Roads. At any given time, we may have as many as 300 weaner calves at that comer. I
believe that the increased traffic along Stone Quarry and Little Willow Roads for the thousands
of construction workers will cause stress to our weaner calves and may force us to close and
move the feedlot.

7.

We routinely use both Little Willow Creek and Stone Quarry Roads for our ranch

operations. We use the roads for access, moving our cattle and farm equipment. These are rural
roads which are used as much for farm and ranch operations as anything else. Little Willow is
only twenty feet wide at places, while Stone Quarry is also only twenty feet wide at places. The
thousands of construction workers who will be using these roads will disrupt and interfere with
our ranch operations.

8.

On the H Hook Ranch we have seven wells that we use for obtaining water for

our domestic use as well as for irrigation. I am concerned that we will not be able to use our
wells in the future if AEHI proceeds with its nuclear plant.

9.

I believe that the value of my property and all the property near the proposed

nuclear plant is worth less because of the County's actions in approving construction of the plant

I also believe that the proposed nuclear power plant has and will interfere with the rural ranch
lifestyle that I have enjoyed with my family and our neighbors in the Little Willow Creek/Stone
Quarry area for the last 26-27 years.

DATED This 41... day of November, 2012

~W.Burlile
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this ~ 1
day of November, 2012.

DEBRA S BOWEN
Notary Public
State of Idaho

No~ Public fo. daho • /A
Residing at:
'
' - t'(._
Commission Expir :
/ O 12, ZtY S---
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[X]
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Email

Charles F. Peterson, Jr.
913 W. River Street, Ste. 420
Boise, ID 83702

[X] U.S. Mail
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[ ] Hand Delivered
[X] Email

Richard A. Roth
The Roth Law Firm, PLLC
295 Madison Avenue, 22 nd Floor
New York, NY 10017

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
[X] Email

John Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2852

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

~JOA&:h__.,
SallyAnderso,
Assistant to Briane Nelson Mitchell
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THOMAS A. BANDUCCI (ISB #2453)
tbanducci@bws1awirroup.com
WADEL. WOODARD (ISB #6312)
v1woodard@bwslawgroup.com
DARA PARKER (ISB #7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
·
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W.
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
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individual,
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Nevada Corporation; DONALD L. GILLISPIE, )
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)
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AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFREY WEBER
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING
STANDING

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

COUNTYOFPAYETTE

)

I, Jeffrey G. Weber, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
1.
That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter and my address is 10465 Stone Quarry
Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a
witness, could and would testify competently thereto.
2.
That I have owned the home and lived at the above address for more than eight (8) years
and have operated a dog training business and dog boarding business at the same location.
3.
That the land for miles around this site has al'?fays been planned and used for agriculture
and is appropriate for the boarding and training of upland game and waterfowl hunting dogs.

4.

That I purchased the land and built the home, kennels, and other dog training facilities at
this location because it was surrounded by agricultural land and had always been zoned
agricultural.
5.
That I believed that I could operate my business here until it was time for me to retire and
sell the home and dog training and boarding facilities to another trainer.
6.
That Payette County has now changed the Comprehensive Plan, rezoned a parcel within
approximately three (3) miles of my home and business, and entered into a twenty (20) year
Development Agreement with Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. (AEID) to permit the company or
its assignee, at any time during the term of the agreement, to construct a nuclear power plant ·
within three (3) miles ofmy home and business.
7.
That Payette County, by entering into the twenty (20) year Development Agreement with
AEIIl, granting the rezone, granting the variance, and changing the county's Comprehensive
Plan, has seriously harmed the marketability of my real property and my business and reduced
the market value of my property.
8.
That a part of the harm to my business and property results from the County's decision,
which may cause my property to be included in a "Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency
Planning Zone'\ which will make many of the owners of dogs unwilling to leave their dogs with
me for training or for boarding.
9.
That being placed in the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone could
require that I have to evacuate and find a place to house and care for as many as thirty-five (35)
to forty (40) dogs, an impossible task.
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10.
That the actions of AEffi and Payette County have made my property so undesirable as a
dog boarding and training location that my property's value as a dog business facility bas been
destroyed.
11.
That I would not buy a dog business in this or a similar location so near a proposed and
approved nuclear power plant, and I am sure that no other trainer would want to buy it.
12.
That I have come to my conclusion regarding the reduced value of my property, based
primarily upon my personal knowledge of the property and my knowledge of the dog training
and boarding business. I have also discussed these matters with friends, real estate professionals,
and other persons in the dog training and boarding business.
13.
That my discussions with other persons have confirmed that other trainers would not be
willing to buy a property located near a proposed nuclear power plant.
14.
That these discussions have also confirmed that other persons would not want to purchase
a home located within a few miles of an approved nuclear power plant and that the value of my
residence is also harmed by the County's actions.
15.
That I have compiled and reviewed information regarding my investment in my home
and in the dog training and boarding facilities in order to determine the amount of financial harm
caused because of the reduced value ofmy home and business.
16.
That I have concluded, based on the above information and my review of the amount I
have invested in my home and business, that my real estate, including both the home and the dog
training and boarding business property, has been reduced in value in a sum in excess of eightyfive thousand dollars ($85,000).
17.
That I have also been harmed by the County's action of August 29, 2011, in entering the
20 year Development Agreement and granting the rezone, because I now cannot plan for the
future operation and expansion of my business because as long as the County actions are in
effect my business has little or no value.

18.

That because of the threat of possible construction of a nuclear power plant in such close
proximity to my property, I am unable to plan for the future operation, improvement, or sale of
my home and business.
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U.S. Mail
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JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
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CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAN, individually and as husband and
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W.
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
individually and as husband and wife;
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R.
ROLAND, individually and as husband and
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an
individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
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AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS F. PENCE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING
STANDING

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF PAYETTE

)
) ss.
)

I, THOMAS F. (TOM) PENCE, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
1.
That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter and my home address is 5433 Big
Willow Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called
as a witness, could and would testify competently thereto.
2.
That Payette County has now taken several actions at the request of Alternate Energy
Holdings, Inc. (AEHI), a Nevada corporation, which will permit AEHI to construct a nuclear
power plant approximately one and one-half (1 ½) miles from my home and ranch.
3.
That Payette County has also agreed that AEHI can reconstruct Big Willow Road, which
is now a partially paved, but mostly gravel, road used for ranch and limited recreational
purposes, as a paved industrial highway to provide primary access to their nuclear power plant.
That I have owned a home and ranch at the above stated address on Big Willow Road for
4.
many years, have resided on the ranch most of my life, and my family has owned this land for
generations, my great grandfather having lived on and operated the ranch since 1867, before
Idaho achieved statehood.
5.
That I manage the ranch land for livestock operations according to an intensive grazing
plan, and I also raise grass hay for horses and provide custom grazing.
6.
That a part of the ranch is managed for wildlife habitat and hunting and is also operated
as a shooting preserve, which includes hunting for upland game birds and waterfowl.
7.
That the wildlife management area also includes an extensive riparian zone which
provides habitat for other species, including wild turkeys, deer, bear, and at times a cougar.
8.
That Big Willow Road, which is located in front of my house, is on my ranch property, as
is the bridge over Big Willow Creek, and both the road and the bridge are, as acknowledged by
Payette County in its Findings of Fact on a prescriptive easement.
9.
That at no time during the county application and approval process did anyone from
Payette County ever contact me or discuss with me any changes in that part of Big Willow Road
that passes through my lands, or the possible construction of a nuclear power plant only one and
one-half (1 ½) miles from my home.
Tnat Payette County and AEHI have now purportediy entered into a Deveiopment
10.
Agreement to make drastic changes in the use of the road, which changes will cause serious
practical and economic harm to me and to my real property by making it very difficult, if not
impossible, to operate the shooting preserve and to continue normal agricultural operations.

11.
That Payette County and AElll have agreed in their Development Agreement that Big
Willow Road" ... shall be paved and improved to meet minimum geometric parameters of a 45
mph roadway designed in accordance with MSHTO design standards and designed to meet HS20 load ratings." Development Agreement, Exhibit D-3, para. 13.
12.
That the Development Agreement continues and states:
"The anticipated public primary access roadway, Big Willow Road, includes a bridge over Big
Willow Creek, which bridge shall be evaluated for integrity and load bearing capacity in
accordance with anticipated loads during construction of the Project. If the approaches to the
bridge are not sufficient according MSHTO Load and Resistance Factor Design Specifications
(current edition) to accommodate off-tracking of larger equipment, improvements to, or
reconstruction of the bridge shall be completed prior to commencing Phase IV--Pre-Construction
Grading." Development Agreement, Exhibit D-3, para. 14.
13.
That in addition to having lived and worked on the ranch for almost all of my life, I have
also worked as an agricultural consultant and for a time sold real estate, specializing in recreation
property.
14.
That I am acquainted with and have discussed the effect of the County's actions with
others, including a real estate professional and an attorney, both of whom are familiar with my
ranch property.
15.
That the rezoning of the proposed site for the construction of a nuclear power plant and
the entering into the Development Agreement, which has a term of twenty (20) years with
provision for extensions, together with the agreed-upon changes which are proposed to be made
to the road and the bridge, have markedly decreased the value of my property.
That I have concluded, after considering the above and discussing the matter with other
16.
knowledgeable persons, that the value of my property has been decreased in the amount of three
hundred to four hundred thousand dollars ($300,000 to $400,000) by the actions of AElll and
Payette County.
~
DATED this
day of November, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAN, individually and as husband and
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W.
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
individually and as husband and wife;
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R.
ROLAND, individually and as husband and
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an
individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)

Case No. CV-2012-364

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC., a )
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L. GILLISPIE, )
an individual; JENNIFER RANSOM, an
)
individual; COUNTY OF PAYETTE, a
)
political subdivision of the State ofldaho; and )
DOES 1-10, fictitiously named,
)
)
Defendants.
--------- - - - - - - ·)

AFFIDAVIT OF CLIFFORD D.
MORGAN IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO COURT'S
QUESTIONS REGARDING
STANDING

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTYOFPAYETIE

)
) ss.
)

I, CLIFFORD D. MORGAN, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
1.
Tha~ together with my wife MARY A. MORGAN, I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled
matter and my address is 7405 Little Willow Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of
the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, could and would testify competently thereto.
2.
That my wife Mary and I have owned our home and farm and have lived here, together
with other family members, on these premises since 1993.
That prior to coming to Idaho we had lived in several western states because of being
3.
transferred to new locations by my employer.
That I had worked in the communications industry for thirty-two (32) years as an
4.
employee of AT&T.

5.

That after my retirement from AT&T I began another career, selling real estate.

6.
That while I was employed in the real estate industry I became familiar with appraisal
techniques and the process of determining the market value of real property.
7.
That my wife and I purchased our present property, which consists of a home and other
buildings, because we wanted to live in a clean, quiet, healthy, rural environment away from the
noise, smell and intrusion of traffic.
8.
That my wife and I purchased our present property, which is seventy-two (72) acres of
cropland and a riparian zone along Little Willow Creek, because we also wanted to pursue a selfsufficient lifestyle.
9.
That my wife and I, along with other family members, have during these last nineteen
(19) years grown, preserved, and prepared much of our food and have also raised some cattle and
kept several draft horses on the property. We have also raised some alfalfa hay on the property.
10.
That I have also served for ten (10) years on the Board of Directors of the Little Willow
Irrigation District.
11.
That I have during the time I have lived here, in part because of my tenure on the
irrigation board, become familiar with the properties owned by my neighbors on Little Willow
Road and Stone Quarry Road.
That I am familiar with property values in this area and during the time I've lived here
12.
have observed and been aware of sale prices of various other properties in this area.

13.
That my home and farm. is located approximately four (4) miles from the Alternate
Energy Holdings, Inc. (AEHI) site which has been approved by Payette County for the
construction of a nuclear power plant.
14.
That my property includes a part of Stone Quarry Road and Little Willow Road and the
bridge which is located near the comer of Little Willow Road and Stone Quarry Road.
15.
That Stone Quarry Road has been designated as a secondary emergency access road for
AEHI' s proposed nuclear power plant. Development Agreement, Exhibit D-4, para. 16.
16.
That Payette County in its contract with AEHI has agreed that Stone Quarry Road
" ... shall be paved and designed and improved to meet AASHTO design standards reasonably
determined by County and AEHI' s traffic engineer ... ". Development Agreement, Exhibit D-4,
para 16.
17.
That my property is not large enough to be operated as a commercial agricultural
business.
18.
That the prospect of these changes agreed to by Payette County has a very negative effect
on the qualities that have made my home such an attractive property, specifically the clean, quiet,
natural surroundings, with very little traffic.
19.
That the approval and rezoning of the AEHI site by the County has made my property
much less attractive as a home site and retirement farm.
20.
That I have concluded that the value of my property has been decreased by approximately
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) by the approval of the AEHI applications and the
entering into the Development Agreement by Payette County.
DATED this~~day ofNovember, 2012.

Cliffor~ jo. Morgan
One of the Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated
below.
Anne-Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 1st Ave N
Payette, ID 83661

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman, PLLC
802 W. Bannock St., Ste. 500
Boise, ID 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Charles F. Peterson, Jr.
913 W. River Street, Ste. 420
Boise, ID 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Richard A. Roth
The Roth Law Firm, PLLC
295 Madison A venue, 22 nd Floor
New York, NY 10017

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

John Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2852

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

S:11 i .1 ~ i OA\h/
Sally Anders~Assistant to Briane Nelson Mitchell

AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES S. UNDERWOOD

BRIANE: ;NELSQN MITCHELL (ISB #2346)
·
ne1s@maukburgoyne.com

MAUK & BIJRGOYNE

515 South 6 th Street
·
Post Office Box 1743
Boise, Idaho 83701-1743
Telephone: (208) 345-2654
Facsimile (208) 345:-3319
THOMAS A. BANDUCCI (ISB #2453)
tbanducci@bwsiawgroup.com
WADEL. WOODARD (ISB #6312)
W\voodard@bwslawgroup.com
DARA PARK.ER (ISB #7177)
dparker@bwslawgroup.com
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAi'-J, individually and as husband and
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W.
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
individually and as husband and wife;
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R.
ROLAND, individually and as husband and
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an
individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC., a )
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L. GILLISPIE, )
an individual; JENNIFER RANSOM, an
)
individual; COUNTY OF PAYETTE, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho; and
DOES 1-10, fictitiously named,

Case No. CV-2012-364

)

)
)
)

_________
D_e_fe_n_da_n_ts_.- - - ~ )

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES S.
UNDERWOOD, JR. IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE TO COURT'S
QUESTIONS REGARDil"l"G
STANDING

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF PAYEITE

)

I, JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
1.
That I am a Plaintiff in the above entitled matter and my address is 8720 Little Willow
Road, Payette, Idaho. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a
witness, could and would testify competently thereto.
2.
That I have owned a home and been domiciled at the above address for more than six (6)
years and have owned, for more than thirty-five (3 5) years, another parcel of land, in the Little
Willow Creek area, located approximately six (6) miles north ofmy home.
3.
That I have, for many years, had clients and friends who lived in or owned property in the
Little Willow Creek area and am generally familiar with local land values.
4.
That I completed an elective course, in law school, that included as a major section the
process of appraising real property and have, since that time, participated in continuing legal
education courses and other industry and institution sponsored courses involving real estate
acquisition, development, sales, and financing, including both private and public properties.
That I have been and am an active member of the Idaho State Bar for more than forty
(40) years and a substantial part ofmy practice has consisted ofrepresenting real property sellers
and buyers, real estate developers, and public and private lenders in matters that required my
participation in determining the fair market value of many properties.

5.

6.
That for fifteen (15) years I was a shareholder in a closely held corporation that
developed rural home sites, in a ranch area east of Boise, and I was directly involved in the sale
of more than twenty (20) of the lots, from the pricing of the lot through the sales process, and I·
met with and discussed the features and the pricing of the various lots with dozens of prospective
buyers.
7.
That in this perio~ which concluded with the final transaction in 2008, I gained
additional experience about the qualities and features the prospective buyers were seeking and
about the process of determining the fair market value of the parcels.
8.
That based on my education and experience, and my personal knowledge of my home
and property, I submit this testimony regarding the reduction in the value of my home and
property, as a result of the actions of Payette Count-y and Alternate Energy Hoidings, Inc.,
(AEHI).

2

9.
That I had, in 2011, in preparation for renewing the homeowners insurance policy on my
house at 8720 Little Willow Road, completed a review of the files from the purchase of the
house, five years earlier, including an appraisal, my valuation notes, and other documents, in
order to determine the present value of the property prior to discussions with the agent regarding
renewing the insurance policy.
10.
That Payette County, by entering into the twenty (20) year Development Agreement -with
AEHI, granting the rezone, granting the variance, and changing the county's Comprehensive
Plan, has detrimentally affected the marketability of my real property and reduced its market
value, by taking action which can result in the building of a nuclear reactor seven (7) miles from
my property, where dangerous radioactive material may be stored for an indefinite period, and in
the placing of my property in a proposed nuclear power plant "Plume Exposure Pathway
Emergency Planning Zone".
11.
That I have come to this conclusion, and my conclusion regarding the amount of the
reduction in the estimated value of my property, based primarily upon my personal knowledge of
my property and my experience in determining the value of other properties, but also after
consulting with :friends and other contacts who have knowledge and experience in determining
the value of rural residential real property.
12.
That those whom I have consulted, in my consideration of and computation of the
reduced value ofmy property, have included, but are not limited to, a real estate broker, a
registered surveyor, a title specialist for a title insurance company, and a real property acquisition
specialist, each of whom has experience regarding real property values, development or sales in
southwest Idaho.
13.
That I have also conducted a limited online search and review of publications regarding
the reduction in the value of real property near nuclear power plants, which identified
investigations that include findings that nuclear power plants have a net negative effect on
property values.
14.
That I have, based on my general experience, my experience with prospective buyers
who choose to live in a rural ranch environment, and my discussions with other knowledgeable
persons, concluded that the county's action, on behalf of AEIIl, has resulted in a reduction in the
value of my home and property.
15.
That I have also concluded, based on the above, that when the estimated value of my
residential property, after the county's action on August 29, 2011, in entering the 20 year
Development Agreement and granting the rezone, is subtracted from the estimated value of the
property before the action, the estimated reduction in value of my property, as a result of the
county's action, is the sum of seventy-four thousand dollars ($74,000).
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DATED this

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _ _ day of November, 2012.
l

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
f DAtio
My Commission Expires: ',, ·Z0\7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated
below.
Anne-Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 1st Ave N
Payette, ID 83661

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman, PLLC
802 W. Bannock St., Ste. 500
Boise, ID 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Charles F. Peterson, Jr.
913 W. River Street, Ste. 420
Boise, ID 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Richard A. Roth
The Roth Law Finn, PLLC
295 Madison Avenue, 22 nd Floor
New York, NY 10017

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

John Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2852

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

~&~-./
Assistant to Briane Nelson Mitchell

AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL HUMPHREYS

:

. · ..·

·.

·.

'

....· ·....

··•··

•.

'\

/ '•

..· ·.

.

)

....

·.

•

:

.

• nm~ff~~~~C$LLQSB#2346)

i~~:E

Te1j;plloµ~: {2Qls) 3~2{?54
Fa:c,silllil~ {20&) 34$':-3319 . ·

-~·~=3::53)
.,,.T~.PLLC
.

.

· F~~irpifo: (2t1$)~4~-44-55 ..

··. ~sfo~i,ritllfs <.· •
1
··•

;

IN~,i~'ffiieic9wa'OF THE lffllWJlJDicrALDISTIUCT oF THE

.. ·. ' '. ...
:STAT.EOl'IDAHO
,. ·, .•,...:' ....................'.",'.•.·.>.:r. IN
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. . . . TBE
. COUNTY
. .
.OFPAYE'ITE
. . . .... .

~t-~~F

MORGAN, iruij\'idlml}y al:l,Q !JS husband and
wife; TQMPJ;NCE.~:iq~d~ CYRIL w.
ROLAND andIRENEJ. ROLAND,
.
indivi~y and ~lmsband.and ,vife;
THOMAS G. ROLANDmtdMARCJAR
ROLAND;, individually and as husband m1d

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

'Wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR.,. an

)

individual; and JEFFREY O. WEBER~ an
individual;,
. ..
. ..
.

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS> INC., a )
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L- GILLISPIE,, )
m1 indi-vidua¾;

JENNIFER RANSOM, rui
individual; COUNTY OF PAYEITE, a
ixilitical subdivision ofthe Strle ofldruto; and

DOES 1~10,. fictitiously nam~ .
.

D~endants.
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STATEOFTEXA.S )
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County of Be,;rar
.)

Michad Huµwhreys, first being duly sworn., subscribes and states as follows:
I make this affidavit upon my personal knowl~ie.

1.

. ·.I am,' a managingllle!Ilber
of H Hook LLC> tlle owner
and ope:qrtor of H Hook
·,
.
.
.

2.

.. ··

.

.

. .

:

..

·.

.

:

.

Ranch mPayette Collllty (tef~d to as 7'H Hook Ranch" or "H Hook") one of the Plaintiffs in
whose
street address
is 10495
Stone
Quany
Road,
is
the above
matter. H . Hook. Rane~
. . entitled
.- ..
.
. .
·. . . . . :
..
.. ·
. ·.
. . .
.
. .
. a
·.

,

:_..

·.:

_.

•.

working cattle ranch of approximat¢ly 15,000 acres tha! is lo~ted along Little Willow Road and
Stone Q1.1arry Road, .My :furnily has operat~ the ranch and conducted related farming

operations on the property since 1987. H HookRanch has 20 :full time resideuts.

H Hook shares a continuous boundary of approximately 3 ¾ miles with the .

·3.

property where the purportednuclear power plant will befocated.
.

.

.

.

Jfthe nudea:r power plant is constructe4 during the proposed fol.IT to :6.ve"'.year ·

·•·4.

~

construction·. period~ I understand
tlmt the construction
site
may operate
up
to 24 houra
day
.
·. '
.
·.
.
.
:
..
.

·,

.

'

·.

.....

.·.

.

generating noise, dust, and traffic with several thousand workers arriving and d~parting daily in
addition to material deliveries. H Hook and its neighbors 1,1se Stone Quarry Ro.ad and Little

wmow Road for moving cattle as well as farm equipment, and those activities would be
negatively affected by the traffic.
5.

H Hook also operates a feedlot for weaner calves at the corner of Little Willow

Road and Stone Quany road fur tb.ree months of the year. This feedlot is approximately 1/2 mile
from the Northeast comer of the Schw-arz Property '\\1lere the purported nuclear power plant will
be located. Continuous traffic and the associated dust and noise ftom the daily arrivals and

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HUMPHREYS-2

departuxesto.andfrolll.fil1.in4ustrial sitewoul(l h~ve ?~v~re.i~p~ct pri tiieJe~ot·s operatjon · .
and could render it unll&'able.· ..·

Two of the H Hook, ranch ;hom,e~ are foqa{eii qn theunpaved Sto11e Quarry !load.

·. 6.

Continuous traffic and the associated dust and.noise.fron1.facility consttuctioµ andoperation,
includingarrivals and departures to and from the indt!$trial site, woul<i adversely affect the use
and enjoyment of these properties•
. . All of

. 7.

theH Hook ranch workers and their filmilies live in homes on Little

Willow Road. :Most have worked for the H Hook ranch for over ten years. H Hook is deeply
concerned about

its ability to co~tim1e its ~bing o~erations ff it is unable to retain ciualified ·.

farm and ranch workers because the Utt.le Willow Creek area will beGome uninhabitable or less
desirable
for residences
due to the adverse effects flowing. from the proposed. power plant and
.
.
-

'

.

.

'

.

,.

.

....

·..

.

.

\

.

....

·,.

related activities. .
··. 8.

H Hook is concerned about the risk of vandalism and theft to our homes and

ranch properti~, vehicles, and livestock from the tho~sands. of transient workers that would be
passing through the previously remote Little Willow Creek Community~
9.

B Hook ope:r;ates several ground water wells in Sections 21 and 22 on the

northeast boundary of the Schwarz Property for crop irrigation, stock water and home drinking

water. The impact on ground water and electrical service from the construction and. operation of
this industrial site may adversely affect H Hook Ranch.
10.

At present the area around Stone Quarry Road and Little Willow Road is

considered own range. Cattle have the right of way. AEHI and Payette County have not
indicated how this conflict could be resolved with the proposed power plant
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DwiIIg the rune since. 1987 whet) my family firstpnrchased the init~ much.
properey Iocat~ at Hl495 Stone Quaey Road, I have participatedin Or cfuffl1y neg-0ti~~the
J 1.

.

.

,

.
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·.

·. .·
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·.

.

.
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.

·.··.

'

..·

.

·..

·.

•·pm:c~ and sale ofoo~itional ranch properties jn th~ Little Willow Creek~$ we expanded .
.()Uf

ranch. .

·. . .· 12. . In ~ddition to nzy falnily,s ran<ili located ip. Payette c®µty, I own jointly ,vith my

I

spouse t1thir ranch p r ~ in Idaho \\lhlch assembled by the direct nesotlatlon and purchase of.·.
four contiguous raooh properties in the previous nineteen ye;ap;. hi the pro~s ofth~

~~ovs, r~~y.metwith and discussed th~~· andtl1eprlcing ofthe purchasoo .
propertie~ "''Ith bro~ and prQspectlve selle~. J have ~ advanced degree in l}usiness and have

considert,3.bfo. prior expeci.enee in vruµiI.tg bush:tesses•
13.

•·· The Payette Coµnty Olmmissioners' actions in entering

into the 20~year

. ·.

DevefopmentAgreement~th AEHt granting the rezone. gralltingthe variance, and changing
the County• s O>mprehensive Plml Ilave. ju my OJ)inion, detrimentally ~ted the marketability
ofmy fanlily's HHook ranch property and reduced its market value,: especially when o:ne

considers :the _pro~ ofmy fumily"s property being i.ocfoded iuthe 10-:mile nucle&r r~ctor ,i

Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone".
14.

My opinions regarding '!he restricted marketability and the amount of the

re.duction in the estimated value ofmy :family's property, are based primarily upon my
knowledge and experience, but also after consulting with knowledgeable associates with

experience valuing recreation :ranch property in Idaho~
15.

Those with whom I have consulted concerning the re-duced value of my property

include, a :recreation much broker,.a ranch appraiser, a much in..<mrance broker and a:ranch

· . . 16. · .·. .

™seA~ti~~atiOJl$c~<l ~~ r~\V.frQnimy ·9wn.f;petje11qe: tb.<tt(~e . · '

market val11es of
construction of

~~elll ~al

.~o~es~ sigIJJilca11tlyreduced not.(}nlydllfingmid ~er·····.·

a~uJear povrei' plant, but also inmlediately upon the chan~e in loc~ zoning to

permit constniction of a.nll~learpowerplailt. ·.
.·.. Therefore,1Jased9iithe above, I believe that the effectofthe county's actions on

·. ·17.

my family's ~ch properly, aI1d other ~ai:by properties, has b~en to significantly reduce the. .
,
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•

•

interest of any recreatl<>Iiratlch bu,yer in purchasing that property. I

••

••

•

•

••••

•

belie;ea prospective .

recreation buyer would only be wterested in considerwg a purchase of my family's ran9h ·..
property

if

at the in~tial conract, a significant discount from fair market value

~ offered as .<ill..

inducement
Obviously,
aprospective;ecreation
buyermightjustas
e~ilyhaye
rerointe~st
.
·.
.
.
.·
....·
..
'.
.
·.
. :
.
:
·. . . . :
·.·
·.
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:

·.

;

·.

de$Pite the offered initial discoun; due to the 20 year un~eIU!iniy :resultiJJg froni the ;ldjacent .

approved nuclear plant site.

· ·•·• 1&.
value

• 1herefore3 based upon the researcll I have performe~ and ~Y lmowl:dge ofthe

qf HH{)ok Rauchand similarproperties prior tothe zoning approval and the Devefopment

Agreeillent, it is ru,y opinion that the value of H Hook Ranch has been significantly reduced --:
well in excess of $100,000- because potential buyers will not wanttQ ~uy a ranch next to
property which has the necessary County a,pprovais for the construction of a nuclear power plant.

19.

The cloud of uncertainty that has been created by the actions of Payette County

have also forced me to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, my family's plans to undertake capital
improvements on our property.

flJ ~:I! ~~A-'

Michael Humphreys
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Notary Public for Texas
Residing at 0JV1 ·f\11trrl\ o f t

My Ccm~s!ori fxplres
.· AUU~$t 12, ~16

MycomnnssiQnexpires:Aujust l2i 20\tp .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated
below.
Anne-Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 1st Ave N
Payette, ID 83661

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
[X] Email

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman, PLLC
802 W. Bannock St., Ste. 500
Boise, ID 83 702

[X] U.S. Mail

Charles F. Peterson, Jr.
913 W. River Street, Ste. 420
Boise, ID 83702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Richard A. Roth
The Roth Law Finn, PLLC
295 Madison Avenue, 22 nd Floor
New York, NY 10017

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

John Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chtd.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
LLC1 an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAN, individually and as husband and
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ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
individually and as husband and wife;
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R.
ROLAND1 individually and as husband and
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD> JR., an
individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
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STATE OF _ _ _ )

)ss.
County of _ _ __,)
Plaintiff Thomas Roland, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness,

could and would testify competently thereto.
2,

I reside at 4331 Little Willow Road with my wife, Marcia. My mother, Irene,

resides at 4001 Little Willow Road. My father Cyril, who was also a Plaintiff in this action,

passed away last month.
3,

My family operates a famtlng operation along Little Willow Road on which we

have a dairy operation and raise com, wheat, alfalfa and both dairy and beef cows,
4.

The plan to build a nuclear power plant approximately four miles from our farm,

wJit.ch has be~gapproved by Payette County, and the Development Agreement, have had and
will continue to have a negative impact on my family's fanning business,

5.

The negative stigma of the planned nuclear plant impacts our dairy operation

because everything that a cow consumes ends up going into its milk.
6.

I. as an experienced dairy farm.er can, by the taste of the mi~ distinguish between

the types of feed that a cow has been consuming.
7.

The milk industry is extremely sensitive to any matter that could possibly taint its

product and I anticipate that we may have a reduced demand for my farm's milk because of our
location within a few miles of the planned AEHI nuclear plant.
8.

We routinely use Little Willow Road to move our farm equipment and even if

Little Willow Road is only used for secondary access to the proposed nuclear plant, it v.ill still
have a negative impact on our farming operations. Little Willow Road is a nan-ow. less than 25
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feet wide in places, winding farm road vvith no shoulders. no center line and many patches and

repairs.
9.

A lot of the farm equipment that we move on the road is sixteen to eighteen feet

wide) including the corrugator and com planter. The disc, shredder and grain drill are fourteen to
sixteen feet wide.
10.

Given the number of construction workers and regular employees that will be

driving on the access roads to the nuclear plant, I do not know how we vvill be able to use Little

Willow Road, which has been a key part of my family's farming operation for more than fifty
years.
11.

Ifwe wanted to sell our farm, the fact that it is near the Payette County.approved

AEHI site would have a negative impact on the marketability and the price we might receive. As
an experienced farmer, I would not be interested in acquiring a farm near a planned or existing
nuclear plant.
12.

Even without an accident, the perception that a nuclear accident could happen

nearby is enough for me and m.ost people that I know. It is the risk of an accident that would
discourage me from thinking about acquiring a faun near where a nuclear plant was located, or
might be located.
13.

The County-approved plan for AEHI to build a nuclear power plant near my

family's farm has interfered 'With our use and enjoyment of the farm and our rural lifestyle.
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DATED Thlsll""day of November, 2012

~~~

---1homas Roland

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this
day of November, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of November, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated
below.
Anne-Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
11151 st AveN
Payette, ID 83661

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
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Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman, PLLC
802 W. Bannock St., Ste. 500
Boise, ID 83702
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[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Charles F. Peterson, Jr.
913 W. River Street, Ste. 420
Boise, ID 83702
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[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

Richard A. Roth
The Roth Law Firm, PLLC
295 Madison A venue, 22nd Floor
New York, NY 10017

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivered
Email

John Janis
Hepworth, Janis & Kluksdal, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2852

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivered
[X] Email

Sally Anderso ,
Assistant to Briane Nelson Mitchell
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802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-4411
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ALTERl\fATE ENERGY HOLDINGS, INC., a )
Nevada Corporation; DONALD L. GILLISPIE, )
an individual; JENNIFER RANSOM, an
)
individual; COillffY OF PAYETTE, a
)
political subdivision of the State ofidaho; and )
DOES 1-10, fictitiously named,
)
)
Defendants.
)

JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAN, individually and as husband and
wife; TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W.
ROLAND and IRENE J. ROLAND,
individually and as husband and wife;
THOMAS G. ROLAND and MARCIA R.
ROLAND, individually and as husband and
wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR., an
individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
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AFFIDAVIT OF PAT THACKER IN
SUPPORT OF CIVIL LAWSUIT
REQUESTING INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT, AND OTHER
EQUITABLE RELIEF

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Ada

)ss.
)

Pat Thacker, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness,

could and would competently testify thereto.
2.

I have extensive experience in the purchase and sale of ranch and farm prope11ies

in Southwestern Idaho. I am a real estate broker licensed by the State ofidaho.
3.

I have been asked for my opinion about the impact that the proposed nuclear

power plant, as reflected in the AEHI/Payette County Development Agreement, the Rezone, and
the Variance, will have on the properties owned by the Plaintiffs that are all located within ten
miles of the proposed plant.
4.

I have personal knowledge of the Little Willow, Stone Quarry and Big Willow

area. I am also familiar with the properties owned by Plaintiff Tom Pence (5433 Big Willow
Road), the H Hook Ranch (10495 Stone Quarry Road), Jeffrey Weber (10465 Stone Quarry
Road), Clifford and Mary Morgan (7405 Little Willow Road), the Ro lands (4001 and 4331 Little
Willow Road), and Jim Underwood (8720 Little Willow Road).
5.

It is my opinion that Payette County's approval and accommodation of the AEHI

plan to build a nuclear power plant has and will continue to reduce the value of properties that
are located adjacent or nearby to the proposed site of the plant. I also believe that any effort to
sell or market properties adjacent or near to the proposed plant will be hampered by the 20-year
Development Agreement as well as the rezoning and variance. I have reached these conclusions
after consideration of many different factors, including the following:
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a.

The Payette County 20-year Development Agreement, the Rezone

from agriculture to industrial, and the height variance are Adverse Material Facts
that would need to be disclosed to any potential purchaser of property adjacent or
near to the proposed nuclear plant. This is a requirement in Idaho and it would
apply to any property owner within the IO-mile Emergency Planning Zone.
Nuclear facilities have a negative stigma and this stigma is even stronger after the
Fukashima disaster.
b.

I have talked with some of the most active purchasers of ranch and

farm land in Southwest Idaho. Without exception, I have been told by these
individuals that they would not be interested in acquiring land near the proposed
nuclear plant. In fact, several of these individuals indicated that they would not
be interested even if a substantial discount was provided to the price of the
property.
c.

I have reviewed literature relating to the impact that nuclear power

plants have on the value of surrounding prope1iies. One of the things that I
noticed was that agricultural land is more negatively impacted than residential
properties because agricultural land does not receive any of the so-called benefits
that may come from a nuclear plant (i.e., better paying jobs and potentially
increased tax base).
d.

The value of the cattle and crops raised from the ranches and fanns

near the nuclear power plant will be negatively impacted. Regardless of whether
there is any type of accident, the fact that cattie and crops are associated with the
nuclear power plant will adversely affect the market.

For example, · at the

Winnemucca cattle auctions, there win certainly be a negative impact when cattle
AFFIDAVIT OF PAT THACKER IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL LAWSUIT REQUESTING INJUNCTIVE
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are described as having been raised near the Payette nuclear power plant versus
cattle raised practically anywhere else. Similarly, people who currently purchase
hay or milk from the Little Willow farms will be less likely to make those smne
purchases if the hay or milk is associated with the Payette nuclear plant.
e.

In my experience, there is oftentimes a premium attached to ranch

and farm properties in Idaho, particularly by out-of-state buyers, who are looking
for rural property with recreational attributes, particularly for hunting.

The

proposed plant and all of the traffic that it would bring to the Big Willow, Stone
Quarry, Little Willow area would undoubtedly discourage that type of out-of-state
purchaser.

' ,..;-/..,

DATED This

J.i.. day of November, 2012
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this
day of November, 2012.

(l!)~

SALLY ANDERSON
Notary Public
State of klaho
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,-IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
JOHN W. BURLILE, an individual; H HOOK
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
CLIFFORD D. MORGAN and MARY A.
MORGAN, individually and as husband and wife;
TOM PENCE, an individual; CYRIL W. ROLAND
and IRENE J. ROLAND, individually and as
husband and wife; THOMAS G. ROLAND and
MARCIA R. ROLAND, individually and as
husband and wife; JAMES S. UNDERWOOD, JR.,
an individual; and JEFFREY G. WEBER, an
individual,
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vs.
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COUNTY OF PAYETTE, a political subdivision of )
)
the State of Idaho; and DOES 1-10, fictitiously
named,
)
)
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

I, Mark W. Richey, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:
1.

I am a State Certified Appraiser in Idaho and Oregon, a designated member of the

Appraisal Institute, and a Professional Member of the American Society of Farm Managers and
Rural Appraisers. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness,
could and would testify competently thereto.
2.

I have conducted an investigation regarding the effects on neighboring real

property of Payette County's recent land-use decisions authorizing the development of a nuclear
power plant in the Little Willow Creek neighborhood in Payette County. My opinions are
effective as of November 15, 2012.
3.

The definitions I relied on for this project are as follows:

Market Value
The most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus. Implicit in this
definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified date and the passing of title
from seller to buyer under conditions whereby:
1.
Buyer and seller are typically motivated; both parties are well informed or
well advised, and acting in what they consider their best interests;
2.

A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market;

3.
Payment is made in terms of cash in U.S. dollars or in terms of financial
arrangements comparable thereto; and
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4.
The price represents the normal consideration for the property sold
unaffected by special or creative financing or sales concessions granted by anyone
associated with the sale. 1
External Obsolescence
An element of depreciation; a diminution in value caused by negative externalities and
generally incurable on the part of the owner, landlord, or tenant.2
Environmental Stigma
An adverse effect on property value produced by the market's perception of increased
environmental risk due to contarnination.3
Exposure Time
1.

The time a property remains on the market.

2.
The estimated length of time the property interest being appraised would
have been offered on the market prior to hypothetical consummation of a sale at
market value on the effective date of the appraisal; a retrospective estimated based
on an analysis of past events assuming a competitive and open market. 4
4.

The scope of my assignment and the extent of this investigation included the

following:
1.
researched locations of existing commercial nuclear generating facilities in
the West;
2.
obtained basic familiarity with nuclear power generating facilities
oversight and regulatory guidelines impacting surrounding areas;
3.
reviewed articles pertaining to real property in proximity of nuclear
generating facilities;
4.

interviewed Institutional investors;

5.

interviewed lenders;

6.

interviewed real estate brokers;

1

The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Fifth Edition, 2010, pp. 122-123.
The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Fifth Edition, 2010, p. 73.
3
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 2012-2013 Edition, p. A-18.
4
The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, Fifth Edition, 2010, p. 73.
2
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7.
toured the neighborhood, including a "drive-by" of the site proposed for
the nuclear generating facility; and

8.
determined the effects to real estate in the Little Willow Creek
neighborhood due to proximity of a nuclear power generating facility.

5.

A copy of my professional qualifications has been attached to this Affidavit as

Exhibit A. I am familiar with this neighborhood because I have made appraisals on various
properties in the area during my career. Some ofmy clients include John Stringer, OX Ranch,
Fred Humphreys, H-Hook Ranch, Harry Bettis, Darrel Barker, and Ralph Crawford. Each of
these appraisal assignments were of ranch properties. Agriculture, both farming and ranching, is
the primary economic practice of most of the property owners within this neighborhood and is
considered a conforming use. There have been a few acreage-type homes constructed within this
neighborhood over the past twenty years. Other than these few homes, I have not observed any
significant transition or change in use in this neighborhood.

6.

Throughout my career, I have appraised real estate that is subject to eminent

domain actions where a change or stigma occurs that was caused by various projects. For these
reasons, I understand the process and investigation required to appraise property that has
experienced external obsolescence, environmental stigma, project blight, or a combination of
these physical or legal conditions. This report describes the steps I took in obtaining the
competency required by USPAP to provide professional assistance in this assignment and afford
a credible opinion(s).

7.

General information regarding costs, benefits, problems, and basic regulations

were reviewed. What I considered important for this initial investigation are the emergency
planning zones. li Ph.1...1ne Exposure Pathway Zone extends out from a facility \\<ith a 10-mile

radius. This zone is concerned with exposure to, and inhalation of, airborne radioactive
contamination. The second is an Ingestion Pathway Zone that reaches out over an area within a
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50-mile radius of the plant. This zone is concerned with the ingestion of food and liquids that
may become contaminated by radioactivity. Regardless of the zone, these types of designations /
map overlays could create a preconceived negative stigma, which affects real estate at least
during the initial announcement and planning process.
8.

I reviewed professional literature regarding real estate values in proximity to

nuclear power generating facilities. The most current book that discusses issues pertinent to this
type of project was written by Robert A. Simons, When Bad Things Happen to Good Property.
He discusses the effects external conditions have on real property and includes a formula to
calculate the "after" values. Additional articles include:
Externalities of Nuclear Power Plants: Further Evidence, Sherman Folland and
Robbin Hough. This is a good article that relates environmental stigma to farms.
The authors conclude that a value decline of 10 percent can occur out 60 miles
from a facility. They also relate the risk to the farms in proximity to a nuclear
power facility having more risk and less profit as well as uncertainties due to
health consequences of the commodities produced. One additional comment in
this article is that they expect reduction in land rent for a farm with proximity to
one of these facilities in comparison to a farm with no proximity characteristics.
Standard on the Valuation of Properties Affected by Environmental
Contamination, International Association of Assessing Officers. They conclude
that proximity to a nuclear power plant is likely to produce a negative value
effect.
The Impacts of nuclear facilities on property values and other factors in the
surrounding communities, Roger H. Bezdek and Robert M Wendling. They
conclude that long-term impact may be nil. However they go on, "but this does
not necessarily remove the issue from the agenda of public concern, and that the
short-run adjustment costs borne by some located near nuclear power sites may be
substantial." This conclusion relates to the subject neighborhood because the
approval was recent, and the uncertainty with potential affects is likely at its peak.
The Effect of Power Plants on Local Housing Values and Rents, Lucas W. Davis.
This author concludes residential neighborhoods within two miles of nuclear
power generating plants experience 3 to 7 percent value/rent reductions, and goes
on to say that there are larger value decreases within one mile of a facility. This
aspect is of concern in the subject neighborhood because there are residential
building improvements.
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK W. RICHEY IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
COURT'S QUESTIONS REGARDING STANDING - 5

summary, the weight of the research indicates a material reduction in market value which
begins with the approval of the local zoning decision.
10.

An important concern regarding liquidity is the ability of an owner to refinance a

property in this type of neighborhood or a buyer to obtain financing. I interviewed a few of the
primary agricultural lenders to learn if there are any lending guidelines that would adversely
affect the ability to finance. If there is no financing, a seller would need to find a cash buyer, and
this would limit the pool of potential buyers to a point that could cause a major hardship on an
owner.
11.

Robb Steinke of Rabobank America indicated they would consider a loan on an

agricultural property in this neighborhood as long as the market value reflected the external
condition and perceived market risk. Mr. Steinke said they had made loans for properties
adjacent to the INEL facility in Eastern Idaho, but qualified that statement with the fact this
neighborhood has a track record, and it is an experimental/developmental facility rather than an
active generating facility. Regardless, Mr. Steinke stated that a loan-to-value ratio less than the
current 65/35 for good credit customers or 55/45 for normal customers would not apply. A
40/60 loan-to-value ratio would be likely.
12.

Erin Plumb with AXA-Equitable AgriFinance stated he was not familiar with any

"like" scenario within their institution. He thought financing under the scenario of an
open-ended 20-year development agreement for a nuclear power plant would likely cause his
institution not to lend on that type of property.
13.

Jack McCall of Clear Creek Land & Mortgage stated he was involved in

financing a large fa1-rn in the Magic Valley 20+ years ago that was adjacent to a former landfili.
At that time he said, "It took a very expensive environmental impact study prior to getting the
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loan approved." Mr. McCall did not think it would be possible under the current regulatory
overview to get a loan approved under the scenario I described with his institutional investor,
MetLife Agricultural Investments. He commented that the potential for the construction of a
nuclear power plant would be an adverse condition and a "prison would be a better neighbor."

Mr. McCall thought that once the facility was constructed it would be difficult for the operators
in the neighborhood to market and or sell their potatoes or cattle.
14.

I interviewed three real estate brokers regarding the marketability of a property

within a neighborhood targeted for the construction of a nuclear power generating facility.
Brokers have good insight to the whims of market participants, and if they perceive difficulty in
marketing, several conditions occur. Some of these would be the loss of enjoyment, stigma, and
liquidity. Trent Jones of Hall and Hall in Ketchum, indicated that none of his buyers would be
interested in a property within a neighborhood impacted by a potential nuclear power generating
facility. He would not be interested in listing a property in this neighborhood because his buyers
would not consider even looking due to the externality and perceived risk.
15.

Henri Lemoyne of Lemoyne Realty and Appraisal in Twin Falls, markets and

sells agricultural real estate throughout southern Idaho. Mr. LeMoyne stated that if they were
priced right, recognizing the external condition, he would market properties in this
neighborhood. He qualified his comments that the price(s) would need to be less than competing
areas unaffected by the uncertainty caused by the potential for the construction of a nuclear
power generating facility. He stated, "[a]II environmentally sensitive purchasers would be
eliminated from the pool of potential buyers," under the scenario I discussed.
16.

Kim Brnce, Silverhawk Realty in Frn.itland has a 445-acre property for saie on

Little Willow Creek. It was listed in March of2012 for $350,000 and reduced in September of
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2012 to $319,500. I asked her ifthere had been market interest, and she said there has been by
local purchasers. Ms. Bruce indicated that while non-local purchasers may be affected by the
potential of a nuclear power plant, local purchasers are not as affected because, according to Ms.
Bruce, the typical response from a local purchaser when told about the nuclear power plant is
that if there is a problem plant it will not make any difference if you are within one mile or ten
miles away from the plant. That said, the property has not sold, and the external
location/neighborhood characteristics are built into the asking price. Given the current strong
market for agricultural real estate, it is unusual that this property has been on the market as long
as it has, which tends to demonstrate that there are concerns regarding external obsolescence.
17.

I have re-inspected the neighborhood as part of this assignment. No significant

changes have occurred over the past twenty years regarding highest and best use. Agriculture
remains the predominant land use and is considered a conforming use.
18.

Based on my investigation, I have concluded there have been adverse effects on

real property within the Little Willow Creek neighborhood created by the granting of the
Development Agreement to AEHI by Payette County and the associated zoning changes, etc.
Those adverse effects are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Stigma - perceived or actual,
Loss of enjoyment,
Extended exposure time,
Limited demand pool,
Financing- difficult and lower loan to value ratios,
Liquidity has been affected
Increased capitalization/discount rates.

Each of these elements individually or combined have an adverse effect on the real property in
the subject neighborhood. It is difficult to measure the extent of the stigma or loss of value
without conducting a complete valuation and carrying this analysis forward to an appraisal of
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each property owned by your clients. Nevertheless, based on my investigation to date, it is my
opinion that the value of the Plaintiffs' Petitioners' properties have been decreased due to the
Development Agreement and accompanying zoning changes which authorize the development of
a nuclear power plant in close proximity to the Plaintiffs' properties. This decrease in value
occurred immediately upon the public announcement

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _ _ day of November 2012.

Notary Public for Idaho
My Commission expires: i I -

7 - ;;2 0 I 3
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This memorandum is submitted in support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Brief
in Excess of 50 Pages. Respondent, Payette County, and Intervenor, Alternate Energy Holdings,
Inc. (herein "Respondents") have objected, in their Reply Brief, to the filing of an over length
brief by Petitioners. Respondent and Intervenor's Brief, page 12, footnote 3. Petitioners submit
that there is good cause for the filing of a brief in this matter in excess of 50 pages.
First, it should be noted that the Respondents' specific objection to Petitioners' brief is to
the attachment of Appendices A and B to the brief. Appendix A is a list of the names and
addresses of each of the Petitioners, indicating the distance of each Petitioner's property from the
power plant approved by the County. Appendix A was included in anticipation that Respondents
would object to Petitioners' standing to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review. Appendix B is
a summary of some of the evidence contained in the record which supports the standing of the
Petitioners to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review. It was also included in anticipation of
the Respondents' attack on Petitioners' standing.
Second, those appendices do not count towards the 50 page limit set forth in I.A.R. 34(b).
Indeed, that rule expressly provides that "[n]o brief in excess of 50 pages, including covers and
anything contained between them excluding addendums or exhibits, shall be filed without the
consent of the [court]." (Emphasis added) Therefore, Respondent's objection that the brief is
over-length on account of Appendix A and Appendix B is without merit.
That said, Petitioners recognize that even taking the appendices out of the equation, the
brief is still slightly over-length. There is good reason for this. The Court will no doubt recall
that there are presently pending before the Court two Petitions for Judicial Review filed by
Petitioners, one seeking review of Payette County's approval of a variance (Case
No. CV-2011-335) and this one, seeking review of Payette County's approval of a related
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF IN EXCESS OF
50 PAGES, Page 2

conditional rezone. After briefing was completed in the variance appeal, Intervenor, Alternate
Energy Holdings, Inc. ("AEHI"), filed a motion seeking to have certain Petitioners dismissed
from the action on the grounds they lack standing to pursue their appeal. That motion was
briefed and argued before this Court and is pending a decision.
In an effort to avoid a similar attack on Petitioners' standing in this appeal, Petitioners
elected to more fully address AEHI's standing arguments in their opening brief. To do so,
Petitioners devoted approximately ten pages of briefing to the standing issue and the related issue
of prejudice to Petitioners' substantial rights in their opening brief. Petitioners also attached
Appendix A in order to provide the Court information about the locations of Petitioners'
properties in relation to the approved power plant, information which AEHI argued was missing
from the briefing in the variance appeal. In addition Petitioners attached, as Appendix B, a 2 ½
page summary of some of the evidence in the record supporting the Petitioners' standing.
Contrary to Respondents' accusation, that Appendix was not included in an attempt to avoid an
over length brief, but in an attempt to improve the readability of the Petitioners' brief by not
including in the text of the brief itself, detailed information taken from the record, yet making
that information convenient for the Court to review.
If not for the need to address the issue of Petitioners' standing, Petitioners' brief could

have met the 50 page limit demanded by Respondents. Fully addressing the standing issue was,
of course, critical since, as Respondents have pointed out, the determination of that issue is a
prerequisite to determination of the substantive appeal issues raised by Petitioners. The Court's
decision on that issue will determine whether the Petitioners will have their day in Court.

In addition to the foregoing, the Petitioners have identified seven separate substantive
issues for determination by the Court in this appeal including whether the conditional rezone is
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invalid because it is based upon an invalid comprehensive plan, whether the conditional rezone
constitutes illegal spot zoning, whether the conditional rezone violates the provisions of the
Payette County Code, whether the Development Agreement exceeds the statutory authority of
the County, whether the Development Agreement is void for not having been properly adopted,
whether Payette County's hearing notice and hearing proceedings violated the requirements of
the Local Land Use Planning Act, Payette County's ordinances and principals of procedural due
process and whether the Board's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
inadequate. Examination of those issues requires detailed analysis of both factual matters and
legal issues. In an attempt to keep the length of the brief manageable, however, Petitioners
devoted only about 30 total pages to discussion of those issues, an average of just over four
pages each (with a high of about 7 pages and a low of about 2 pages), resulting in a reiatively
concise treatment of each issue. In other words, the substantive portions of the Petitioners' brief
were not, in Petitioners' view, overwritten. There was simply a relatively long list of issues to
address, requiring a brief somewhat longer than permitted by right under the rules.
Finally, in making their objection to Petitioners' brief, the Respondents do not claim they
are prejudiced by the length of Petitioners' brief. Respondents do not argue that Petitioners have
been unfairly advantaged by the length of their brief, nor that Respondents have been unfairly
disadvantaged. Respondents do not claim that Petitioners are unduly benefited as a result of the
over length brief nor that they are unduly detrimented.

Respondents simply object to the

technical violation which this Court is free to excuse in the exercise of its discretion.
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For the above reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court authorize the filing
of the Petitioners' October 18, 2012, brief in the above captioned matter.
DATED: This

{pt1--day of December, 2012.
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Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated
association, et al.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS )
)
OF PAYETTE COUNTY,
)
)
Respondent,
)
)
and
)
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., )
)
a Nevada corporation,
)
Applicant/Intervenor.
)
)

Case No. CV 2011-959
(Consolidated with CV 2011-335)

OBJECTION TO
PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF

AND
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE BRIEF IN EXCESS OF SO
PAGES

________________

Appiicantiimervcnor Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. (''AEHI"), by and through its

coum::el of record, objects to the additional affidavits attached to Petilioners' Reply Brief. AEHI

also opposes Petitioners' aftcr-the~foct motion to allow an over-length brief, as set forth below:
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OBJECTION
hereby objects to the attempt to incorporate additional affidavits and testimony
filed in Case No. CV-2012-364 in Petitioners· Reply Brief. Petitioners claim that this Court
should take judicial notice of these affidavits: however, this matter is not a "civil action" (see,

e.g .. Krempast.y v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,239,245 P.3d 983.
991 (2010)), but is, instead, a petition for judicial review driven by the separate rules, standards,
and procedures contained in I.R.C.P. 84 and the Administrutivc Procedure Act (Title 67, Chapter
52, Idaho Code). Those procedures require that the record before the Court be based solclv on
the evidence presented before the agency below. See I.C. § 67-5277. Additional items may be
included in the record only through the augmentation procedure identified in Ruic 84(1).
The record is subject to review and settlement through a process identified in Rule 84(j).
Thar process was drawn out to incredible lengths in this case: however, Petitioners, Respondent,
and AEHI each agreed that the record was complete and settled upon filing of the Notice of

Transmitting of Electronic Record of Consolidated Agency Record by the Respondent on
1

October 4, 2012. The timeframe in which to supplement the record ran-at the latest -from
that time. Petitioners made no such motion. And an attempt to do so under these circumstances
would be futile as the affidavits unmistakably fail to qualify under Rule 84(1), which requires that
the "additional materials" be documents previously '"presented to the agency."
AEHI respectfully requests that the additional affidavits be stricken from the record in
this case. AEHI further requests that the affidavits also be stricken as their attachment to the

Petitioners· Reply Brief renders the same well in excess of the limitations identified in Idaho
Appellate Rule 34(b), which limits briefing to no more than fifty pages-cover to cover.
1

Respondent previously filed a Norice of Tran.,·miuing of Agt:ncy Record on August 2, 2012. Thnt filing should be
considered to haw triggered the timeframe in which to supplement; however, for purposes of argument. we assume
that the timeframe for wpplementation began with the later filing on October 4. 20 I 2.
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EXCESS OF

AEHI also opposes Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages.

Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, there is no good cause for filing such an overlength brief.
First, Petitioners claim AEHI forced them to file an ovcrlcngth brief by previously raising
the issue of standing, stating, "If not for the need to address the issue of Petitioners' standing,

Petitioners' brief could have met the 50 page limit demanded by Respondent::;," Petitioners·
Memo in Support, at 3. In the saine breath, however, Petitioners reeogni%e that the issue is

prerequisite to Petitioners' claims. Indeed, it is Petitioners' burden to allege standing to support
their participation in this petition for judicial review. and the fifty pages allowed by rule is more
than sufficient space in which to make the specific altegations required by Idaho case law. If
Petitioners anticipated the argument and legitimately believed addressing standing would push
them over the 50-page limit, then they should have asked for permission rather than forgiveness.
Second, Rule 34(b) limits briefs to fifty pages, which includes "covers and anything
contained between them excluding addendums or exhibits, ... " It should be noted, first,
Petitioners have not labeled the additional pages as addenda or exhibits, but instead referred to
them as appendices. In addition, while Petitioners' Brief is numbered up to page 52, Petitioners·

Brief actually contains 58 pages from caption to certificate of delivery. From there, Petitioners
add four additional pages labeled as appendices-again, not addenda or exhibits. Those
additional pages contain allegations and argument that very easily could have been included
within Petitioners' Brief: There is nothing in Rule 34(b) that allows Petitioners not to count the

first six pages of their brief, and nothing in Rule 34(b) that permits Petitioners to skirt the 50page limit by placing additional allegation and argument in "appendices," Petitioners argument

amounts to nothing more than an endaround of the appellate rules, and would have this Court
adopt an interpretation that would render Rule 34(b) meaningless.
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DA TED this 13 th day of December 2012.
SPINK BUTLER, LLP

By:~~
T. Hcthc Clark
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings Inc.
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response

Alternate Energy

's (AEHI) objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief.

I. INTRODUCTION
AEHI objects to Petitioners' request that this Court take judicial notice of several
affidavits tiled by certain Petitioners and other witnesses 1 in a related case pending before this
Court, John W. Burlile> et al v. Alternate Energy Holdings Inc., et al, Case No. CV2012-364.
For the Court's convenience, copies of those affidavits were attached to Petitioners• Reply Brief
in this matter as Appendix A. Those affidavits were submitted in Case No. CV2012-364 in
response to questions regarding the Plaintiffs' standing to pursue the claims made therein. Since
similar questions regarding Petitioners' standing were raised in this case, Petitioners submitted
the affidavits here to provide further evidence that Petitioners have standing to pursue this
appeal. AEHI objects to the Court considering the affidavits on the ground that the Court's
review of the action of the Payette County Board of County Commissioners (the "Boardn) in in
this case must be based solely on the record of the administrative proceedings. As shown below,

AEHI's objections to the affidavits are without merit. For purposes of establishing standing to
contest the action of the Board~ the Court is not confined to the record made before the Boal'd,
and may consider the affidavits of Petitioners and other witnesses.

II. ARGUMENT
(

This action was initiated as a petition for judicial review of the action of the Board in
approving a conditional rezone for ce~in property in Payette County, the approval of which
permitted AEHI to develop a nuclear power plant thereon. Petitioners are property owners and

1
The affidavits in question were made by Plaintiffs John W. Burlile, Jeffrey G. Weber, Thomas F. Pence,
Clifford D. Morgan, fames S. Underwood, Michaol Humphreys, as Managing Member of B-Hook LLC, and
Thomas Roland; Pat Thacker, a licensed real estate broker; and Mark Richey, a real estt1.te appraiser.
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Petition

Petitioners alleged that they are '"affected persons having an interest

Judicial Review, the
real property which. may

be adversely affected by the Board of County Commissioners• approval of the [conditional
rezone] within the provisions of I.C. § 67-6521, whose substantial rights have been prejudiced
within the meaning of I.C. § 67~5279(4)." In thefr opening brief, Petitioners further addressed
the issue of standing by pointing out that all individual Petitioners reside on or own property
adjacent to or within a few miles of the approved power plant and all within the ten~mile radius
Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone of the approved power plant> where they
are especially vulnerable to injury and haim in the event of an accident at the plant, that the
nuclear plant, if constructed, would expose the Petitioners to injury and hann from the routine
emission of radioactive water into the environment, that their use and enjoyment of their
properties would be adversely impacted by the construction and operation of the power plant and
that the values of their properties were diminished as a result of the approval of the conditional
rezone. AEHI and Payette County (together the HRespondents,,) responded by arguing that the
Petitione1s 1 allegations were "insufficient to establish standing." Respondent and Intervenor's

Brief, page 12. Petitioners' allegations, they say, are ill defined and lacking in detail. Id at
page 13.
In view of Respondents continued attacks on Petitioners' standing, Petitioners, in their

Reply Brief, further described the basis for their standing and requested the Court take judicial
notice of the above-described affidavits in which the factual basis for standing was described in

greater detail. 2

2
The informadon contained in the subject affidavits is not new or different from that which Petitioners have
previously argued and relied upon. Rather, those affidavits simply provide greater detail in support of allegations
previously made,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS

INC. 'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF- 3

12/21/2012 FRI 10: 36

FA~ 208 342 4455 BWS

AEHI cites to no case law holding that a district court,

~005/009

considering an attack on a

petitioner's standing to ,..,""'"""' judicial review of a zoning decision, is confined to the record
made before the zoning body, and Petitioners are aware of none. Indeed, such a requirement

would make little sense, since standing is a matter for detennination by the Court, not th.e Board
of County Commissioners. Standing ls a preliminary question the Court resolves before reaching

the merits of the case. Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228,
231, 254 P .3d 1224, 1227 (2011 ). It is a jurisdictional issue and as such is a question of law for
determination by the Court. Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151, 219 P.3d 473 (2009).
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have
adjudicated. Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371; 375, 913 P.2d 1141,

1145 (1996). As has been previously pointed out, to have standing in a land use case the
Petitioners need to allege, not prove, only that the development could potentially harm his

or her real estate interest. Hawkins, supra. i at 231. Said simply, a determination of standing to
pursue judicial review is a legal question for determination by the court 1 not by the agency whose
action is the subject of review.

The Local Land Use Planning Act does not require that a person interested in an
application being considered by a planning and zoning commission or a governing board first
establish standing in order to participate in a hearing on that application. In fact, the Local Land
Use Planning Act does not even require that an "affected person" eligible to seek judicial review,
as defined in I.C. § 67-6521, participate in the hearings before the decision making body. The
need to consider a party•s standing to pursue a petition for judicial review a.rises only after a
petition for judicial review has been filed, an event which takes place after the zoning body has
held its hearings and made its decision. Zoning boards do not make factual findings or reach
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legal conclusions about standing and certainly the Board made no such factual findings nor
._,a,du1.,u

any such legal conclusions

issue to be addressed during

this case. Accordingly, there is simply no reason for the

administrative proceedings and no reason for the Court to be

confined to consideration of the administrative record in making its determination of a
petitioner's standing.

Instead. where the is.sue of standing is raised, as here, after the

administrative proceedings have been completed, the Court is free to consider additional
evidence in support of a party's standing to pursue judicial review.
A recent Idaho Supreme Court decision that addressed standing in a land use case relied
upon affidavits that had been presented to the court considering the petition for judicial review.
In In the Matter of the Jerome County Board of Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d 1076
(2012) the court was asked to determine the standing of the various petitioners contesting Jerome
County's approval of a permit for a livestock confinement operation (an "LCO'l As is common
in such cases3 , in addressfog the standing issue, the court briefly described the facts and
circumstances bearing on the standing of the various petitioners saying:
"Next, we find that the record contains sufficient allegations that the LCO
could potentially harm the individual property owners' real estate and health
interests. Evidence was presented to the board regarding probable compromised
resale value of existing homes in the area, odors, and possible health concerns.
These could each be categodzed as threatened hann.u [internal citations omitted]
281 P.3d at 1087.
The court went on to point out, however, that "[t)he record on appeal includes an
affidavit from the Idaho Rural Council, Inc. stating that 'several [members] own and farm real

3

In most such land use cases where the issue of standing has been raised, the court briefly discusses the fa.ctual basis
for a. dete1minatfon of standing, but does not state the source of those facts~whether they are contained entirety in
the administrative record or alleged in the petition for judicial review, or addressed in the petitioners' briefing.
Petitioners have found no Idaho case, however, where the court h11s stated that it must confine itself to the
administrative record in determining the issue of standing.
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... several who live on such

prope1iy.'

... An affidavit from ICARE names three members whose primary residences are within one
mile of the proposed LCO ... " 281 P.3d at 1087Hl088. Based on those affidavits, the court
found that those organizations had standing to appeal the board's decision. By relying on those
affidavits to support allegations of standing to pursue the petition for judicial review, it is
apparent the Supreme Court did not believe it was confined to the administrative record.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the administrative record in an
appeal brought by a petition for judicial review may be supplemented with affidavits submitted
for purposes of establishing standing. In Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Bonneville

Power Administration, 117 F .3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1997), the petitioners submitted affidavits to the
court to establish standing.

The administrative agency (Bonneville Power Administration)

moved the court to strike the affidavits (as AEHI has done here). The Court denied the motion
and agreed to consider the affidavits saying:
"Because Article Ill's standing requirement does not apply to agency
proceedings, petitioners had no reason to include facts sufficient to establish
standing as a part of the administrative record. We therefore consider the
affidavits not in order to supplement the administrative record on the merits. but
rather to determine whether petitioners can satisfy a prerequisite to this court's
jurisdiction.... Because standing was not at issue in earlier proceedings, we hold
that petitioners in this case were entitled to establish stariding anytime durin1ithe
briefing phase. We consider the affidavits solely to determine whether petitioners
have standing to bring this action."

117 F.3d at 1527-1528.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recently applied the rule.

In U.S.

Magnesium, LLC v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 690 F.3d 1157 (10 th Cir.

2012), the petitioners sought judicial review of an action of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). The EPA argued that the petitioner lacked standing to pursue the appeal. In an
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to establish its standing, the petitioner attached an affidavit to its :reply brief, In agreeing

consider

affidavit for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner had standing to

challenge the EPA~ s action, the court said:
"Before addressing whether U.S. Magnesium has standing, we must first
determine whether we can consider the declaration of Bryce Bird, Director of
UDAQ (Bird Declaration), which U.S. Magnesium attached to its reply brief.
Generally, parties petitioning for review of agency decisions may only reply on
evidence in the administrative record, but> as we have recognized, 1 [b]ecause
Article Ill's standing requirement does not apply to agency proceedings, [US
Magnesium) had no reason to include facts sufficient to establish standing as a
part of the administrative record.' Qwest Commc 'ns Int'! v. FCC, 240 F.3d 8861
892 (10 th Cir. 2001) (citing Nw. Envtl. Def Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117

F.3d 1520, 1527-28 (9 th Cir. 1997)."

690 F.3d at 1164. The court went on agree with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest

Environmental Defense Center that the petitioners were entitled to establish standing anytime
during the briefing phase and relied on the affidavit attached to the petitioner's reply brief in its
consideration of the issue.
This Court should likewise consider the affidavits submitted by the Petitioners in this
case.

The situation regarding standing here is similar to the situations in Northwest

Environmental Defense Center and US. Magnesium.

H~re the statutory requirements for

standing do not apply to the County's proceedings. The issue of standing arises only once a
petition for judicial review has been :filed. Because standing was not an issue in those earlier
proceedings, Petitioners should be permitted to establish standing now, by affidavit submitted
during briefing.

Moreover; because it is the Court, not the agency which makes the

determination on standing, the Court is permitted to consider additional evidence in order to aid
the Court, s determination of the issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petitioners request

the Court overrule AEHI' s

Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and take judicial notice of the above described affidavits.
DATED this 21st day of December 2012,

Wade L. Woodard

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of December 2012> a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Anne Marie Kelso
Payette County Prosecutor
1115 1st Avenue North
Payette1 ID 83661
Attorneys.for Payette County Board of
Commissioners

OU§,..Mail
G}.Facsimile: 20&-642-6099
0Hand Delivery
Oovernight Mail
OE-mail: akelso@payettecounty.org

JoAnn Butler
Spink-Butler
251 E. Front St., Ste. 200
Boise1 ID 83 702
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc.

QUjMail
[;}Facsimile: 208-388-1001
0Hand Delivery
00vemight Mail
QE-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com

Wade L. Woodard
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
)
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF)
THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, )
}
. an unincorporated association, et. al.,

)
)
)
)
-vs)
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF )
PAYETTE COUNTY,
)
)
)
Respondent,
}
}
and
)
)
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., a
Nevada corporation,
}
)
)
Applicant/Intervenor.

CASE NO. CV 2011-959
CV2011-335

Petitioner,

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF

On December 6, 2012, Petitioners filed a Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File
Brief in Excess of 50 Pages. The motion was brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(p) and

I.AR. 34(b). Petitioners assert that the additional length was necessary to address
standing issues that were raised in a related appeal currently before this Court. Next,
Petitioners assert that there are seven substantive issues, not including standing, to be

ORDER RE: MOTION TO FILE BRIEF

Page 1

considered by the Court. Additionally, Petitioners assert that under the Rule(s).
appendices are not included in the total page count. Finally, Petitioners state that

Respondents are not prejudiced by the length of the brief.
The Intervenor filed an Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and Response to
Motion for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 pages on the grounds that the additional
affidavits were not before the Board, and therefore cannot be considered by this Court

on review. Further, the briefing is required to be no more than fifty pages, cover to
cover. Finally, if more than fifty pages was needed to address the issues in this matter,
the Petitioners should have requested permission prior to filing the brief, rather than
asking for forgiveness after the fact. Intervenor requests that the affidavits be stricken.
Idaho Ru!e of Civil Procedure Rule 84(p) provides as follows:

Briefs and memoranda shall be in the form and arrangement and filed and
served within the time provided by rules for appeals to the Supreme Court
unless otherwise ordered by the district court; provided that such briefs
may be typewritten and copies may be carbon copies or photo copies.
Only one {1) original signed brief need be filed with the court and copies
shall be served on all parties.
Idaho Appellate Rule 34(b} then provides, "No brief in excess of 50 pages,
including covers and anything contained between them excluding addendums or
exhibits, shall be filed wfthout consent of the Supreme Court." The Petitioners' brief,
which is in excess of the fifty page limit even without any of the attached documents,
was filed prior to obtaining permission for the overlength filing. The Intervenor objects to
the excessive length of the brief on the grounds that there is no good cause to support
the length. Although the Court wourd prefer that a motion to file a brief in excess of fifty
pages be made prior to the actual filing of the overlength brief1 in this case the number

ORDER RE: MOTION TO FILE BRIEF
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of issues in this appeal and the complexity thereof do warrant the additional briefing
provided. Therefore, the Petitioners' Motion will be granted with respect to the brief only.
With respect to the attached appendices, the Court's review is necessarily limited
to the factual record that was before the county. LC.§ 67-5277; St. Luke's Magic Valley

Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. of County Com'rs of Gooding County, 150 Idaho 484, 486,
248 P.3d 735, 737 (2011). Because those affidavits, and the infonnation contained
therein, were not before the Board in this matter, they cannot be considered during this
Court's review of the Board's decision. The affidavits contained within Appendix A and B
will therefore be stricken.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in
Excess of 50 Pages is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
DATED:

\_\(1'.fc..\A. 7-Cj t 20\~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
mailed or served upon the following persons on this

;?,,Z~ay of March, 2013.

Anne-Marie Kelso
PAYETTE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
1130 3rd Ave N, Rm 105
Payette, ID 83661-2473
Michael T. Spink
JoAnn C. Butler
T. Hethe Clark
SPINK BUTLER, LLP
251 E Front St, Ste 200
PO Box639
Boise, ID 83701
Stephen A. Bradbury
WILLIAMS BRADBURY
1015 W Hays St
Boise, ID 83702
Thomas A. Banducci
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC
802 W Bannock St, Ste 500
Boise, ID 83702
Betty Dressen, Clerk

By Deputy Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JU DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TH E COUNTY OF PAYETTE
NEIGHORS FOR THE PRESERVATION
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK
COMMUNITY,
unincorporated
an
associations, et al .,,

CASE NO. CV11-959
CV11-335
ORDER ON APPEAL AND ORDER OF
REMAND IN CV11-959

Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF PAYETTE COUNTY,
Respondents,
and
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Applicant/Intervenor.

I.
Course of Proceedings
Petitioners appeal the Payette County Board of County Commissioners'
(hereinafter, Board) decision to rezone property designated for agricultural use to heavy
industrial use to allow the Intervenor to build and operate a nuclear power plant and to
approve a Development Agreement and concept plan for the project.
ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN CV11-959 PAGE-1
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Intervenor wishes to purchase property to build a nuclear power plant in Payette
County.

The land he wishes to purchase is zoned for agricultural purposes so

Intervenor sought an amendment to the Payette County Comprehensive Plan, filed an
application to rezone the land on which property is located from agricultural use to
heavy industrial use, and a variance from the 125 feet height restriction for buildings in
the Heavy Industrial zone.
The applications for the zone change, the approval of a development agreement
and conceptual plan, and a variance were filed on June 22, 2010. (R., pp. 166-175.)
The Board designated a Technical Review Committee that held public meetings to
address the above applications.

Following the recommendation of that committee,

Payette County Planning and Zoning Commission (hereinafter, Commission), posted
notice and held public meetings on December 2 and 9, 2010. In advance of the
hearings, hundreds of pages of documents were submitted and 47 people, both in favor
of and opposed to the rezone, made statements 1 at the hearings on December 2, 2010
and December 9, 2010.

The Commission approved the variance and recommended

the Board approve the rezone and Development Agreement. Various parties appealed
the decision of the Commission to approve the variance.
The Board held a public hearing on the rezone and the Development Agreement
on June 6, 2011 and at that hearing, took statements 2 from interested parties. (R., pp.
3996-4021, Tr. 6/6/11, generally.) The Board deliberated on June 20, 2011, ultimately

1

No orai testimony was given at the hearings on December 2 or December 9, 2010, as
no person was placed under oath prior to making statements. (See infra.) Therefore, the
court will treat the oral information given at the hearings as statements rather than
testimony.
2
For the reasons stated in footnote 1, and as discussed infra, there was no oral
testimony, only statements.
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granted the application and rezoned the land from agricultural use to heavy industrial
use, and entered into a Development Agreement with Intervenor. The Board issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on August 29, 2011 (R., pp.41374160,) and thereafter, adopted Ordinance 2011-03 to effectuate the rezone. (R.,
pp.4161.) Petitioners appeal the Board's decision to rezone the property and enter the
Development Agreement. This matter was consolidated with Payette County Case CV2012-335 for purposes of Argument and Opinion because of the length of the record
and the relationship between the issues. The Record, therefore, includes the materials
and transcripts from the hearings in both cases.

11.
Issues on Appeal
1. Whether the decision to approve the rezone is invalid for the reason that it was
not based on a valid Comprehensive Plan as required by I.C. § 67-6511.
2. Whether the decision to grant the rezone constitutes illegal spot zoning.
3. Whether the decision to grant the rezone and Development Agreement was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the use approved violates
Payette County Code § 8-10-9, which prohibits any land or building in any zone
to be used or occupied in any manner creating dangerous, injurious, noxious, or
otherwise

objectionable

conditions,

including

the

emission

of

harmful

radioactivity, which could adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining
premises.
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4. Whether the County acted outside its statutory grant of authority in approving the
Development Agreement, rendering the Development Agreement illegal and
unenforceable.
5. Whether the Board failed to properly adopt the Development Agreement.
6. Whether the decision to approve the rezone and Development agreement
violated the notice and hearing requirements of the Payette County Code, the
Local Land Use Planning Act, and Petitioners' due process rights.
7. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Board of
County Commissioners were inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act
and thereby violated Petitioners' due process rights.

111.
Standard of Review
Preliminarily, this Court finds that the statements made at the December 2, 2010,
and June 6, 2011 hearings were not testimony, as no individual oath or affirmation was
given to any of the speakers. "The basic purpose behind an oath is to affirm the import
and necessity of telling the truth." State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 641, 67 P.3d 831, 836
{2003). Idaho Rule of Evidence 603 requires that before testifying, every witness must
declare "by oath or affirmation" that he will tell the truth. State v. Hardman, 120 Idaho
667, 670, 818 P.2d 782, 785 {Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
requires that, "all testimony presented at hearings will be given under oath or
affirmation." IDAPA 58.01 .23.558.
At the December 2, 2010 hearing, Mr. Osborn stated, "No one is going to be
given an individual oath this evening, but everyone is going to be testifying under a
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penalty of perjury." (Tr. 12/2/10, p.7, Ls. 7-9.) This statement is insufficient to transform
statements into testimony for several reasons. First, a charge of perjury requires
that an individual "having taken an oath" makes a false statement. IC. §18-5401 3 • Mr.
Osborn's statement that individuals would be subject to a penalty of perjury without
having taken any oath is incorrect. Secondly, IDAPA requires that all testimony given at
hearings be given under oath or affirmation. Thus, because there was no oath, there is
no oral testimony, only statements by interested parties.
Similarly, at the June 6, 2011 hearing, although the Board stated individuals
would be sworn in before speaking (6/6/11 Tr., p.1, L.8,) it does not appear anyone was
given an oath before making a statement and as such, there is no sworn testimony of
any of the Petitioners in this hearing. (See, 6/6/11 Transcript, generally, and Record,
pp.3993-4021.)
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek
judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA). Idaho Code § 67-6521(1 )(d) (2002);
Evans v. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 430, 50 P.3d 443, 445
(2002). The district court conducts judicial review of the actions of local government
agencies. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) (2002). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions,
a local agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is
treated as a government agency under IDAPA. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,

3

I.C. 18-5401 provides" "Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify,
declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee,
officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered,
wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to
be false, is guilty of perjury."
ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN CV11-959 PAGE-5

357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). The district court bases its judicial review on the record
created before the local government agency. LR.C.P. 84(e)(1)." Evans v. Teton County,
139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). Review on appeal is limited to those issues
raised before the administrative tribunal. Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm'rs,
110 Idaho 37, 40, 714 P.2d 6, 9 (1986). "[A]n appellate court will not decide issues
presented for the first time on appeal." Id. "The court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the [Board] on questions of fact." Id.; I.C. § 67-5279(1 ). Taylor v. Canyon County
Bd. of Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424,431,210 P.3d 532, 539 (2009).

The court must affirm the decision of the administrative tribunal unless the
administrative tribunal erred and such error prejudiced the substantial rights of the
appellant. I.C. § 67-5279(4)." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 920, 204 P.3d
1127, 1131 (2009).

An administrative tribunal errs when its findings, inferences,

conclusions, or decision are: (a) in violation of the constitution or a statute; (b) in excess
of its statutory authority; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3).
In its Reply Brief, Petitioner asks the Court to take judicial notice of affidavits filed
in Burlile, et.al. v. Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. et.al., Canyon County Case CV-2012364. These affidavits are not present in the Record on Appeal and there is no indication
that the affidavits were submitted to the Commission or the Board for their
consideration.

Therefore, because the affidavits were not presented to either the

Commission or the Board, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the affidavits, as
this Court sits in an appellate capacity and is therefore limited to reviewing the facts as
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established by the agency from which the appeal is taken. Crown Point Development,
Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573, 577 (2007); l.C. § 67-5276.

111.
Certain Petitioners Have Not Established They Have A Bona Fide Interest In
Real Property For Purposes Of Establishing Standing
Standing is a preliminary question the Court must resolve before reaching the
merits of the case. Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231,
254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011 ), citing Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143
Idaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575, 578 (2007). LLUPA allows a person having a bona fide
interest in real property who is adversely affected by a final decision granting approval
for a rezone and an amendment to a comprehensive plan to petition for judicial review
pursuant to IDAPA after exhausting all available remedies. I.C. §§ 67-652(i), 67-6516;
Rollins v. Blaine Cnty., 147 Idaho 729, 731-32, 215 P.3d 449, 451-52 (2009); Evans v.
Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). Additionally, the "petitioner
needs to allege, not prove, only that the development could potentially harm his or her
real estate interests." Id. at 76, 73 P.3d at 89 (2003), see also, Hawkins v. Bonneville
County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 {2011 ). Thus, for
standing, Petitioners must only allege, rather than "show'' prejudice to a substantial
right:
The language in LC. § 67-6535(c) instructing courts that "[o]nly those
whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of
fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a
remedy or reversal of a decision" cannot be construed as a standing
requirement. The existence of real or potential harm is sufficient to
challenge a land use decision.
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Evans, 139 Idaho at 76, 73 P.3d at 89; Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 231, 254 P.3d at 1229.

However, the record must contain evidence of both a property interest and the adverse
effect on that property to establish standing.
Petitioners allege that they have standing because:
1. All of the individual petitioners reside or own property adjacent to, or within
a few miles of, the proposed nuclear power plant (Petitioner's Brief, p.13);
2. The organizational petitioners have standing to pursue the petition in their
own right and on behalf of their individual members (Petitioner's Brief,
pp.13-14);

3. Individual Petitioners will be forced to live with the inherent risks of
cataclysmic harm and diminution in the value of their properties resulting
from the proximity of the power plant (Petitioner's Brief, p.14);
4. The value of their property is immediately negatively affected by the mere
possibility that a nuclear power plant may be built in the community
(Petitioner's Brief, p.14 );
5. That there will be routine emissions of radioactive materials which will
expose Petitioners to radiation or radioactive materials (Petitioner's Brief,
pp.14-15);
6. All petitioners reside or own property in the "Plume Exposure Pathway
Emergency Planning Zone," as defined by the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, exposing them to a greater risk of harm in the
event of an accident (Petitioner's Brief, p.15);
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7. There will be noise, dust and traffic related to the construction and
operation of the power plant, thereby interfering with Petitioner's quiet
enjoyment of their property (Petitioner's Brief, p.16);
8. There will be a loss of business and commercial operations on the
properties. (Petitioner's brief, p.16.)
Respondent and Intervenor argue that Petitioners may not allege any adverse
effects based on health or safety issues associated with radiological concerns or threats
of harm caused by a nuclear accident, as health and safety issues related to
radiological concerns are pre-empted by the federal government. In this, they are
correct.
The adverse effect relied upon by the Petitioners cannot be based upon safety or
health concerns arising from radiological incidents of a nuclear power plant, as that area
of law is are pre-empted by federal law and therefore, this Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims on those grounds. Moreover, because subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, Idaho State Insurance Fund By and

Through Forney v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 191, 938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997), the Court
must address this claim as raised by the Respondent and Intervenor, even where it was
not previously raised.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as well as subsequent amendments, regulates
nuclear reactors from the stand point of radiological health and safety concerns and
those concerns are in the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter, "NRC").
Congress, in passing the 1954 [Atomic Energy] Act and in subsequently
amending it, intended that the [t]ederal [g]overnment should regulate the
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radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a
nuclear plant, but that the [s]tates retain their traditional responsibility in
the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need,
reliability, cost, and other related state concerns.
Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 552, 23 A.3d 1176, 1184
(2011) citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 205, 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983).
In United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
Columbia University received permission from the Atomic Energy Commission to build a
nuclear reactor at the University for research purposes. Id. at 605. After completing the
necessary licensing inspections and reviews, the NRC issued an operating license
finding that the reactor could be "operated consonant with the public health and safety."
Id.

At the time, the City of New York did not require NRC licensees to obtain city

certificates, permits or licenses prior to operation. Id. at 606. However, after Columbia
received its federal operating license, the City, through its Board of Health, amended
the Health Code which required NRC licensees, in addition to obtaining federal
approval, to obtain additional certificates through the city. Id. The reason for the change
was to address the City's obligation to provide emergency services based on any
radiation releases or other nuclear incidents. Id. at 607. The City Commissioner denied
Columbia's request for a certificate pursuant to the newly-enacted ordinance based
"upon the possibility of injury to the health and safety of the public resulting from an
accidental release of radiation." Id.
The Court determined that because the City's decision "was based entirely upon
the alleged possibility of injury resulting from an accidental release of radiation," an area
in which the federal government had exclusive control, the City could not exercise any
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control over the licensing and regulation of the reactor and therefore, the ordinance was
invalid. Id.
In Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266
(1975), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that state courts were preempted from
considering plaintiff's allegations concerning the workability of the nuclear power plant's
emergency core cooling system and the possibility of nuclear accident. In that case,
Marshall sought a declaratory judgment on the grounds that, among other things, a
nuclear accident "would impair the marketability of his property, and result in a
depreciation of the value thereof, and in a diminution in the rental value thereof ... " Id. at
243, 237 N.W.2d at 273. He further claimed that the "results of a possible nuclear
accident [would be] so catastrophic that the siting and location of the said plant is a
private and/or public nuisance." Id. at 243, 237 N.W.2d at 273.
After determining that the Atomic Energy Act granted exclusive jurisdiction over
the area of radiological concerns to the federal courts, the Court held,
We find that this state is preempted from regulating, and this Court from
adjudicating, those matters which deal with dangerous radioactive
hazards. Specifically, we hold that we are barred from considering
plaintiff's allegations concerning the workability of the emergency core
cooling system of defendant's plant and the possibility of nuclear accident.
Id., at 247, 237 N.W.2d at 274. As such, the court could not consider or adjudicate any

of Marshall's concerns regarding radiological hazards from the plant, although it could
consider other, nonradiological hazards, such as steam, fog, and ice creating hazardous
driving conditions. Id. at 247, 237 N.W.2d at 275. In support of its conclusion, the Court
cited to 42 U.S.C. s 2021(k), which read as follows: 'Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for
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purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." Id. at 249-50, 237 N.W.2d at
(1975).
Other courts have taken similar positions. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v.

Pollution Control Bd., 5 III.App.3d 800, 284 N.E.2d 342 (Ill.App.Ct. 1972) (state statute
regulating level of radioactive discharge is preempted); New Jersey Dep't of Envir.

Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102,351 A.2d 337 (1976) (state
regulation of spent nuclear material conflicting with AEC regulation of same is
preempted); Pac. Legal Found. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903, 921 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Congress's intent to assert exclusive federal control
over the radiation hazards associated with nuclear materials is clear.") aff'd sub nom.

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
205,103 S. Ct. 1713, 1723, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 ( 1983) ("the federal government should
regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a
nuclear plant, but the States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating
electrical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other related
state concerns.")
All of Petitioners' claims about residing in the "Plume Exposure Pathway
Emergency Planning Zone," exposure to "cataclysmic risk" or "radiation," and the
adverse effects to their property are premised upon radiological concerns, which is an
area of law preempted by federal law and therefore, this Court cannot adjudicate those
claims. Petitioners must allege adverse effects other than the concerns about radiation
emissions or other types of radiological accidents for the court to determine standing,
therefore, the Court will not consider standing based on allegations 1, 3,4,5, and 6;
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rather it will consider only those adverse effects which are unrelated to claims of
radiation or possible nuclear accident as establishing standing for purpose of this
review.
Respondent and Intervenor further argue that of the remaining allegations, the
Petitioners have failed to identify specific adverse effects for each individual petitioner.

A. Petitioner Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek
Community

The Petitioner, Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek
Community, may have standing in its own right or solely as the representative of its
members if it cannot establish injury to itself. Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 675 P.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983). "[T]o justify any relief the association

must show that it has suffered harm, or that one or more of its members are injured." Id.
at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213. Id. at 87,675 P.2d at 347, citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2213 (1975).

However, in order to establish standing the

Organization must establish all three of the following elements: "(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief
requested, requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id. at 88, 675
P.2d at 348 (emphasis added).
Petitioner asserts standing on two grounds: first, that standing is premised upon
the "organization's [sic] members have standing to pursue the petition in their own right"
and second, "the interests which they seek to protect in these proceedings are germane
to each organization's purpose." (Petitioner's Brief, p.14.)
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Although Petitioner cites to pages 3247-3261, and 3660-3667 of the Record as
the location of the factual support to establish standing, the only mention of Neighbors
for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek Community is on page 3248 of
the Record, and the information, in its entirety, is as follows:
The Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek
Community is an unincorporated association of potentially affected
landholders, residents, and others with interests in the Big and Little
Willow Creek Community who would be adversely affected by the
approval of the Applications and resulting activities, including the same
and similar adverse effects as described below for H Hook and others.

(R., p.3248.)

This summary indicates that the Petitioner organization is

comprised of three different categories of people: potentially affected landholders,
residents and others with interest. If standing is premised on the ability of the individual
members to seek redress, that would require the individual members to have a bona
fide real property interest that is adversely affected. This would exclude "residents and
others with interests" absent some indication in the record that the residents and
interested others were also landholders - an unlikely proposition given that landholders
comprise a separate category. Residents and others with interest, without alleging that
they are real property owners whose property will be adversely affected, are not those
who could maintain the cause of action on their own, and therefore, do not confer
standing on Petitioner organization. See, In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, 153 Idaho
298,281 P.3d 1076, 1088 (2012).
Of the remaining members of the Organization who are landholders, there are no
specifically identifiable members of the Organization that have a bona fide real property
interest. Unlike the organizations in In re Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, supra, in this
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case, there is nothing in the Record that lists or otherwise indicates the membership of
the Petitioner organization, whether those members hold property, and if so, where that
property is located.

Failing to specifically allege that an identified member of the

organization has property that would be adversely affected deprives the Petitioner
organization of standing on this basis. "As the record does not include any indication
that Friends of Minidoka had a member who was an affected party suffering potential
harm to real estate in the area surrounding the proposed LCO site, Friends of Minidoka
cannot meet the first requirement for associational standing-no member has standing to
sue in their own right." Id., at 410,281 P.3d at 1088.
Even if the Petitioner Organization can point to an identifiable member, it has
failed to allege any facts or claims related to the second and third elements of the
standard. As to the second prong of the standard, "the interests which they seek to
protect in these proceedings are germane to each organization's purpose," nothing in
the Record supports this claim. Unlike the organizations in Glengarry-Gam/in, or In re
Jerome County Bd. of Com'rs, the Record in this case does not contain any information

about the constituents of the organization, why, how or when the organization was
created, the goals or missions of the Organization or any other information that would
indicate the Organization's purpose. Cf., Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Bird,
106 Idaho 84 (Ct. App. 1983).

Finally, the Petitioner Organization has provided no

claim or alleged any facts that neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested,
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit and therefore, have not
established the third prong of the test to acquire standing.
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Because Petitioners have not alleged, provided factual support for, or argued the
second and third bases for asserting standing, it has failed to meet its burden to
establish it has standing to go forward, as issues not supported by argument or
authority will not be reviewed. Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho
501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006) ("[W]e will not address those issues because this
Court does not consider issues not supported by argument or authority.")
Even assuming it could establish a property interest, Petitioner Organization fails
to sufficiently allege adverse effects as the only adverse effects alleged by the
landholders are '"similar' effects described for H Hook and others." However, Petitioner
H Hook's claims that it will be adversely impacted are based on particular factual
representations - its proximity to the proposed development and the nature of its
business as a cattle operation. There is no factual information in the Record about the
proximity of the property interest of the Petitioner's landholders, what that property
interest is or how that interest would be adversely affected by the Board's decision such
that this Court can assess whether the owners have sufficiently alleged an adverse
interest to their property. Therefore, the Petitioner Organization has failed to establish
they have organizational standing to challenge the Board's decision and therefore, their
appeal is dismissed.
B. People for Payette's Future, Inc.
As described in the Record, Petitioner is:
An organization of over 90 members created to provide economic and
other information and analysis, and to seek information, on land use,
development, growth, and other issues affecting the future of Payette
County. PFPF, acting for and on behalf of its 90-plus members, joins
these comments and objections as to all procedural issues raised herein,
including without limitation the County's failure to provide adequate notice
of these Applications and an adequate opportunity to review and comment
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on the application materials, all as required by Idaho law and the Local
Land Use Planning Act, among other authorities.
(R., p.3248.) The only identified individual members of the Petitioner Organization in
the Record are Michael Humphreys, on behalf of, and whose family owns and operates.
H Hook, LLC., (R., pp.111-112, 124; 3853-3854,) James Underwood (R., pp.124; 3854,)
and Joe Bercik (R., p.3565.) To the extent any of those individuals can maintain a cause
of action, then the Petitioner Organization has met the first prong of the test.
The Petitioner has, however, failed to establish the second and third prongs of
the test. As to the second element, the interest the Organization sees to protect is not
germane to the organization's purpose as the Petitioner's mission or goal is to "provide
economic or other information or to seek information" regarding various topics.

These

proceedings have no impact on the Petitioner's ability to gather, analyze or disseminate
information and therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish this element.

Notably,

Petitioners make no argument in this regard. Similarly, the third element has not been
alleged, supported or argued; therefore, Petitioner People for Payette's Future, Inc. has
failed to sustain its burden establishing it has standing and the Court declines to further
review the issue as issues not supported by argument or authority will not be reviewed.

Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254
(2006) ("[W]e will not address those issues because this Court does not consider issues
not supported by argument or authority.")

Therefore, as to Petitioner People for

Payette's Future, their appeal is dismissed.
C.

Petitioners Cody Burlile and Chris Burlile, De Burlile and Lori Pratt, John (Jack)
Burlile and Linda Burlile, Jordan Cary and Harmony Cary, Susan Dahnke, Dale
Dellinger and Jean Dellinger, Ray Denig and Jackie Denig, Richard Evey and
Susan Evey, Lane Huddleston and Joyce Huddleston, Luke Huddleston, Jerry
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Korn and Leon Korn, Cameron Mahler and Cindy Mahler. Cliff Morgan4 and Mary
Morgan. Thomas Pence and Kimberly Christensen, Cyril Roland and Irene
Roland, Tom Roland and Marcia Roland. Greg Semon and Terry Semon, Roger
Smith and Mary Vivian Smith, Elizabeth Stephens, Dick Towner and Sue
Towner. John Walgenback and Denise Morgan. Enrique Ybarra, Jr.
The above-listed Petitioners assert standing on the basis of:
1. All of the individual petitioners reside or own property adjacent to, or
within a few miles of, the proposed nuclear power plant, (Petitioner's
Brief, p.13);
2. There will be noise, dust and traffic related to the construction and
operation of the power plant, thereby interfering with Petitioner's quiet
enjoyment of their property, (Petitioner's Brief, p.16);
3. There will be a loss of business and commercial operations on the
properties. (Petitioner's brief, p.16.)
None of the above petitioners testified, either orally or in writing, about what
property interest they have and what the adverse effect to their individual property
would be. There is nothing in the record except general, unsworn statements that the
"construction and eventual operation of the site could adversely affect marketability and
value" (emphasis added) (R., p.3664,) or that there will be "noise, dust and traffic
related to the operation of the power plant." None of these petitioners are listed as
having property within 300 feet of the property boundaries (R., pp.184-186.) None of the
petitioners provided oral testimony, written testimony or any written submissions as to
4

Cliff Morgan appears in the complaint as an individual. He provided comments both
as an individual (Tr., p.12/2/10, p.137, L.4-p.138, L.12) and as the President of Little
Willow Irrigation District. (Tr., p.420, L. 21 - p.422, L.23; R., p.848). Because Little
Willow Irrigation District is not listed as a Petitioner, Cliff Morgan is treated as an
individual, rather than as the President of the Irrigation District, for the purposes of this
Decision.
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how the noise, dust or traffic would specifically impact them, or what business and
commercial ventures would be lost as a result of the Board's decisions.
In Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123,129,254 P.3d 24, 30
(2011 ), Ciszek provided an affidavit alleging that the rezone will result in a decrease of
her property's value, expose her to health risks and interfere with the use and
enjoyment of her property. Here, nothing in the Record indicates or alleges specifically,
what property interest these Petitioners have or how that property interest may be
adversely affected. "It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record
to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. In the absence of an adequate record on
appeal to support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error." Belk v. Martin, 136
Idaho 652, 660, 39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001 ). Because the Record does not provide any
information regarding any bona fide property interest or any specific adverse effect,
these Petitioners have not established they have standing to pursue this case and
therefore, their appeals are dismissed.
D. Petitioner Larry Dahnke
Petitioner Dahnke5 appears on a list of names of Property Owners within 300 feet
of the prospective property boundaries. (R., p.184.) Proximity to a proposed project, in
and of itself, is insufficient to confer standing; the party must demonstrate both property
ownership and that the property interest will be adversely affected. ("The appellants

5

Susan Dahnke's name does not appear on the list of those homeowners in the
Emergency Planning Zone. Nothing in the Record establishes that she has a property
interest in Larry Dahnke's property, therefore the Court will not presume that she does,
particularly where other entries on the list do indicate more than one name as property
owners of a particular address. For example, then entry immediately above Dahnke,
Larry, indicates that Horst, Daryl and Carol, reside at 5606 Little Willow Rd. (emphasis
added).
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standing status depends on whether they own property that may be adversely affected
by the PUD's construction, not because they can claim they own property within a
specified distance.") Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84, 88 {2003).
Nothing in the Record indicates Petitioner Dahnke is asserting his property
interest will be adversely affected, except, perhaps reading the documents in the
broadest sense, that it is the mere proximity that will adversely affect his property. The
Court will not speculate as to what, if any, adverse impacts Petitioner Dahnke believes
he will suffer, but in the absence of evidence in the Record to support his assertion of
adverse effects, Petitioner Dahnke has failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish
his standing to pursue the case and therefore, his appeal is dismissed.
E. Petitioner Jeffrey and Deborah Weber

Petitioners Weber allege that:
Jeffrey and Debbie Weber have an interest in real property located at
10465 Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, ID 83661, and would be adversely
affected by the approval of the Applications and resulting industrial
development activities. Among other activities, the Webers operate a
hunting dog training business on their property, which business
operations will be directly harmed and adversely affected by the
proposed construction and operation of the industrial facilities proposed
to be facilitated by the rezone and development Applications before the
Commission.

(R., p. 3248.) In another written submission, Petitioner Weber stated,
Building a nuclear plant within 3 miles from our business would have a
direct reflection on the desirability to bring dogs to our kennel for training
and boarding. Building this plant within 3 miles of our business also puts
us in a very dangerous position as responsible professionals. If AEHI
were to have any type of nuclear accident. ... "
(R., p. 3655.)
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Deborah Weber also submitted written opposition to the rezone wherein she exp I ains
that a prior development group held preliminary discussions about siting a nuclear
power plant in Payette County.

(R., p.3246.) During those discussions, there were

concerns about the impact to the land, air, water and the protection of the community,
as well as the time it takes for emergency vehicles to reach Little Willow Road and
Stone

Quarry

Road;

Petitioner Weber was

impressed

with

the way those

representatives handled the concerns and questions that existed at that time.

(R.,

p.3246.) She does not allege, however, that the same concerns that existed in 2007
also exist with the current proposal.
Although Petitioners Weber have established their bona fide property interest,
(R., p.184, 3655-3656; Tr. 12/2/10, p.138, L.24-p. 139, L.4; Tr., 6/6/11, p.96, L.16-p.98,
L.15,) Petitioners have not established through written or oral testimony what the nonradiological adverse effects will be on that property, as there is no sworn oral or written
testimony or any other written submission that articulates a specific harm. Cf, Ciszek v.
Kootenai County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 123,129,254 P.3d 24, 30 (2011)("Ciszek's
affidavit alleges that the rezone will result in a decrease of her property's value, expose
her to health risks and interfere with the use and enjoyment of her property.")
In Davisco Foods Int'/, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 787, 118 P.3d
116, 119 (2005), the property owners challenged the special use permit of the Jerome
Cheese factory to build a "reclaimed water project," arguing that, "the odor from this
sewage empoundment can cause irreparable economic damage to residential values.
Beautiful properties can suddenly be unsellable just with a change in the wind direction."
Id. The property owner also presented testimony at the hearing that his property could
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devalued by a change in the wind direction. Id. The Court found that was sufficient
to establish an adverse effect.
In Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247
(2006), the Court held that because the property owner had "demonstrated his land will
be adversely affected and presented evidence that the proposed development would
adversely impact his property rights and diminish his property value," Cowan
established standing to challenge the Board's decision.

Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of

Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006). What is not clear

from the decision, however, is what evidence Cowan produced in order to sufficiently
demonstrate the adverse effects on his property.
Regardless, while it appears from these cases that the allegation requirement is
relatively minimal and that an individual can establish an adverse effect for purposes of
standing by simply articulating a specific adverse effect, there still must be facts alleged
to establish the adverse effect.

Simply using the words "adverse effect" without

providing testimony or articulating what the specific adverse effects are, is insufficient to
establish standing.

Petitioners have not alleged what the non-radiological adverse

effects will be on that property because all of their claims relate to the radiological
impact, and/or fear of a radiological impact on their property. (See Record, p. 3655
("Building this plant within 3 miles of our business also puts us in a very dangerous
position as responsible professionals.

If AEHI were to have any type of nuclear

accident. ... "))
The most specific allegation of harm is that the Webers "operate a hunting dog
training business on their property, which business operations will be directly harmed
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and adversely affected by the proposed
facilities proposed ... " (R., p.3248.) (emphasis added). Petitioners have not articulated
how the construction and operation would affect their property given that Petitioners
Weber live approximately 2.75 miles from the proposed site. (R., p.3655.) There is no
evidence in the Record to establish how, over a distance of 2. 75 miles, the Petitioners
Weber will experience an adverse effect to their property associated with the
construction or operation of the proposed plant. Cf., Ciskek, 151 Idaho 123, 254 P.3d 24
(2011 ). (Ciszek's affidavit alleged sufficient particularized harm to meet the standing
requirements of a declaratory judgment action.") Because Petitioners do not allege how
the proposed construction and operation would affect their property interest, Petitioners
Weber have not met the statutory requirement to establish standing and their appeal is
dismissed.
F. Petitioners Jo Ann and John Jefferies
Petitioner John Jefferies alleges that because there are "two gas wells ... within 5
miles of the proposed location," AEHI should be required to maintain Big Willow Road
and address safety concerns regarding the transportation of radioactive materials. (R.,
p.3241 ). Petition Jo Ann Jeffries alleges, generally, that there will be insufficient water
to run a nuclear power plant, the cooling ponds seem too small and too shallow, and
has concerns about the plan for transporting nuclear waste in Payette County and the
potential for tax increases for all county taxpayers. (R., pp.3242; 3610.)
None of the allegations establish that Petitioners Jeffries have a real property
interest or that the adverse effects are specific to Petitioner's real property. At best,
they allege only generalized harm, which is insufficient to establish standing. For the
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reasons articulated in in this and previous sections, Petitioners Jeffries have failed to
establish standing and therefore, their appeal is dismissed.
G. Petitioners Joe and Betty Bercik
Petitioners Betty and Joe Bercik live at 6550 Little Willow Road in Payette. (R.,
pp.3274; 3604-3609.) Petitioner Bercik was concerned that additional information was
necessary before a rezone and variance could be granted. (R., pp.3274; 3604-3609).
Specifically, Petitioner Betty Bercik was concerned about how much water the plant
would use, what entities would have priority water rights, whether the site was
seismically safe, how power would be transported, whether AEHI would be required to
improve various roads to accommodate "5000 vehicles per day," and whether the
construction of a concrete plant would be necessary. (R., p.3274.) Her oral statements
mirrored her written submission. (Tr. 12/2/10, p. 107, s. 1-p.110, L.25.)

She also

submitted a letter in opposition to the rezone (R., p.3604,) outlining her concerns about
safety if an earthquake were to hit. (R., p.3605.)
written submission. (Tr., 6/6/11, p.57, L.20

Her oral statement mirrored that

p.60, L.15.) She makes no representations

about her business or livelihood being impacted or references to noise, dust or traffic
issues in either her written or oral statements.
Petitioner Joe Bercik's concerns were whether there was sufficient water for the
project, whether the site was seismically safe, how the power would be transported,
whether Intervenor would be required to maintain the roads such that the additional
traffic could be accommodated, and how the project could be feasible. (R., p.3273.) He
was also concerned about the impact on the infrastructure of Payette County, schools,
housing and traffic will all be affected," (R., p. 3273.) His oral testimony mirrored his
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written submission. (Tr., 12/2/10, p. 111, L.4 - p.114, L. 7.) Petitioner Joe Bercik also
jointly submitted the letter regarding earthquake concerns (R., p. 3605,) and in an oral
statement, reiterated the concerns about an earthquake, the lack of water, where waste
would be stored, and the general opposition to the plant. (Tr., 6/6/11, p.63, L.16 - p. 66,
L.16.) He makes no representations about his business or livelihood being impacted or
references noise, dust or traffic issues in either his written or oral statements.
While Petitioners Bercik have established they are property owners, they have
not alleged any specific adverse effect on their real property. Instead, they both posed
questions about aspects of the project, but those questions are generalized concerns
about the project and cannot fairly be categorized as allegations of specific adverse
effects on their real property.

Without a specific allegation of an adverse effect,

Petitioners Bercik have not established standing and their appeal is dismissed.
H. H Hook, LLC
Petitioner H Hook, LLC, has established both that it is a real property owner (R., pp.
184-187; 3247,) as well as the adverse effects to its property interest. (R., pp. 32483250.)

Petitioner H Hook specifically alleges that during the construction, the

construction "may operate up to 24 hours a day, generating noise, dust and traffic ... ,"
that the continuous traffic and associated dust and noise could render its feedlot for
weaner calves unusable ... ," (R., pp. 3249; 3663,) that its ranch homes on Stone Quarry
Road would be adversely affected by the "continuous traffic, and associated dust and
noise from the construction," and that if Petitioner cannot provide for the employees who
live in the ranch houses, the ranch business would be adversely affected.
3249; 3663-3664.)

ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN CV11-959 PAGE-25

(R., pp.

While some of Petitioner H Hook's allegations do not establish an adverse impact,
for example, the fear that there may be depredation to crops from a future "significant
elk herd," and the concern about the lack of open range, Petitioner H Hook has
sufficiently alleged both that it owns real property and that the property may suffer
potential adverse effects by the proposed use of the property and therefore, has
established standing to challenge the Board's decision.

IV.
Certain Petitioners Have Failed To Establish Substantial Harm Pursuant to Idaho Code
§67-5279(4)
"I.C. § 67-6535(3) requires a demonstration of actual harm or violation of a
fundamental right in order to be entitled to a remedy in cases disputing a LLUPA
decision." Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). Thus, the
party appealing the Board of Commissioners' decision must show the Board of
Commissioners erred in a manner specified under I.C. § 67-5279(3), and that a
substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Price v. Payette County Bd. Of

Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). Evans v. Teton County, 139
Idaho 71, 74-75, 73 P.3d 84, 87-88 (2003)
While the petitioner must show both an error under § 67-5279(3) and prejudice
under § 67-5279(4), nothing in IDAPA requires the courts to address these two
requirements in any particular order. Appellate courts, including the district court sitting
in an appellate capacity, "may therefore affirm a governing board's decision solely on
the grounds that the petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial right." See

Krempasky v. Nez Perce Cnty. Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235-36, 245 P.3d
983, 987-88 (2010) (upholding a conditional-use permit because the petitioner failed to
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challenge the district court's adverse ruling regarding substantial rights); Kirk-Hughes

Dev. LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 557, 237 P.3d 652,
655. In other words, the Court may forego analyzing whether the governing board erred
in a manner specified by LC. § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner cannot show that his or her
substantial rights were violated." Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com'rs, 151
Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011 ).
Even if all Petitioners established standing, most of them fail to assert any harm
for which the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims.

Petitioners allege two

general categories of harm to assert there is prejudice to their substantial rights. The
first category relates to the nature and proximity of the power plant to their property and
the second category generally includes procedural challenges to the process by which
the Commission recommended and the Board approved the application for rezone, the
Development Agreement and the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan.
In the first category, the Petitioners have five different claims: First, Petitioners
argue that if Intervenor is permitted to build a nuclear power plant near or adjacent to
Petitioners' property, "the community in which the Petitioners reside will be forever
changed and each of the Petitioners will be forced to live with the inherent risks of
cataclysmic harm and the resulting diminution in the value of their properties."
(Petitioner's Brief, p.14.) Petitioners second allegation is even if the power plant is not
built, they suffer "immediate economic harm due to the diminution on the value of their
property caused by the mere possibility that a nuclear power plant may be built in their
community." (Petitioner's Brief, p.14.) Third, Petitioners allege they will "suffer injury
and harm" from the "unavoidable radioactive emissions and discharges" from the plant
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the form of exposure to radioactive materials.

(Petitioner's Brief, p.15.) Fourth,

Petitioners allege that their property lies within the ten mile "Plume Exposure Pathway
Emergency Planning Zone," which subjects them to greater health and safety concerns
following some kind of nuclear accident or incident. Finally, Petitioners allege that the
nuclear power plant will affect business, commercial, or agricultural operations and use
of their property. (Petitioner's Brief, p.16.)
In the second category, Petitioner's claim the County's defective notice, improper
hearing procedure, and failure to adopt a reasoned decision in accordance with
statutory requirements violated their due process right, thereby prejudicing a substantial
right. (Petitioners' Brief, p.19.)
Just as the Court could not adjudicate whether radiological concerns constitute an
adverse effect on real property for purposes of standing, neither can the court determine
that prejudice to a substantial right exists where the prejudice is premised on
radiological concerns. To the extent the claims of economic harm are based on the
safety and health concerns of a nuclear accident, the Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on that ground.
Thus, as to claims in the first category, the only basis on which the court could find
prejudice to a substantial right would be that the construction and operation of the
nuclear plant will affect "business, commercial or agricultural operations" or "interfere
with the use and enjoyment of their property." (Petitioner's Brief, p.16.)

Of the

Petitioners, only Jeffrey and Deborah Weber and H Hook, LLC., have alleged any
general business, commercial or agricultural impacts on their real property and
therefore, the decision of the Board is affirmed on this ground as to all Petitioners and
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their appeal is dismissed, except as to Jeffrey and Deborah Weber and H Hook,
who will be discussed separately.

A. Petitioners Jeffrey and Deborah Weber
Although this Court finds these Petitioners have not established standing, even if they
had, they have not demonstrated prejudice to a substantial right as they have not
sufficiently alleged non-radiological grounds showing how the plant will affect their
business or commercial operations or how the use and enjoyment of their property will
be affected. Petitioners Weber allege that:
Jeffrey and Debbie Weber have an interest in real property located at
10465 Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, ID 83661, and would be adversely
affected by the approval of the Applications and resulting industrial
development activities. Among other activities, the Webers operate a
hunting dog training business on their property, which business
operations will be directly harmed and adversely affected by the
proposed construction and operation of the industrial facilities proposed
to be facilitated by the rezone and development Applications before the
Commission.
(R., p. 3248.) Deborah Weber also submitted written opposition to the rezone wherein
she explains that a prior group held preliminary discussions about siting a nuclear
power plant in Payette County in 2007 and that there were concerns at that time. (R.,
p.3246.) She does not allege, however, that the same concerns that existed in 2007
also exist with the current proposal. Regarding Intervenor's proposal, Petitioner Weber
explains the failings of Intervenor but does not assert what the substantial prejudice to
her business, agricultural or economic interests are other than the proximity of the
proposed plant and health and safety concerns.
The most specific allegation of harm is that the Webers "operate a hunting dog
training business on their property, which business operations will be directly harmed
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and adversely affected by the proposed construction and

of

industrial

facilities proposed ... " (R., p.3248,) (emphasis added). In another written submission,

Petitioner Weber stated,
Building a nuclear plant within 3 miles from our business would have a
direct reflection on the desirability to bring dogs to our kennel for training
and boarding. Building this plant within 3 miles of our business also puts
us in a very dangerous position as responsible professionals. If AEHI
were to have any type of nuclear accident. ... "
(R., p. 3655.)
In Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning & Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 234, 245
P.3d 983, 986 (2010), ten residents, including Krempasky, testified regarding their
opposition to conditional use permit allowing construction of a wedding event center.
The residents all testified regarding their shared concerns of noise and traffic. Id. The
residents provided no actual evidence to support these fears or concerns. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court held:
Krempasky only briefly addresses any prejudice to a substantial right, by
alleging in a conclusory manner that her property rights have been
prejudiced by the grant of the permit because of "noise, commercial traffic
and a disproportionately large building in the residential area." However,
she does not provide any applicable authority to support the allegation that
these complaints constitute prejudice to a substantial right.
Id. at 235, 245 P.3d at 987 (2010). Like Krempasky, Petitioners Weber only

generally conclude they will be adversely affected by the proposed construction and
operation of the industrial facilities but have not articulated how, specifically, the
construction and operation would prejudice a substantial right in their property that is
approximately 2.75 miles away from the proposed construction site.
Krempasky, the residents testified.

presented written statements.

Additionally, in

Here, the Webers made oral statements and

The Record does not reflect that Petitioners Weber

ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN CV11-959 PAGE-30

provided any other evidence except for the general comments in their written
statements that there would be an increase in noise, dust or traffic or that would affect
their property given that they lived 2.75 miles away. Even if there were additional noise,
traffic and dust how it would affect their ability to engage in their dog training business.
Petitioners Weber have also failed to provide any evidence that fewer people would
avail themselves of the Petitioner's dog training services or what, if any, impact they
would suffer, apart from the health and safety concerns. It appears that it is the nature
of the proposed facility as a nuclear plant that generates this concern. To the extent the
concern is premised upon the safety of the plant, the Court cannot adjudicate the claim
on that basis. Alternatively, the Court finds Petitioners Weber have not sufficiently
articulated injury to a substantial right.
Without any factual support or allegations of specific harm, the Petitioners Weber
simply state in a conclusory fashion, that the rezone will have an adverse effect.
Petitioners have the obligation of doing more than asserting a conclusion. Therefore,
because Petitioners Jeffrey and Deborah Weber have failed to articulate prejudice to a
substantial right, the decision of the Board to grant the application for a rezone is
affirmed as to them.
B. H Hook. LLC
Petitioner H Hook raises several allegations about the substantial prejudice to its
ranching operations.

Petitioner alleges as follows: 1) the construction will generate

"noise, dust and traffic" and affect the traffic on the road it uses to move cattle as well as
farm equipment (R., pp.3249; 3663); 2) Petitioner's feedlot is "approximately ½ mile
from the Northeast corner of the Schwartz property" at the corner of Little Willow Creek
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and Stone Quarry Road and the "continuous traffic and dust" from the site "would have
severe impact on the feedlot's operation and render it unusable" (R., pp.3249; 3663 ); 3)
H Hook provides homes for its ranch hands and two of the ranch homes are located on
the unpaved Stone Quarry Road. The continuous traffic, dust and noise during
construction and operation would adversely affect the families who live there, thereby
reducing the ability of H Hook to house and retain qualified ranch hands, which would
affect its ability to operate the ranch (R., pp.3249; 3663); 4) there is an increased risk of
vandalism and theft (R., pp.3249; 3664); 5} there are ground water wells and the impact
on the ground water from construction and operation is unknown and should be
addressed (R., pp.3249; 3664); 6) the industrial site could decrease value and
marketability of the homes (R., pp.3249; 3664); 7) there is a possibility of a large group
of elk congregating on protected ground, resulting in significant depredation of crops
and grazing lands (R., pp.3249; 3664-3665); 8) there may be reduction in the ability of
the owners to use H Hook property for upland bird and big game hunting because of
potential weapon restrictions in an area surrounding a nuclear plant (R., pp.3250; 3665);
and, 9) the proposed development did not address the open range issue. (R., pp.3250;
3665.)
Of these claims, the Court finds that claims 4, 7, and 8 are too speculative to
provide a basis to show actual, substantial prejudice to an existing right. Allegation 5 is
not a claim that is unique to Petitioner, claim 6 is based on radiological concerns and
therefore, cannot be adjudicated by the court and allegation 9 involves property that
does not belong to H Hook and is also speculative, as there has been no claim that the
property would not continue to be open range.
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Claims 1, 2, and 3, however, provide specific, factual, allegations that support
Petitioner H Hook's claim that it will suffer actual harm pursuant to IC§ 67-6535(3) and
therefore, have met their burden for purposes of establishing harm.
Thus, only Petitioner H Hook has established both standing and substantial prejudice
such that the merits of the case will be analyzed.
V.
The Comprehensive Plan Is Not Invalid Following the Amendment
Petitioners allege that the Comprehensive Plan, both before and after the
amendment, is invalid because it does not have any general provisions for power plant
siting and utility transmission corridors and therefore, any rezone based on the
Comprehensive Plan is also invalid. 6 lntervenors argue that there is a general plan that applications will be considered on an individual basis - and that the provision for
transmission lines are currently contained in the comprehensive plan.
A valid comprehensive plan is a precondition to the validity of zoning ordinances.
Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 322, 986 P.2d 343,

345 (1999). The inclusion of the components is mandatory. Idaho Code§ 67-6508.
Black's Law Dictionary, defines "general" as:
Pertaining to, or designating, the genus or class, as distinguished from
that which characterizes the species or individual. Universal, not
particularized; as opposed to special. Principal or central; as opposed to
local. Open or available to all, as opposed to select. Obtaining commonly,
or recognized universally; as opposed to particular. Universal or
unbounded; as opposed to limited. Comprehending the whole, or directed
to the whole; as distinguished from anything applying to or designed for a
portion only.

6

The Amendment to the Comprehensive Plan was approved by the Board June 21,
2010.
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Thus, Payette County, in its Comprehensive Plan, was required to address how it
would deal with power plant siting as a whole. It needed a "universal" plan on power
plant siting. The Comprehensive Plan, before the amendment, spends two paragraphs
identifying what power is available to county residents, but does not discuss where in
the County, if at all, those power plants are located. As such, before the amendment,
the Plan has no provision for power plant siting, presumably because the power needs
were being sufficiently met by plants located outside the county and therefore, there
was no need to have power plant siting within the county.
However, once there was a request to locate a power plant within the County, the
Comprehensive Plan was statutorily required to have a provision addressing power
plant siting. To achieve that, the Board amended section 9.2. 7.1 of the Comprehensive
Plan to include the following:
Energy producers who wish to locate electric, gas, or other energy
production facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County
Planning and Zoning Department and each application will be considered
on an individual basis in accordance with the Local Land Use Planning
Act, Payette County Code and this plan.

(R., p.3883.) Payette County, in adopting the amendment, has complied with
Idaho Code § 67-6508.

Where a particular power plant would be specifically

sited would depend on the type and size of the power plant, the need for power
transmission and other factors. For example, a wind turbine would have different
siting needs that an electrical transmission station. Unless and until the Board
had information about the type of power plant to be sited in Payette County, the
Board would be ill-equipped to try to anticipate the size, type, and other relevant
factors to designate where, in Payette County, such a plant could be sited.
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Conversely, upon application by an entity, the Board would then have the
information it needed to determine, in conformity with federal, state and local law,
where, if anywhere, the plant should be sited. Intending to address the requests
as the requests are made, is a "general" plan, and as such, the Amendment to
the Comprehensive Plan brings the plan into statutory compliance. Therefore,
because this Court finds the Comprehensive Plan is valid. The decision of the
Board is affirmed on this issue.

VI.
The Board's Approval of the Rezone Did Not Constitute Type I Spot Zoning
Petitioners argue that the Board's approval of the rezone violated both
Type I and Type II spot zoning. The Respondent and Intervenor argue that there
was no spot zoning at all.
"A claim of 'spot zoning' is essentially an argument the change in zoning is
not in accord with the comprehensive plan." Evans v. Teton County, 139
Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). In Evans, this Court clarified that
there are two types of spot zoning. The first type, referred to as type one
spot zoning, "may simply refer to a rezoning of property for a use
prohibited by the original zoning classification." Id. 'The test for whether
[type one spot zoning] is valid is whether the zone change is in accord
with the comprehensive plan." Id. at 77, 73 P.3d at 90. "[T]he question of
whether a zoning ordinance is 'in accordance with' the comprehensive
plan is a factual question which can be overturned only where the factual
findings are clearly erroneous." Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley
County, 137 Idaho 192, 200, 46 P.3d 9, 17 (2002). The second type,
referred to as type two spot zoning, "refers to a zone change that singles
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest
of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner." Id.
Taylorv. Canyon CountyBd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 424,436,210 P.3d 532,544 (2009).
As discussed above, the Comprehensive Plan was amended to permit
applications for power plant facilities to be reviewed on an individual basis. Because
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the Court has found the amendment rendered the Comprehensive Plan valid, and
because this application for a rezone was granted consistently and in accord with the
comprehensive plan, the Board did not engage in Type I spot zoning. Like the Taylor
case, supra, the Board's finding that the rezone is in accordance with the Amended
Comprehensive Plan is supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting,
evidence in the record and therefore, must be affirmed. Consequently, because the
type one spot zoning was valid, there is no need to address the claim of type two spot
zoning and the decision of the Board is affirmed on this ground.
VII.

The Board Did Not Address Whether The Rezone Violates Payette County Code
8-10-9 7 And The Court Declines To Address This Issue
Petitioner contends that the rezone violates Payette County Code section 8-10-7
which prohibits any activity that emits harmful radiation. 8 At oral argument, Petitioner
concedes that Payette County Code section 8-10-9 is likely invalid, as it is preempted
by the Atomic Energy Act.

The Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws or local

ordinances that '"interfere with, or are contrary to,' federal law." Boundary Backpackers
v. Boundary Cnty., 128 Idaho 371,376,913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996) citing Hillsborough
County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371,

7

Payette County Code Section 8-10-9 is a synopsis of official height and area
regulations and the Petitioners have provided no briefing on this section. From the
Brief, it appears Petitioners are referencing 8-10-7, which is the ordinance analyzed by
the Court.
8
Utilizing the Court's logic in Ada County v. 2007 Legacy 2013, Opinion No. 33 (March
26, 2013), it appears that the ordinance prohibits the emission of harmful radiation at
any point other than the source of such disturbance, thereby allowing harmful radiation
at the point of the disturbance. Notwithstanding that, analysis, the Court declines to
address this issue as discussed above.
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2374-75, 85

Ed.2d 714 (1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22

(9Wheat.} 1,211,

6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)).
If that section of the Payette County Code is invalid, the Board did not err in
failing to reference or discuss the code section. However, the issue of whether that
section of the Code is valid is not properly before this Court on appeal.

Because

Petitioner's concession at oral argument would result in a denial of this claim and
because the validity of Payette County Ordinance§ 8-10-7 is not at issue in this appeal,
the Court declines to address this issue.
VIII.
Some Parts Of The Development Agreement Are An Improper Delegation Of The
Board's Exercise Of Its Police Power And Therefore, Are Invalid
The Petitioners argue that the Development Agreement exceeds the statutory
authority granted the Board because the Development Agreement makes commitments
from the Board to the Intervenor and because the Agreement allegedly binds
subsequent Boards; the Respondent and Intervenor disagree.

A The Board Does Not Exceed Its Statutory Authority By Making Commitments
Pursuant To I.C. § 67-6511A
County commissioners must act as a board and have only such power as is
expressly or impliedly conferred on them by statute. Shillingford v. Benewah County, 48
Idaho 447, 282 P. 864, 866 (1929). Local Boards have the statutory authority to enter
into Development Agreements and contracts, which can include both Development
Agreements and long-term leases. Idaho Code §§ 67-6511A, 31-604(3) and 31-836,
respectively; Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 32, 253 P.3d 700, 706
(2011) (analyzing a Development Agreement as a contract to determine whether the
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right of access to property had been contracted away as a term of the Development
Agreement); Krasse/t v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124, 578 P.2d 240 (1978).
Thus, Boards can, in some instances, enter into long-term contracts and bind
subsequent Boards to the term of the contracts. Because local Boards have the ability
to enter contracts, and a Development Agreement is akin to a contract, the Board has
the statutory right to contract, including making commitments in a Development
Agreement without exceeding the authority of I.C. §§ 67-6511A and 31-605(3).
Additionally, although I.C. § 67-6511A allows Boards to permit or require an
owner or developer to make commitments, it does not preclude a Board from also doing
so.
So long as the actions of local governing boards are not unreasonable, i.e.
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory, and bear 'a substantial relationship
to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare,' local governing
boards act within their constitutional authority.

Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 123,132,254 P.3d 24, 33 (2011).
While a local governing body must comply with the procedural and
substantive provisions of LLUPA, its authority in the land use arena is not
derived solely from LLUPA. Rather, the cities and counties of this State
have traditionally exercised their constitutional police powers to provide for
planning and zoning activities in their jurisdictions and, therefore, their
ability to act is not confined to only those actions specifically mentioned in
LLUPA.

Id. at 131, 254 P.3d at 32. Because LLUPA was intended to grant broad powers to
local Boards in planning decisions, and because the constitutional grant of authority to
exercise general police powers has been recognized as a broader grant of authority
than those powers specifically articulated in statute, the Board has not exceeded its
authority pursuant to I.C. § 67-6511A simply by making commitments to the Intervenor
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in this case. It is not the fact of making a commitment that may render the Development
Agreement invalid, but rather, the nature of the commitment made.
B. A Board Acts Ultra Vires When It Unlawfully Restricts The Exercise Of Its
Police Power By Present Or Future Boards
Notwithstanding its ability to enter contracts and make commitments, if a Board
acts ultra vires, a Development Agreement could be void. An improper commitment is
one that would improperly limit, partially or wholly, a Board's ability to exercise its police
power. Adopting zoning ordinances is the exercise of police power of the local
government and that power cannot be "bartered away even by express contract since it
immediately concerns the safety of persons and property." City of Idaho Falls v.
Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461, 463-64 (1941 ).

For example, an illegal

concession of police power would occur when
a zoning authority binds itself to enact a zoning amendment and agrees
not to alter the zoning change for a specified period of time. When a
zoning authority takes such a step and curtails its independent legislative
power, it has acted ultra vires and the rezoning is therefore a nullity.
Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning That Is Neither
Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383, 411 (2004).
On the other hand,
By bargaining away the police powers, the courts cannot mean that the
current legislature must refrain from entering into binding contracts or
other obligations whose terms extend beyond the terms of the current
body. Such an interpretation would almost nullify the municipality's power
to contract and its power to be sued if every time, when things looked
different, it could claim that the act was outside its power.
Id. at 407-08. The question, then, is whether the Board improperly contracted away its

police powers in certain provisions of the Development Agreement and if so, whether
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the ultra vires commitments render just that portion of the Agreement void or whether
entire Agreement is void.
Even if the Board's acted ultra vires as to some of the provisions, that does not
necessarily mean the entire agreement is void. For example, in Inverness Mobile Home
Community, Ltd. V. Bedford Tp., 263 Mich.App. 241, 250, 687 N.W.2d 869, 875 (Mich.

Ct. App. 2004), despite finding that some of the paragraphs of the consent judgment
were ultra vi res, the remedy was to declare those paragraphs void and strike them from
the agreement, rather than declare the entire agreement void.

Similarly, in Black v.

Young, 122 Idaho 302, 834 P.2d 304 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the

issue of whether an ordinance which contained a severability clause, and parts of which
were ultra vires acts by the Board, could be maintained by other factors to support the
ordinance. Id. at 311, 834 P.2d at 309.
The Petitioner alleges that the Development Agreement unlawfully binds future
Boards because:
1. Recital J requires the County to take the steps necessary to rezone the
property (Petitioner's Brief, p.33);
2. It limits the County's ability to exercise its police powers to adopt future land
use rules, regulations, resolutions and ordinances that might be made
applicable to the property (Petitioner's Brief, p.37);
3. Requires the County to rezone other land in furtherance of Intervenor's
development plans (Petitioner's Brief, p.37);
4. Requires the County to adopt amendments to the development agreement in
furtherance of Intervenor's development plans (Petitioner's Brief, p.37);
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5. Restricts the County from initiating any changes to the Development
Agreement unless consented to by Intervenor (Petitioner's Brief, p.37);
6. Restricts the County's power to adopt moratoriums or other regulations on the
manner or timing of the development of the project (Petitioner's Brief, p.37);
7. Grants rights and privileges to Intervenor to demand that the County do and
perform certain acts such as the acquisition of road right-of-way, installation
of public infrastructure and expenditure of County resources in support of
Intervenor's development plans (Petitioner's Brief, p.38); and,
8. Requires the County to defend Intervenor in legal actions that may be brought
challenging the validity of any County action related to AEHl's application.
(Petitioner's Brief, p.38.)9
1. Recital J To The Development Agreement Requires The Board To Take The
Steps Necessary To Rezone The Property.
Recital J of the Development Agreement reads as follows:
AEHI desires that the Property be zoned 1-2 in accordance with the
Payette
County
Comprehensive
Plan.
After
hearings
and
recommendations by the P&Z Commission and hearings by the Board,
County has determined that it is in the best interest of County to rezone
the Property 1-2. AEHI has submitted to County a duly executed
application requesting an amendment to County's Zoning Ordinance
and zoning map in connection with the Property and the Project.
County shall continue to take steps necessary to rezone the Property
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, including
publication of the Rezoning Ordinance and the Development Agreement
Ordinance.
(R., p.4104.} Petitioners take issue with the last sentence of the recital. The Court finds
this recital to be unclear. What is clear is that the rezone is subject to the terms and
9

The Petitioners generally alleges claims that the Development Agreement unlawfully
binds the Board on pages 33-34 of the Petitioner's Brief. These general allegations are
encompassed in the above claims and will not be addressed separately.
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conditions set forth in the Agreement. Because this Court finds several provisions of
the Development Agreement to be an illegal restraint on the ability of future Boards to
exercise its police power, Respondent and/or Intervenor may not wish the property
rezoned in light of the provisions that have been struck from the Development
Agreement.

The Court remands this portion of the Development Agreement for

clarification by the parties whether they wish the rezone to go forward in light of the
changes the Court has made to the Development Agreement, as discussed infra.
2. Some Portions Of The Development Agreement Limit The Board's Ability To
Exercise Its Police Powers To Adopt Future Land Use Rules, Regulations,
Resolutions And Ordinances That Might Be Made Applicable To The Property
Specifically, Petitioners claim that section 2.1 (b) of the Development Agreement
is an unlawful restraint on the Counties exercise of its police powers. Section 2.1 (b)
provides:
(b) Permissible Additions to the Applicable Rules. All future approval
requests shall be evaluated consistent with the terms and intent
expressed in this Agreement, as may be modified. Except as
otherwise provided in this Agreement, County may enact the following
provisions, and take the following actions, which shall be applicable to
and binding on the development of the Property; provided, however,
County shall provide AEHI with an opportunity to suggest methods of
enacting and implementing such provisions to the Property and the
Project:
(i)

future land use ordinances, rules, regulations,
permit
requirements, other requirements and official policies of
County that are consistent with the express provisions of this
Agreement, and not contrary to the existing land use
regulations applicable to and governing the development of
the Property, provided that such land use ordinances, rules,
regulations, permit requirements, other requirements, and
official policies shall, to the extent applicable, not involve the
of any factual determinations
of County
modification
memorialized in this Agreement and shall not materially
impair AEHl's ability to develop the Property in the manner
provided in this Agreement. In the event of conflict between
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this Agreement and such future land use ordinances, rules,
regulations, permit requirements, other requirements and
policies of County, this Agreement shall control;
(ii)

other future land use ordinances, rules, regulations, permit
requirements, development fees, other requirements, and/or
official policies that AEHI may agree, in writing apply to the
development of the Property;

(iii)

future land use ordinances, rules, regulations,
permit
requirements, other requirements and official policies of
County enacted as necessary to comply with this Agreement
or mandatory requirements imposed on County by state or
federal laws and regulations, court decisions, and other
similar superior external authorities beyond the control of
County; provided, however, that in the event any such
mandatory requirement prevents or precludes compliance
with this Agreement,
such affected provisions
of this
Agreement shall be modified as may be necessary to achieve
the minimum permissible variance from the terms of this
Agreement in order to achieve compliance with such
mandatory requirement.
To the extent such compliance
requires any discretionary factual determination by County,
such determinations shall be consistent with County's findings
in connection with the rezone of the Property and as
memorialized in this Agreement;

(iv)

future land use and other ordinances, rules, regulations,
permit requirements, other requirements and official policies
of County of uniform application throughout County and
reasonably necessary to alleviate legitimate threats to public
health and safety, provided that such land use ordinances,
rules, regulations, permit requirements, other requirements
and official policies shall, to the extent applicable, not involve
the modification of any material factual determinations of
County in connection with the rezone of the Property and as
memorialized in this Agreement; and

(v)

future updates of, and amendments to, existing building, fire,
plumbing, mechanical,
electrical, dangerous
buildings,
drainage, and similar construction and safety related codes,
such as the International Building Code, which updates and
amendments are generated by a nationally recognized
construction/safety organization, such as the International
Conference of Building Officials, or by the state or federal
governments.
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(R., pp. 4106-4107.) Subsection 2(b), as an introductory paragraph, does not limit
future Boards from taking action, it simply provides an opportunity for Intervenor to
suggest ways of enacting provisions or actions that have already been determined
by the Board. While the Development Agreement allows Intervenor to make
suggestions, nothing in this portion of the Development Agreement requires future
Boards to implement those suggestions and therefore, doesn't restrain or limit any
future acts of a Board.
Section 2(b )(i) allows future Boards to enact future land use actions only to
the extent those future land use ordinances are not contrary to the land use
regulations in effect at the time the Development Agreement is enacted. This is an
improper curtailment of the Board's police power and as such, is an invalid term of
the Development Agreement. See City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117
P .2d 461 (1941 ). Section 2(b )((i) also unlawfully restricts future Boards because
pursuant to the Development Agreement, future ordinances may not modify any of
the factual determinations made by the County or materially impair Intervenor's
ability to develop the Property in the manner provided in the Development
Agreement.
For example, the Board found that the Project will result in significant
economic benefits to the County and the rezone is in the best interest of the
County.

(R., pp.4103; 4104).

That fact is premised, in part, upon testimony by

Intervenor that the power plant will be locally owned and operated, thus retaining
profits and tax revenue within the State. (Tr., 12/2/10, p.20, Ls. 19-24; p.70, Ls. 2124; p.74, Ls. 22-24.)

However, the fact of local ownership may change, if, for
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example, Intervenor sold the project after obtaining all approvals but before building
plant, to a foreign corporation. There then would be a change in one of the
factual premises of the Development Agreement but future Boards would not be
able to amend, alter, or adjust the Development Agreement in light of that new
factual circumstance pursuant to Section 2(b)(i).
The Board has an obligation to act for the good and general welfare of its
citizenry and in so doing, a need might arise in which the factual premises
underlying the Development Agreement are no longer accurate.

To prohibit the

Board from considering new factual scenarios that alter the factual premises
existing at the time of the Development Agreement is an illegal restriction on the
exercise of this and future Board's exercise of its police power and therefore,
cannot stand.
For the same reasons, the court finds the "shall not materially impair" clause
to be a similar restriction and that clause also cannot stand. Finally, while the Court
recognizes that the sections 6.8 and 6.14 are two separate severability clauses (R.,
pp. 4112, 4112,) it finds that the illegal portions of section 2(b)(i) cannot be severed
from the remaining portion of the subsection as the Agreement clearly intended the
provisions and the subsection be read as a whole, thus, the Court will strike section
2(b)(i) in its entirety.
The Court finds that section 2(b )(ii) is not an illegal restraint on the police
power of future Boards because this provision simply allows Intervenor to agree that
future ordinances may apply to the Project. This provision does not prohibit future
Boards from acting, even if Intervenor disagrees with whether future ordinances
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apply to the Project.

It is the Court, not the parties, that ultimately determines

whether ordinances apply and therefore, Intervenor's agreement as to

the

applicability is irrelevant to any legal determination and therefore, cannot bind future
Boards.
Neither does section 2(b )(iii) unlawfully restrict a future Board. This section
simply requires the parties to draft a provision that both comports with the legal
requirements and, as closely as possible, effectuate the intent of the agreement.
There is nothing in this that restricts future Boards, particularly in light of section
6.14, which allows a Party to terminate the Agreement if a Court has struck a
portion of the agreement.
While section 2(b )(iv) is an explicit acknowledgement of the Board's ability to
exercise its police powers, this section limits future Boards' exercise of police power
because if an ordinance regarding threats to public health and safety apply to the
Development Agreement, future Boards may not modify any of the material fact
determinations that were part of the determination to allow the rezone. This directly
limits the Boards ability to determine, for example, that the rezone is "in the best
interest of the County to rezone the Property to 1-2." (R., p. 4104, Recital J.) If
some factual scenario develops such that there is a legitimate threat to public health
and safety, it may no longer be in the best interest of the County to allow this
property to remain zoned 1-2 and as a proper exercise of Board authority, future
Board's may need to determine, in light of the facts that exist at the time, what is in
the best interest of the County. Attempting to prohibit the Board from doing so,
especially in the context of legitimate threats to public health and safety, is an illegal
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restriction of the Board's authority and as such, is illegal

thus, section 2(b )(iv)

will be struck.
Petitioners do not challenge Section 2(b )(v) and therefore, it will not be
analyzed.
3. The Development Agreement Does Not Require The Board To Rezone Other
Land In Furtherance Of Intervenor's Development Plans
Petitioners argue that section 2.2 of the Development Agreement requires future
Boards to rezone property at Intervenor's request.

Petitioners misread section 2.2,

which provides:
2.2
Additional Property. In the event AEHI owns or acquires
Additional Property which is not subject to this Agreement, including,
without limitation, Additional Property that will serve to meet
requirements of local, state and/or federal governmental agencies in
connection with development of the Project, and desires to subject
such Additional Property to the benefits and obligations of this
Agreement, AEHI may request that County rezone the Additional
Property to 1-2. Upon such request, the Parties will commence rezone
proceedings, including any necessary proceedings to amend this
Agreement, for such Additional Property which will subject such
Additional Property to this Agreement. The presently sitting Board may
not predetermine the outcome of any future application for a rezone of
any Additional Property.
(R., pp.4106-4107.) Section 2.2 by its plain language does not restrict future Board
action. This section treats Intervenor like any other citizen and allows Intervenor to
request that certain property be rezoned. The future Board is only required to do
that which it is required to do by law - to have a process in place by which
applications for rezones are considered.

"Commencing rezone proceedings" is

nothing more than the Board must do in all circumstances - begin the proceedings
to determine whether a rezone of the property would be warranted.
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To the extent Petitioners argue that "commencing rezone proceedings" is an
affirmative action by the Board to allow the rezone, the second part of this section
makes it clear that any future rezone is left to the decision of the future Board and
therefore, by the explicit language of section 2.2 there is no unlawful requirement of
the future Board to do anything.
4. The Development Agreement Requires The County To Adopt Amendments
To The Development Agreement In Furtherance Of Intervenor's Development
Plans
Section 2.3 of the Development Agreement provides:

2.3
Amendment. County and AEHI acknowledge that
amendments to this agreement may be necessary or appropriate from
time to time. When the parties agree that an amendment is necessary
or appropriate, the parties shall, unless otherwise required by
applicable law as established in this agreement or by state or federal
statutes,
regulations,
rules and/or policies
effectuate
minor
amendments administratively approved by the zoning administrator.
The approval of such minor amendments shall not necessitate formal
amendment of this agreement, but shall be retained in county's official
file for the property. All amendments to this agreement shall be
reviewed and approved by the board in accord with the notice and
public hearing procedures of Payette County Code. The parties shall
cooperate in good faith to agree upon and use reasonable efforts to
process any amendments to this agreement.
No moratorium, future ordinance, resolution or other land use rule
or regulation imposing a limitation on the development or the rate,
timing or sequencing of the development, of the property or any portion
thereof shall apply to or govern the development of the property
whether affecting land use permits, subdivision plat(s), building permits,
occupancy permits or other entitlements to use issued or granted by
county, except as otherwise provided in this agreement. Nothing in
this section shall prohibit county from withholding the issuance of
certificates of occupancy for a structure to be occupied if the
improvements set forth in this agreement required to serve the
applicable portion of the property on which a structure to be occupied
is to be located are not in place prior to occupation of such structure.
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Nothing in the first paragraph of section 2.3 can reasonably be read to require an
unlawful delegation of the Board's police power. However, the second paragraph clearly
limits the ability of future Boards to lawfully exercise its police power, despite the
inclusion of the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this Agreement." First, no other
section of the Development Agreement addresses the "rate, timing or sequencing" of
the project. (See, R., pp. 4098-4136.)

Additionally, there is no other portion of the

Development Agreement that allows for "moratoriums, future ordinances, resolutions or
other land use rules or regulations" that limit the development, timing or sequencing of
the Project.
There is no mechanism by which the current Board can prohibit future Boards, in
every circumstance, from passing land use regulations regarding this Project and
therefore, the first sentence of the second paragraph of section 2.3 will be struck.
5. Section 2.4 of the Development Agreement Restricts The County From
Initiating Any Changes To The Development Agreement Unless Consented
To By Intervenor
Section 2.4 provides as follows:
2.4 Changes to Zoning and Development Program. Any requests
for changes or modifications to this Agreement or the zoning
designation applicable to the Property shall be processed in the manner
then set forth by County Code and/or this Agreement and/or other
applicable law. Any such requests that are initiated by County shall
become effective only upon AEHl's written consent.
The portion of Section 2.4 that prohibits the County from making changes
to the Agreement is not an ultra vires act. Because the Development Agreement
is treated like a contract, it is an appropriate term of the contract that one party
cannot unilaterally alter the contract.

As such, this portion of Section 2.4 will

remain.
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However, the portion of Section 2.4 that limits any Board-initiated request
a change or modification to the zoning designation effective only upon
Intervenor's written consent is a limit of future Board's ability to exercise their
police power vis a vis land use planning. As discussed above, there may come a
time when it is no longer in the best interest of the County to leave the zone
designation as 1-2 and future Boards must have the ability to make that
determination without being limited to the consent of the interested party. As
such, the words "or the zoning designation applicable to the Property" shall be
struck from Section 2.4.
6. The Development Agreement Does Not Grant Rights And Privileges To
Intervenor To Demand That The County Do And Perform Certain Acts Such
As The Acquisition Of Road Right-Of-Way, Installation Of Public Infrastructure
And Expenditure Of County Resources In Support Of Intervenor's
Development Plans
The Petitioners misread the County's obligation pursuant to this section.
Although Petitioners argue that this section requires the County to do and perform
certain acts, Petitioners are incorrect. The County's obligations as it relates to section
2. 7 of the Development Agreement are as follows:
No requirement for expenditures by County. Nothing
2.7
herein contained shall require County to expend funds to acquire right
of way, improve roads or improve any Public Infrastructure in
In the event
connection with the development of the Project.
development of the Project requires County to make improvements to
Public Infrastructure, AEHI shall provide all funding necessary to
achieve those improvements. County, as necessary to implement the
installation of Public Infrastructure, shall cooperate reasonably with
AEHI. It shall be the obligation of the then-sitting Board to determine the
ievel of cooperation that is reasonable under the circumstances.

(R., pp. 4107-4108.) All this section requires is that the County reasonably cooperate,
as defined by future Boards, with Intervenor. There is nothing here that requires the
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Board to acquire road right-of-way or install public infrastructure or expend County
funds; the language is clear that Intervenor is to provide the funding, not the Board. As
such, this does not impermissibly restrict future Board exercises of its police power.
7. The Agreement Does Not Unlawfully Require The County To Defend
Intervenor In Legal Actions That May Be Brought Challenging The Validity Of
Any County Action Related To Intervenor's Application
This section does not illegally restrict or limit an exercise of police power by a
future Board. In fact, this provision has nothing to do with the exercise of police powers,
but rather, represents the bargaining of legitimate contractual terms.
3.2
Agreement to Cooperate. In the event of any legal or equitable
action or other proceeding instituted by a non-government third-party
challenging the validity of any County action and/or this Agreement, the
Parties hereby agree to cooperate in defending such action or proceeding.
County and AEHI may agree to select mutually agreeable legal counsel to
defend such action or proceeding with the Parties sharing equally in the
cost of such joint counsel, or each Party may select its own legal counsel
at each Party's separate expense. All other costs of such defense(s) shall
be shared equally by the Parties. Each Party shall retain the right to
pursue such Party's own independent legal defense.
(R., p. 4108.) This section does not require the Board to defend Intervenor in future

legal actions.

While this section requires cooperation, that cooperation is relatively

benign, where each party can obtain its own attorney and pursue an independent
defense.

It does not restrict a future Board from acting in its own best interest since

each party can pursue its own defense with its own counsel.

Since the Board can

legally enter into contracts, I.C. § 31-604(3), the determination of how much cooperation
and the sharing in the costs of counsel is an appropriate exercise of the Board's
contracting authority and therefore, does not unlawfully bind future Board actions.
In sum, the Court is striking paragraph 2(b )(i) in its entirety, section 2(b )(v) in its
entirety, the first sentence of the second paragraph in section 2.3 and the language, "or
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the zoning designation applicable to the property" from section 2.4. All other terms of
the Development Agreement shall remain.

IX.
The Development Agreement and Rezone Were Properly Adopted
Petitioners argue the rezone and the Development Agreement are void and
unenforceable because no ordinance was ever adopted authorizing the Development
Agreement and therefore, the Development Agreement has never been authorized by
I.C. § 67-6509.

Respondent and Intervenor argue that rather than requiring an

ordinance to be passed each time a development agreement is requested, the statute
simply allows local governing agencies to enact ordinances that permit a development
agreement.
In a recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the standards for statutory
interpretation:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review." Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho
804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). "The interpretation of a statute 'must
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as
a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it,
but simply follows the law as written."' Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 {2011) (quoting State v.
Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). "A statute is
ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction." Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141
Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004).

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007 Legendary Motorcycle, 2013 Opinion No. 33
(March 26, 2013).
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Idaho Code§ 67-6511A provides:
Each governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in
accordance with the notice and hearing provisions provided under section
67-6509, Idaho Code, require or permit as a condition of rezoning that an
owner or developer make a written commitment concerning the use or
development of the subject parcel. The governing board shall adopt
ordinance provisions governing the creation, form, recording, modification,
enforcement and termination of conditional commitments. Such
commitments shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder and
shall take effect upon the adoption of the amendment to the zoning
ordinance.
The plain language of the statute allows a Board to pass an ordinance that allows
written commitments to be made. The statute requires that the ordinance apply to
commitments (plural) rather than a commitment (singular). Thus, the plain
language of the statute indicates that local Boards may enact ordinances that would
create a uniform process by which all commitments could be considered, not that a
separate ordinance is required each time a Development Agreement is entered.
This Court does not read the statute such that it would require a Board to enact a
new

development-agreement-specific

Agreement was accepted.

ordinance

each

time

a

Development

To read the statute as Petitioner would wish would

require this Court to ignore the plain meaning of the statute and would also require
this Court to read into the statute an unwieldy and impractical result, which this
Court is unwilling to do. Additionally, the statute is clear that the commitment is
effective once the rezone is completed, not by the passage of an ordinance related
specifically to the Development Agreement.
As such, the Court finds that there was no separate ordinance required that
relates to the Development Agreement at issue in this case.

Instead, the Board

was required to pass an ordinance that governs written commitments. Here, the
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Board has passed PCC section 8-5-11.G and therefore, has complied with the
statutory requirement.

Because no separate ordinance was required,

the

Development Agreement was, subject to the above discussion, properly adopted
and will not be set aside on the grounds proffered by Petitioners on this issue.
X.
The Board Provided Adequate Notice Of The Hearing And An Adequate Opportunity To
Present And Rebut Evidence

While failing to comply with due process considerations can be a violation of
fundamental rights, in planning and zoning decisions, due process requires:" (a) notice
of the proceedings; (b) a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings; (c) specific,
written findings of fact; and (d) an opportunity to present and rebut evidence." Neighbors
for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007)
citing Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 510, 148
P.3d 1247, 1256. (2006). Of these, Petitioner argues that there was inadequate notice
of the proceedings, they had a limited opportunity to present and rebut evidence, and
that there are not specific written findings of fact. As such, the other bases will not be
discussed.
A. The Board Provided Sufficient Notice Of The Proceedings

Petitioners argue that the notice they received was insufficient. Respondent and
Intervenor argues that the Board provided more notice than was required by statute.
The issue for this appeal is whether Petitioners had notice and an opportunity to be
heard on Intervenor's request for a rezone.
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Procedural due process requires some process to ensure that the
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the
state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant
is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to
be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in
order to satisfy the due process requirement.
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127-28, 176 P.3d
126, 132-33 (2007) citing Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258. Payette County
Code§ 8-11-6 requires that:
Notice Of Hearing:

A.

Notice of time, place and purpose of each public hearing held by the
planning and zoning commission shall be given by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county at least fifteen (15) days
prior to such hearing.

B. Written Notice By Mail: When the public hearing is before the planning and
zoning commission on a proposed change, modification or reclassification
and the enlargement, expansion and amplification thereof, notice shall be
given by the applicant to the planning and zoning administrator who shall
deliver said notice by regular U.S. mail to each property owner whose
name and address appears on the list accompanying such application.
C. Notice To Over Two Hundred Property Owners: When notice is required to
two hundred (200) or more property owners or residents, alternate forms
of procedures which would provide adequate notice may be provided in
lieu of mailed notice.
Section 8-11-8 provides that:
A. Report Of Planning And Zoning Commission: At every hearing before the
commission, the commission shall hear all persons interested in the
subject matter. Not later than sixty (60) working days after the conclusion
of the hearing, the commission shall file a report stating the action taken
by the commission at such hearing or its recommendation to the board of
county commissioners.
B. Aciion By Board Of County Commissioners: The board of county
commissioners shall either approve, disapprove or modify the
recommendations of the planning and zoning commission. The board shall
hold a public hearing, in accordance with section 8-11-6 of this chapter.
(Ord. 57, 4-18-1988)
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Pursuant to statute, any notice must be submitted to the official newspaper of the city or
county at least 15 days prior to the hearing date. I.C. § 67-6511(b).
Petitioners concede that "a copy of both the published and mailed notice of the
P&Z Commission's December 9, 2010 hearing on AEHl's rezone application is found in
the record at pages 1342 and 1343." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 40.) Although Petitioner
claims "the record does not indicate in which newspaper the notice was published or to
which property owners and residents it was mailed," the Record indicates to whom the
notice was mailed (R., pp.3923-3927,) and that the notice was mailed to adjoining
property owners, the owner of the land under consideration, and those property owners
within 300 feet of the land being considered.

(R., pp. 184-187; 3923-3927.)

The

Record further indicates the notice was delivered to the newspaper on November 9,
2010, and mailed to the neighbors on November 10, 2010, well in advance of the 15day notice requirement. Thus, the Record supports finding both that the appropriate
parties were given notice of the hearing and that the notice was submitted to a
newspaper within the time standards set forth in Payette County and Idaho Code.
The Record also establishes that the notice for the June 6, 2011 hearing was
submitted to the Independent-Enterprise, a Payette, Idaho, newspaper on May 17,
2011, and to the "neighbors" on May 19, 2011; the notice was published on May 18,
2011 (R., pp.4081-4084.)

None of the Petitioners contend they did not have notice of

this hearing, therefore, the Record supports a finding that the notice was delivered to
the newspaper on November 9, 2010.
Similarly, Petitioner concedes that a notice was timely sent for the June 6, 2011
hearing (R., pp. 4081-4083.) Further, the Notice provided that information regarding the
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rezone application was available in the Commission's office and included a link to
access the documents for those parties interested in seeing exactly which documents
were at issue. (R., pp.1342; 4081-4084.) The hearing was set for June 6, 2011, and the
material was published May 18, 2011.

(R., pp.4082-4084.)

Thus, the material

regarding the variance was available 15 days before the scheduled hearing and was
available to the public. As such, the County provided sufficient notice pursuant to the
state and county code requirements.
The Record reflects that the application for the rezone and variance were posted
to the Payette County website with copies available in hard copy or on computer disk
and several individuals, including one of the Petitioners, purchased either printed or
electronic versions of the documents. (R., pp. 1291-1305, 2537-2538.)

Thus, the

Petitioners had timely notice of the rezone application and the date on which it would be
addressed by the Commission, thus satisfying any due process concerns.
Even if Petitioners received timely notice, the notice still must be sufficiently
specific so as to give them meaningful information about the content of the notice.
Idaho Code§ 67-6511(b) requires that
Any property owner entitled to specific notice pursuant to the provisions of
this subsection shall have a right to participate in public hearings before a
planning commission, planning and zoning commission or governing
board subject to applicable procedures." prior to granting a variance,
notice and an opportunity to be heard shall be provided to property owners
adjoining the parcel under consideration.
Petitioners argue that the content of the notice was insufficient because it did
adequately summarize the nature of the hearing. {Petitioner's Brief, pp.40-43.) The first
notice stated:
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The purpose of the hearing is to establish a recommendation to the
Board of County Commissioners regarding an application for a
REZONE (AG TO IND-2), CONCEPTUAL PLAN, DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT & VARIANCE by Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. for
properties located off of Big Willow Rd. and Stone Quarry Rd., Payette,
ID and owned by JG Schwarz.
The Properties are described more specifically: A portion of land in
Section 08 &17, T.8N., R.3W., Boise Meridian, Payette County ID.
(R., p.1342.) The second notice stated, in part:
Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. requests a rezone from Agriculture to
lndustrial-2, Conceptual Plan and Development Agreement regarding
property located at Township 8 North, Range 3 West, Section 8 and
Section 17, of the Boise Meridian, Payette County, Idaho, which is
comprised of a portion of properties identified as Tax Parcel
Identification Numbers 08N03W080000 and 08N03W170000 (more
particularly described in Exhibit A).
The application and a more particular description of the subject property
and the proceedings related to this application are on file in the office of
the Payette County Planning and Zoning Administrator, 1130 3rd Ave.
N., Room #107, Payette, Idaho 83661. These documents are also
available online at pnz.claypeak.com.
(R., p.4084.)
Petitioners argue that notice is insufficient to apprise interested parties that the
rezone was for building a nuclear power plant but none of them, individually, claim they
were unaware of the rezone request or the reason for the rezone. The Petitioners were
already aware of Intervenor's proposed use of the property, as there had been
community meeting notifications distributed by Intervenor (R., pp.63-64, 115, 182-188,)
and public hearings on the amendments to the Comprehensive Plan, at which several of
the Petitioners were sworn in and testified, as early as February, 2010. {R., pp. 98-131;
3823-3908); Petitioners had also participated in a hearing for the variance. (Tr., 12/2/10
and 12/9/10; see also, Record, generally.) Thus, Petitioners had actual notice of the
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use to which the property would be put and cannot demonstrate that they did not have
knowledge.
Nor can Petitioners assert fundamental harm on behalf of others. Cowan v.

Board of Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258
(2006).

Therefore, because Petitioners have not established a violation of their

individual fundamental rights, they have not sufficiently established harm.
This Court also finds that the Notice provided a general description of the issues
and provided more specific information for interested parties via the link to digital
copies. Thus, anyone with access to the internet could access, download, and review
the rezone application and the documents in support of the application. If a party did
not have access to the Internet, printed copies were available. This provides even more
information than the summary Petitioners believe should have been included.
Therefore, this Court finds that the summary of the Notice was sufficient.
B. The Notice Was Sufficiently Specific
Petitioners further argue that the notice did not specify with particularity the land at
issue. (Petitioner's Brief, p.41.) This argument is without merit. Petitioners have cited
no authority that the description be more specific than that which was given. As noted
above, none of the Petitioners are claiming they were unaware of the land at issue
either generally or specifically.

In fact, the Record is clear that the Petitioners had

actual knowledge of the land at issue because of their involvement in the amendment to
the Comprehensive Plan and the variance application. Therefore, Petitioners have not
established any due process violations relating to the notice given and have not
established a violation of their fundamental rights on this ground.
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Even if the notice had been defective, because Petitioner's participated in the
public hearings, that participation cured any defect in the notice. Ciszek v. Kootenai
County Bd. of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 133, 254 P.3d 24, 34 (2011 citing Gay v. County
Com'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 631, 651 P.2d 560, 565 (Ct.App.1982).

Where a citizen is able to attend a public hearing that has been properly noticed, and a
transcribable record of the proceeding is maintained, there is no denial of due process.
Id. Because there is no allegation by any individual Petitioner that he or she was unable

to attend the public hearing, the Court finds there were no due process violations on this
ground.
C. Petitioners Have Not Established They Were Denied The Ability to Present or
Respond to Evidence
Petitioners argue that because they were required to submit written materials in
advance and were limited to five (5) minutes to speak, they were not provided a
"meaningful opportunity'' to be heard on the issue of the rezone. The first published
notice contained the following:
The hearing officer shall be authorized to impose a 5 minute limitation on
any oral testimony. If testimony is anticipated to exceed that 5 minute limit,
it may be submitted in writing in advance to the Planning and Zoning office
to be part of the record. Any written testimony, any exhibits or any written
documentation that a witness would like to have made a part of the
hearing record, must be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office
before 5:00 p.m. on November 26, 2010. Written information presented at
the hearing will be placed in a sealed envelope and will not be considered.
(R., p.1342.) The published notice for the June 6, 2011 hearing stated:
Th p hPafino nffici:>r c:ha!I hi:> :::iuthnri7od tn imnnc,o ,::, i:; min, 1te l'1mit,::,tir.n
on any oral testimony. If testimony is anticipated to exceed that 5 minute
limit, it may be submitted in writing in advance to the Planning and
Zoning Administrator to be part of the record. The record will be open
for public viewing at the Planning and Zoning Office located at the
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Payette County Courthouse, Payette, Idaho during regular business
hours.
, p.4084.)
The relevant portions of Payette County Code 1-7-2 provide:

A Testimony: At a hearing, a party requesting relief from the Board of
County Commissioners or Planning and Zoning Commission shall be
allowed the opportunity to present oral testimony and such exhibits as the
hearing officer may deem appropriate. Any affected party shall be allowed
to produce information either orally or in a written form which the hearing
officer deems appropriate.
D. Time Limit: The hearing officer may set a time limit on presentations,
but not less than three (3) minutes.
Nothing in Payette County code § 1-7-2(a) limits the hearing officer's ability to
provide a procedure by which exhibits shall be submitted. The plain language of the
code states that the opportunity to present oral testimony and exhibits is "as the hearing
officer may deem appropriate." PCC § 1-7-2(A). In this case, given what he believed
would be the submission of voluminous exhibits, the hearing officer deemed it
appropriate to have those exhibits submitted in advance. Petitioners were not restricted
from submitting exhibits in advance, nor were they limited from referencing or relying on
those exhibits during their oral statements. (See, Transcript, 12/2/10 and Tr., 6/6/11,
generally). The Record further indicates that written submissions were accepted after
the November 26, 2010 deadline. (R., pp. 3313-3319, 3324).
In Cowan v. Bd. Of Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d
1247, 1254 (2006), the Court held the Commission's action did not violate Cowan's due
process rights where Cowan had a meaningful opportunity to be heard even though the
planning and zoning commission limited public comment on the issue to two minutes
because Cowan had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
ORDER ON APEAL AND ORDER OF REMAND IN CV11-959 PAGE-61

meaningful manner, his attorney spoke at length and presented evidence during the
initial hearing and during the appeals. Id, see also, Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v.
Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127-28, 176 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2007).

Petitioners have not claimed that there was additional written material they
wished to submit and they cannot claim a violation of fundamental rights on behalf of
others. As Petitioners make no claim they wished to submit additional documentation
and they cannot point to any written documents they were not allowed to submit, they
have failed to show how this limitation prevented them from participating in the hearing
in a meaningful way. Similarly, Petitioners have not established that any one of them,
individually, was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to make a statement, despite
being limited to five (5) minutes.

Nothing in the Record indicates that any of the

Petitioners were prevented from making any statement or that they were not allowed to
complete their statements. This Court's review of the transcripts indicates only one (1)
instance, where one of the Petitioners, Jeff Weber, was told he was approaching the
time limit. (Tr. 12/2/10, p. 142, Ls. 6-25.) Nothing in the transcript indicates that the
Petitioner Weber believed that to be unreasonable, that he had more to say that he
could not say, or that he was otherwise prejudiced in making his statement. Thus, it
appears that Petitioners were permitted to be heard in a meaningful way, which is what
is required by due process. See Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512-513, 148 P.3d at 1258-59.
Although Petitioners argue that Intervenor got additional time, they have not
alleged they needed more time or that they wished to provide more statements. In light
of the number of individuals who testified against the rezone application, providing
Intervenor the opportunity to respond to some of the concerns was not unreasonable
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and granting Intervenor 15 minutes, as compared to the total number of minutes of
statements of those opposed to the rezone, was not unreasonable. Therefore, based
on the above, the Court finds there were no Due Process violations in the manner in
which the hearing was conducted and the Petitioners have not established any violation
of a fundamental right on this basis to establish harm.
IX.

The Board Issued Specific, Written Findings Of Fact Except In Regards to
Payette County Code Section 8-10-7
Petitioner has alleged that the Board did not satisfy the requirements of Idaho
Code§ 67-6535 because its Findings and Facts and Conclusions of Law are deficient.
Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2) provides:
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant
to this chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned
statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant,
states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale
for the decision based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive
plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional
principles and factual information contained in the record.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a district court's decision that the Board's
findings of fact and conclusions of law did not amount to a reasoned statement as
required by I.C. § 67-6535 in Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 792, 264 P.3d
897, 899 (2011). There, the Court noted that the required findings must be more than
"recitations of portions of the record" and must include "determinations of the facts
disputed by the parties." Id. at 794, 264 P.3d at 901.

Citing other cases, the Court

noted that "conclusions that do not reveal the underlying facts or poiicies that were
considered were inadequate, as was a Board's Findings that were supplemented by a
staff report." Id. In sum, the Commission and Board's Findings "must plainly state the
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resolution

of factual

disputes,

identify the

evidence

supporting

that factual

determination, and explain the basis for legal conclusions, including identification of the
pertinent laws and/or regulations upon which the legal conclusions rest." Id.
The decision issued by the Board is 23 pages long. (R., pp.4137-4160.)

The

second page indicates what evidence the Board considered:
In making its decision, the Board considered the written application of
AEHI, along with all attachments, all letters and documents submitted by
the public, all documents and exhibits presented, the staff report, the
findings of fact and favorable recommendation from the Payette County
Planning and Zoning [sic], the written responses of any local, state or
federal agencies which were given notice pursuant to Idaho Code, and
the testimony at the public hearing, including the following:
(R., p. 4138.) The next 17 pages summarize the statements made by each individual at
the June 6, 2011 hearing. The next half page is a list of the applicable factors the Board
believed it must consider when deciding whether to grant or deny an application for a
rezone. (R., p. 4155.) The Board then analyzes each of the factors set out in Payette
County Code Section 8-11-7. (R., pp. 4156-4159.) The statements as summarized on
pages 4156-4159 of the Record by the Commission and Board can fairly be
characterized as factual findings as contemplated by the case law. See Jasso, infra.
In its analysis, the Board recognizes there are contested facts, for example,
whether there would be sufficient water, evaluates the information it received, and
reached a reasoned conclusion.

(R., p.4156.)

Another contested fact was the

capability of the roads to adequately handle the increased traffic. (R., pp.4157-4158.)
The Board indicated it had considered all the evidence that had been submitted and
cited to the information on which it relied to render its decision. (R., pp. 4157-4158.)
Just because the Board did not say it was a contested fact does not render the decision
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it reached invalid. The Board further recognized that many local landowners opposed
the project and listed the reasons for the opposition. (R., p.4159.)

The Board again

referenced the evidence it considered. The Board's conclusion, based on analyzing all
the factors, was, "The proposed rezone is not in conflict with the comprehensive plan."
(R., p.4159.) This Court finds that in light of the deference provided a Board's zoning
decision, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions meet the requirements of Idaho Code§
67-6535.
Despite Petitioner's assertion, the Board did not just summarize the testimony
and then issue a summary decision.

Instead, the Board indicated the evidence it

considered and applied that evidence to each of the facts.

Despite Petitioner's

contention to the contrary, there is mention of the pages of evidence submitted to the
Board, as the Board identified that it considered, "all letters and documents submitted
by the public, all documents and exhibits presented." (R., p.4138.)

However, the

Board was free to consider, weigh and reject any evidence, including the evidence
submitted by the Petitioners.

Despite Petitioner's contention, Idaho Code § 67-6535

does not require Boards to "articulate the rationale for rejecting factual information
presented." Instead, the statute requires that the Board, "states the relevant contested
facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions,
pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record." I.C.
§67-6535(2). Ultimately, the Board determined the weight of the evidence supported
the finding that the conditional rezone was in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan.
This finding is supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting, evidence in the
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record and, therefore, must be affirmed. See Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley

County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. of
Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424,437, 210 P.3d 532, 545 (2009). Thus, the Board has done what
was statutorily required of it in all respects except with regard to Payette County Code
section 8-10-7.
Payette County Code 8-10-7 provides:
No land or building in any zone shall be used or occupied in any manner
creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable
conditions which could adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining
premises, except that any use permitted by this title may be undertaken
and maintained if acceptable measures and safeguards to reduce
dangerous and objectionable conditions to acceptable limits as
established by the following performance requirements:
C. Radioactivity Or Electrical Disturbance: No activity shall emit harmful
radioactivity at any point, or electrical disturbance adversely affecting the
operation of any equipment at any point, other than at the source of such
disturbance;
Petitioner contends that the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
invalid because they don't address the above county ordinance. Although the Board
cites to Payette County Code sections 8-11-1 through 8-11-10, it does not cite to and
does not appear to have considered section 8-10-7, although it is required by statute to
consider "relevant ordinance provisions." I.C. § 67-6535(2).
As discussed in Section VII, supra, and incorporated herein by reference, if that
section of the Payette County Code is invalid, the Board did not err in failing to
reference or discuss the statute.

However, the issue of whether that section of the

Code is valid is not properly before this Court on appeal.

Because Petitioner's

concession at oral argument would result in a denial of this claim and because the
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validity of Payette County Ordinance § 8-10-7 is not at issue in this appeal, the Court
declines to address this issue.

VL
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, this case is HEREBY REMANDED for action
consistent with this opinion.
Dated this

--~l~
__ day of May, 2013.
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
PAYETTE COUNTY, AND ITS ATTORNEY, ANNE MARlE KELSO, AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
I. The following named Appellants, John (Jack) Burlile, H-Hook, LLC, Clifford Morgan and
Mary Morgan, Thomas Pence, Irene Roland, Tom Roland and Marcia Roland, James Underwood,
Jr., and Jeffery Weber, appeal against the above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the Order on Appeal and Order of Remand entered in the above-entitled action on the 2nd day
of May, 2013, Honorable Judge Molly Huskey presiding.
2. That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (f) I.AR.
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3. preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert in the
appeal follows; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from
asserting other issues on appeal:
(a) Whether the District Court erred in determining that there was no testimony of any
Petitioners in the hearings held by the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of County
Commissioners because no individual oath or affirmation was given to any of the speakers.
(b) Whether the District Court erred in determining that certain Appellants lacked standing
to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review.
(c) Whether the District Court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of and considering
the Affidavits of certain Appellants and other witnesses submitted in support of Appellants' standing
to pursue their Petition for Judicial Review.
(d) Whether the District Court erred in determining that certain Appellants failed to
establish substantial harm pursuant to LC. § 67-5279(4).
(e) Whether the District Court erred in dete1mining that the Board of County
Commissioners' decision to approve the conditional rezone was not invalid for the reason that it was
based on an invalid comprehensive plan.
(f) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County
Commissioners' decision to approve the conditional rezone did not constitute illegal spot zoning.
(g) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County
Commissioners did not exceed its statutory authority in approving the development agreement in
connection with the conditional rezone.
(h) Whether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County
Commissioners properly adopted the development agreement in connection with the conditional
rezone pursuant to the requirements on LC.§ 67-651 lA.
(i) \Vhether the District Court erred in determining that the Board of County
Commissioners decision to approve the conditional rezone did not violate the notice and hearing
requirements of the Payette County Code, the Local Land Use Planning Act, and Appellants' due
process rights.

G)

\Vhether the District Court erred in determining that the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law issued by the Board of County Commissioners satisfied the requirements of
I.C. § 67-6535 and therefore did not prejudice Appellants' substantial right to due process.
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.
5.(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? No.
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(b) The Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript:
IS
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
(a) Petitioners' Brief and Appendices.
(b) Petitioners' Reply Brief and Appendices.
(c) Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages.
, (d) Memorandum in Support of Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in Excess of
50 Pages.
(e) Memorandum in Response to Intervenor Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc.' s Objection to
Petitioners' Reply Brief.
(f) Order Re: Motion for Leave to File Brief
In requesting the foregoing additional documents to be included in the clerk's record,
Appellants anticipate that the entirety of the record and transcripts of the proceedings of the Payette
County Planning and Zoning Commission and Payette County Board of County Commissioners, as
filed or lodged with the District Court, will be lodged with the Supreme Court in accordance with
Rule 31, I.A.R.
7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: N/A
Name and address: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Name and address: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (b) (1) [ ] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2) [X] That the Appellants are exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because
no reporter's transcript has been requested.
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.
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(2) [ ] That Appellants are exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the
record because
(d) ( 1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(2) [ ] That Appellants are exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20
(and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to § 67-1401 (1 ), Idaho Code).
DATED: This

iv-

/ f"

day of June, 2013.

Attorney for the Appellants
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Overnight Mail
E-mail

JoAnn Butler
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E-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings,
Inc.
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US Mail
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E-mail
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Stephen Bradbury and Thomas A. Banducci

Attorney for Respondent: Anne Marie Kelso
Appealed by: John (Jack) Burlile, etal.
Appealed Against: Respondents: Board of Payette Com.missioners of
Payette County
Notice of Appeal Filed: June 12, 2013

Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed:

-------------

Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal Filed:

------------

Appellate Fee Paid: Yes
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional record
filed:
Respondent or Cross-Respondent's request for additional
Reporter's Transcript filed:
-------------------Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested?
If so Name of Reporter:

No

N/A.

DATE:

June 18, 2013
Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

~

\

By__~_--P!d-'p_u_t_y---,-C~l_e_r~k---

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
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FILED

THIRD JUDICIAL DiSTRICT COURT
PAYETTE C.OUNTY, !DAHO

2

Anne-Marie Kelso
Payette County Attorney's Office
1130 Third A venue North, Room
Payette, IO 83661

Telephone: 208-642-6096

Facsimile: 208-642-6099
Attorneys for Respondent Board of County Commissioners of P.1yette County
JoAnn C. Butler, ISB No. 4170

T. Hethe Clark. ISB No. 7265
SPINK BUTLER. LLP
251 E. Front Street. Suite 200
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 639
Boise. ID 83701
Telephone: 208-388-1000

Facsimile: 208-388-1001
Attorneys for Intervenor Alternate Energy Holdings Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION )
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK
)
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated
association, et al.,
Petitioners-Appellants.

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS )
OF PAYETTE COUNTY,
)
Respondent-Respondent,
and

)
)
)

)
)

ALTERNATE EI\1ERGY HOLDI.t~GS INC .• )
a Nevada corporation,
)
Applicant/Intervenor.

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - l

)
)

Case No. CV 2011-959
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD

2013-06-

10:24

TO:

s

Butler

1 208 388 1001

ette County Pros

P 3/4

THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, Stephen A.
Bradbury of Williams Bradbury, P.C .• 1015 West.Hays Street, Boise. [daho 83702. and
Thomas A. Banducci, Wade Woodard, and Dara L. Parker of Andersen Banducci
PLLC, 101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600, Boise. Idaho 83702, AND THE CLERK
AND REPORTER OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT the Respondent. Board of County Commissioners

of Payette County, and the Intervenor, Alternate Energy Holdings Inc .• in the above-entitled
ptocecding hereby request pursuant to Ruie 19. I.AR., the inclusion of the following material in
the clerk's record in addition to that requil'ed to be included by the I.AR. and the Notice of
Appeal.
1,

Clerk's Record:
a. Respondent and Intervenor's Btief (dated November 15, 2012).
b. Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and Response to Motion for Leave to
File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages (dated December 12, 2012).

2.

1 certify a copy of this Request for Additional Record has been served on

e

Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties re

/'

th

DATED this 26 day of June 2013. (

\

\

&y:
\ _A_n_n""M'..._ar-ic_K_c_l_so-,-P-r-li~F-e-cu-t-in_g_A_t-to_r_n-ey
\ Atto eys for Board · County
\~om issioners of P ette County
SPINK BUTLER. LLP

B~~~=====-T. Hethe Clark
Attorneys for Alternate Energy Holdings Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of June 2013, I caused a true and correct copy
of the above REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD to be served upon the following
individuals in the manner indicated below:
Stephen A. Bradbury
Williams Bradbury, P.C.
1015 West Hays Street
Boise, ID 83702
Facsimile: 208/344-0077

] U.S. Mail
J Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
w·via Facsimile
[ J Via E-Mail

s1evc@williamshradhu1:~.. com

Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L Woodard

Dara L. Parker
Andersen Banducci PLLC
101 S. Capitol Boulevard. Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Facsimile: 208/342-4455

[ J U.S. Mail
l J Hand-Delivery

[ J FcderaJ Express
~Via Facsimile
[ l Via E-Mail

tah@andel'senhnnducci.com
wlw@andcrscnbanducci.com

dlp@andcrscnbanducci.com

Payette County Clerk of the District Court
Payette County Courthouse
1130 3rd Avenue No1th, Room 104
Payette, ID 83661
Facsimile: 208/642-601 I

[ ] U.S. Mail
_J.d7Hand-Dclivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ J Via Facsimile
[ ] Via E-Mail

Anne-Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD .. 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE

NEIGHBORS FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND
LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, an
unincorporated corporation;
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'S FUTURE
INC., an Idaho nonprofit
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER;
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON;
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES;
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER;
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND;
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH;
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR. ,
Petitioners,

And
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; H-HOOK,LLC, an
Idaho limited liablilty company;
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN;
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER,
Petitioners-Appellants,

-vsBOARD OF PAYETTE COMMISSIONERS
OF PAYETTE COUNTY,
Respondent,
and
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC.,
Applicant/Intervenor.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS -1

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Payette County Case No.

CV-2011-000959
Supreme Court #41113-2013

I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the Third
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Payette do hereby certify that the following is a list of the
exhibits, offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the
Supreme Court or retained as indicated:
EXHIBIT LIST
Exhibit No.

Admitted

Description

Ruling Reserved

Electronic Consolidated Agency Record

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
said Court at Payette, Idaho, this-----""'- day of
2013.

Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

s/i~

Dep~k

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

-t

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
NEIGHBORS FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND
LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, an
unincorporated corporation;
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'S FUTURE
INC., an Idaho nonprofit
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER;
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON;
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES;
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER;
KI:MBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND;
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH;
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR. ,
Petitioners,

And
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; H-HOOK,LLC, an
Idaho limited liablilty company;
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN;
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER,
Petitioners-Appellants,
-vsBOARD OF PAYETTE COMMISSIONERS
OF PAYETTE COUNTY,
Respondent,
and
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC.,
Applicant/Intervenor.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

1

Payette County Case No.

CV-2011-000959
Supreme Court #41113-2013

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the
Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Payette do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under
my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that all documents, x-rays, charts and
pictures offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause will be
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the
Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record.
I further certify that, in addition to the exhibits
identified in the Reporter's Transcript, the following will be
submitted as a confidential exhibit to the Record on Appeal:
(1)

NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this ~ 3 day of
20~.

A~

,

Betty J. Dressen
Clerk of the District Court

By

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-~

i>iputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE
NEIGHBORS FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF THE BIG AND
LITTLE CREEK CO:MMUNITY, an
unincorporated corporation;
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
PEOPLE FOR PAYETTE'$ FUTURE
INC., an Idaho nonprofit
Corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and
BETTY BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and
Payette County Case No.
CHRISTINA BURLILE; DE BURLILE and
CV-2011-000959
LORI PRATT; LINDA BURLILE; JORDAN
CARY and HARMONY CARY; LARRY DAHNKE
and SUSAN DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER;
Supreme Court #41113-2013
RAY DENIG and JACKIE DENIG; RICHARD
EVEY and SUSAN EVEY; KANE HUDDLESTON
and JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE HUDDLESTON;
JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES;
JERRY KORN; LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER;
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND;
GREG SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH;
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER and
SUE TOWNER; JOHN WALGENBACH and
DENISE MORGAN; DEBORAH WEBER; and
ENRIQUE YBARRA, JR.,
Petitioners,

And
JOHN(JACK)BURLILE; 'H-HOOK,LLC, an
Idaho limited liablilty company;
CLIFFORD MORGAN and MARY MORGAN;
THOMAS PENCE; IRENE ROLAND; TOM
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; JAMES
UNDERWOOD, JR. ; and JEFFERY WEBER,
Petitioners-Appellants,
-vsBOARD OF PAYETTE COMMISSIONERS
OF PAYETTE COUNTY,
Respondent,
and
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC.,
Applicant/Intervenor.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-1

I, Betty J. Dressen, Clerk of the District Court of the
rd Judicial
strict of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Payette do hereby certify that I have personally served
or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of
the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the
parties or their Attorney of Record as follows:
STEPHEN BRADBURY
Petitioners

ANNE MARIE KELSO
Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for:
Appellants

Idaho 83E,
Attorney for:
Respondent

JOANN BUTLER
Attorney for Intervenor
251 E Front St. Ste 200
Boise ID 83702
Attorney for:
Intervenor
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date
of service of the appeal record to file any objections, together
with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court.
If no
objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be
filed with the Supreme Court.
If there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), I will
serve the record, and any transcript, upon the parties upon
receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order stating
which party shall be served.
If no stipulation or order is filed
in seven (7) days, I will serve the party whose name appears
first in the case title.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said Court at Payette Idaho, this ~ day of
1
lAl)f: , 2 0

/-4 v½3

B.

Betty J. Dressen
Clerk
t
strict Court
By_'f-.-.y__.9,,""IZl'-~~-,----

1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-~

